The QUARTERLY JOURNAL *of* SPEECH

Vol. XLV · DECEMBER 1959 · No. 4

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VOLUME XLV DECEMBER 1959 NUMBER 4

THE CONFUCIAN RHETORICAL TRADITION IN KOREA DURING THE YI DYNASTY (1392-1910)

Robert T. Oliver

RHETORIC, so Aristotle taught us, is a way of thinking.[1] Rather than having a special subject matter of its own, it is "the faculty of discovering in the particular case all the available means of persuasion." Moreover, "this art has to do with matters that may turn out in more than one way." Hence, its concern is with probabilities rather than with certainties. The end to be sought is the influencing of an audience.

Rhetoric is the art of achieving an adjustment, or of establishing a relationship, between the subject matter and the auditor—with the nature of that relationship to be determined in accordance with the purpose of the speaker. According to Aristotle, the purpose of the speaker is limited by two factors beyond his control: (1) truth and justice, which it is his duty to maintain; and (2) the emotional nature of auditors, which requires the speaker to utilize emotion and his own ethos as supplements to the "essence of persuasion," which properly consists of arguments and proofs. Thus the speaker tries at once to accomplish (a) what he most desires, (b) what the facts prescribe, and (c) what the audience is capable of receiving.

Through the influence of Aristotle (supported in essence by the democratic philosophy of John Locke), this is the foundation of persuasion as it has been known and advocated in the Anglo-American and Western European communities. It is basic to our democracy, for it presumes a society in which honest inquiry will lead to debate, by means of which questions of fact and policy will be decided ultimately by decision of the majority. Truth and justice will triumph—if adequately championed; but minds "warped by emotion" will accept whatever probability is made to appear most appealing to them.

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[1] My two-paragraph summation of Aristotle's theory is drawn from Chapters 1 and 2 of Book I of the *Rhetoric*, with my own judgment reinforced by the commentary of Lane Cooper, in *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (New York, 1932).

1.

In our new world ushered in by amazing developments of communication and transportation, it becomes important to us in America and Europe to determine whether this rhetoric that depicts (and shapes) our own mode of conducting our communal affairs is universal; or whether it may be that we must now deal intimately with segments of the world population that are accustomed to reason in different fashions. The need for analysis of differing rhetorics deeply rooted in other cultures is not academic but urgently practical.

What are the ends sought, and by what means, in the rhetoric of Marxian Communism?[2] What in the rhetoric of India?[3] What in Latin America?[4] What among the vast populations nurtured on Confucianism?[5] A whole new body of scholarly inquiry is needed; and the equipment for undertaking it must be the product of slow growth.

In this paper it is my intention to offer some guides to the subject of rhetoric as practiced in the vast civilization built upon the precepts of Confucius.[6] The specific topic is the rhetorical implications of the divergent schools of Confucianism that developed during the Yi dynasty in Korea (1392-1910). My linguistic limitations are such that I should gladly leave the subject to others if it were being studied by others;[7] but I am deeply indebted to the Confucian analyses made by Gregory Henderson, cultural attache of the American Embassy in Seoul, and his collaborator, Key P. Yang,[8] and by the scholarly former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Pyun Yung Tae, who has made a new translation (as yet unpublished) of the *Analects* of Confucius. I have also had the opportunity of hearing many Korean speakers, both in English and in Korean, in many kinds of audience situations.[9]

Delight in and frequent practice of argumentation has for centuries been even more strongly characteristic of the Confucian East[10] than even of the Aristotelian-Lockian West. But there has been an essential difference. Whereas the West has developed its rhetoric to deal with "popular audiences . . . un-

[2] This question has been opened (barely) in my commentary on Communist rhetoric, *QJS*, XLII (December 1956), 421-423; "The Rhetoric of Power in International Conferences," *QJS*, XL (October 1954), 288-292; "The Top Communist Weapon—the Spoken Word," *Vital Speeches*, XXI (May 1955), 1200-1203. See also James G. Powell, *A Descriptive Analysis of the Communist Theory of International Negotiations . . .*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1956.

[3] Cf. Solomon Simonson, "Four Modes of Interpretation," *Review of Religion* (May 1945), 339-345; and "The Categories of Proof in Indian Logic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VI (March 1946), 400-409.

[4] Cf. Mario Lins, "Logico-Semantical Forms of Philosophical Inquiry," *Archivio Di Filosofia*, III (1955), 1-35; and "Functionalization of the New Logico-Conceptual Forms," paper presented at Second Brazilian Congress of Philosophy, Curitiba, September 20-26, 1953, privately printed, *Jornal Do Commercio* (Rio de Janiero, 1953).

[5] Cf. my "An Ancient Korean Answer to a Modern Paradox," *New Outlook* (November 1956), 25-28; and "Psychological Warfare in Korea: Old and New," *United Asia*, VIII (April 1957), 387-389.

[6] Because all scholarship in Northeast Asia was conducted in Chinese ideograms, there is a strong communal relationship among the Confucian sects of China, Korea, and Japan.

[7] The glimmer of promise indicated by James J. Crump and John J. Dreher's "Peripatetic Rhetors of the Warring Kingdoms," *Central States Speech Journal*, II (March 1951), 15-17, seems not to have been followed up.

[8] Yang and Henderson, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism: Part II: The Schools of Yi Confucianism," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVIII (February 1959), 259-276.

[9] Cf. my *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York, 1954); and S. M. Vinocour, *Syngman Rhee: Spokesman for Korea . . .*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1953.

[10] Charles H. Parker, *Dog Eats Moon* (Pittsfield, Mass., 1950), p. 65; "The Chinese are preeminently one of the reasoning peoples of the world. They like to think, and because they like to think, they like to talk. . . . The Chinese like to discuss things; they like to put their ideas down in the form of Confucian dialogues."

trained in rigorous thinking," to cite Cooper's interpretation of Aristotle, the Confucian concern has been with the mode of argumentation suited for scholars highly trained in a common background of learning.[11] The West has been chiefly concerned (except during the Medieval period) with persuasion devoted to practical problems arising in courts of law, legislatures, and community affairs; the Confucian East, on the contrary, has constructed an art of persuasion primarily aimed at abstract definitions of philosophical terms and principles. Nevertheless, the attainment of persuasive skill has been regarded no less highly in the Orient than in the Occident. Indeed, while our society offers many ways of advancement, in the Confucian civilization the only avenue to either political or scholarly attainment was for many centuries success in a carefully prescribed mode of argumentation and analytic review.

The East, of course, has changed and is still rapidly changing. Its current practice is to seek to meet the West on our own chosen ground, with our own methods—for only thus can it hope to win its own share of scientific, technological, and political progress. Still, habits of thought that have been carefully nurtured for centuries do not easily change. There is still a great need for us (if we are to understand the East) to delve into its traditional modes of thinking. Even from our own Aristotelian base, we are charged with the necessity of adjusting our case to the nature of the audience; and our Eastern audience cannot help reacting in fundamental ways that are implanted in its own cultural heritage. Thus, both to understand what the Confucian East says to us, and to be able to speak meaningfullly to it, we are required to attain the best insight we can into Confucian rhetoric.

[11] So far as I have found, the first discussion of Confucian rhetoric appeared in the Jesuit priest, P. J. B. Du Halde's *A Description of the Empire of China and Chinese-Tartary, together with the Kingdoms of Korea and Tibet* . . . translated anonymously (London, Vol. I, 1738; Vol. II, 1741). In addition to discussing the Chinese vocabulary (the largest in the world) and education, with specific attention to rhetoric, he also presents some score of "model discourses."

2.

Aristotle identified four uses of rhetoric: (1) to maintain truth and justice; (2) to deal with popular audiences; (3) to provide a means of seeing both sides of a controversial question; and (4) to defend ourselves. The first use links rhetoric to dialectic; the third and fourth are practical arms of ethics; and the second is the core of his rhetorical theorizing.

Confucian rhetoric, on the contrary, is concerned almost exclusively with the first of the uses Aristotle indicated. Like Marxian dialectic (however unlike the two are in most essential respects), Confucianism assumes that truth and justice exist; since they exist, they can be identified; hence the purpose of dialectic is to discover truth and justice, and the purpose of rhetoric is to win their acceptance by the auditor.

Confucius was essentially unlike Marx in this vital respect: he did not believe that he had attained to an understanding of what truth and justice inevitably are. He did, however, feel that truth and justice are wholly removed from expediency; that they are not to be subordinated to popular demand; and that the purpose of inquiry and argument is not merely to influence auditors but specifically to influence them to accept

what is eternally right.[12] To lose an argument, in his view, is not a matter for great concern, for there is always time and opportunity for further study and meditation as a basis for renewing the effort. But to win an argument by the wrong means, or to argue for wrong ends, would be a denial of the very heart of his rhetorical principles.

Our concern, however, is not with Confucius himself—whose words and conduct were aimed not at prescribing truth and justice, nor even with defining specific modes for identifying them, but at stimulating thought aimed toward these goals. Our subject is the deviant schools of Confucianism that achieved a vigorous growth during the dynamic and liberal years of the first several generations of the Korean Yi dynasty. We shall examine the School of Li, the School of Rites, the School of Wang, the Legalist School, and the later Sirhok School. Despite their basic similarities, they illustrate the wide range of diversity which is characteristic of Oriental life and thought.

3.

The School of Li (or I) attained a dominant position with the advent of the Yi dynasty, in 1392, for to it was assigned control over the annual examinations which dominated most study because they were the only route to political preferment.

For all Confucianism, and surely for the School of Li, the primary rhetorical concern was with *inventio*. What should a man believe? From the great body of truth, how can we find a centrality of meaning, and what elements of meaning can we select to use in affecting conduct? What are the *topics* that should and must be dealt with? To put the matter very simply, the Li School of Confucianism disagreed with the Aristotelian philosophy of seeking "all available means" by which the auditor can be induced to accept the speaker's proposition; instead, it conformed more closely to what Plato in the *Phaedrus* called *psychagogy:* "the turning of men's souls toward truth."[13]

Whereas Confucianism had come in China (during the age of Sung and under the influence of Chu Hsi) to concern itself primarily with social doctrine, the Li School sought to base its rhetoric upon moral authority within a framework of universals. Underlying its philosophy was the Supreme Ultimate, something like Aristotle's "first cause." This basic moral law of nature expressed itself through five elements: (1) benevolence, which partakes of the nature of wood and spring; (2) righteousness, which resembles metal and summer; (3) propriety, which is akin to fire and autumn; (4) wisdom, which has attributes of fire and winter; and (5) dedication (or loyalty) which reflects all nature.

From this beginning, the School of Li (also called the School of Moral Law) deduced that man's first requirement is to achieve virtue by practicing self-control, and that he can do this only as he increases his knowledge. In Platonic terms, to know is to be good. The question of what is to be known was answered, "That which has been known by

[12] The living influence of Confucian rhetoric, as here summarized, seems to me to be evident in the thinking and speaking of President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea —who, when told that his views are unpopular, will retort sharply that he is "not engaged in a popularity contest," and whose chief criticism of adverse policies is that they are "expedient" rather than addressed to basic principles of right and wrong.

[13] Cf. Whitney J. Oates, "Classic Theories of Communication," *The Communication of Ideas*, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York, 1948), 27-36.

the sages." In other words, reflection would lead the individual thinker not to new and original conclusions, but to conformity with the truths revealed by the classics. The school, then, discouraged both practicality, or concern with contemporary problems, and individuality. Its tenets were subordination of the mind and spirit to official doctrine and centralized rule. Like the 18th century English neo-classicists, its concern was with seeing clearly and saying well "What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed."

This aim did not discourage analysis, but it turned the analytic inquiry away from concrete problems or situations and toward abstract terms. The proper topics of inquiry were defined in the "Four-Seven Thesis"—which dealt not with the facts of nature but with the origin and characteristics of human motivation. In a rough paraphrase, the idea was not to subdue facts and divert them to human use, but to reshape thought and conduct to make them conform to facts.

The four principles from which right conduct arises were thought to be: (1) charity, (2) duty to neighbors, (3) propriety, and (4) wisdom. Opposing these principles of right conduct were the seven passions: joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire.

Within this school there developed a centuries-long argument between the dualists, led by Hwadam[14] (1489-1546) and T'oege (1501-70), who argued that nature and moral law are different, so that the four principles and the seven passions are in eternal conflict, and the monistic position of Yulgok (1536-84), who insisted that the principles tending toward right and the passions tending toward error are only differing manifestations of the same invariant force.

Yulgok, then, developed a rhetorical theory that sanctioned appeals to any or all of the seven passions as means of leading the auditor to live in accordance with the four principles. In this he resembled Aristotle, who regretted that men are emotional, but felt that since they are, we must adapt our persuasive means accordingly. Yulgok's principal opponent was a scholar named Kobong (1527-72), who insisted that the principles and the passions are in direct antagonism to one another; so that the only proper mode of argumentation is to try to lead the auditor away from so much as awareness of existence within himself of the seven passions. Yulgok was a student not of Confucius alone but also of Buddhism, and his monistic position surely derived in part from his extensive study of the Buddhist *sutra*, or collection of readings.

In our view the entire controversy may seem unreal, for it was carefully safeguarded from the contamination of the practical realities of everyday life. Abstraction was the only plane on which the argumentation could be conducted. But the School of Li's theorizing involved an essential inquiry into the nature of man and the means by which human conduct may properly be influenced. It was a rhetoric that for centuries had a decisive influence on the modes of thinking of the scholastic and political community in Korea.

4.

The School of Rites conformed very closely to the social doctrine advocated

[14] In citing the Korean scholars, I sometimes use their baptismal names and sometimes the pseudonyms (which all Korean scholars have affected), depending in part upon typographical convenience. Access to the works of these men can be found through use of *The Korean Studies Guide*, compiled by B. H. Hazard, Jr., *et al.* (Berkeley, California, 1954).

by the Chinese Chu Hsi Confucianists. Founded by Kim Chang-saeng (1548-1631), who was known as the Sage and who was a follower of Yulgok, it was carried on by his son, Kim Chip (1574-1656) and by Pak Se-ch'ae (1631-95) and Song Chun-gil (1606-72). The teaching of this school was the rigid adherence to a formalized set of rites or ceremonial patterns of behavior. In this sense, its concern was less with *inventio* than with *memoria* and *pronunciatio*.[15] The theory of the Sage and his followers was that truth is ultimately unknowable; but that human conduct cannot go far astray if it adheres to manners that have proved efficacious through long centuries of experience.

In the teachings of this school, then, the emphasis was all upon precedent, protocol, ritual, ceremony—with precise rules governing costume, language, music, art, and such activities as eating, drinking, working, fighting, and conducting disputations. Whether the immediate concern was trying a case in court[16] or conducting foreign policy, whether settling a dispute over the use of an irrigation ditch or deciding on the education of children, the important consideration was less the facts of the matter than the proper mode of procedure.

Within the family, since Confucius had once observed that one should be silent while eating, for centuries Korean meals have typically been eaten in silence. Children's relations with their parents, and the husband's with his wife, are governed by strict ceremonialism (in marked contrast with the quarrelsomeness of many American homes). In public life, the policies a man advocates or the depth of his understanding of issues was of less importance than whether he comported himself with propriety and in accordance with custom.[17] Argument flourished over such matters as what was the right decorum to be observed in given circumstances. In all matters of thought and behavior, form was of far more importance than matter. On such questions factions arose and energy was dissipated. Even today the five rules of the Confucian *Li* are of genuine (if passing) concern.

These five rules concern the relationship of subjects to ruler, of wife to husband, of children to parents, of neighbor to neighbor, and of friend to friend. Sons, for example, whatever their age, do not smoke in the presence of their fathers. Even the smallest matters are governed by form. If, for instance, two strangers should simultaneously step up to a drinking fountain, one of them would politely offer the other the chance for a first drink; the second would decline; whereupon, the first would touch his lips lightly to the water, then step back to await his chance when the other had finished. We may feel that such detailed ritual is artificial. But in effect

[15] For a description of the prescribed forms of behavior, see Du Halde, I, 278-294 and *passim*. He cites the Confucian book, *Rules of Civility*, which contains "above three thousand" carefully prescribed modes of action—rules that are observed "no less in the villages than in the cities." He concludes, "It is a Task to learn them, and a Science to be a Master of them; but they are brought up to them from Infancy, so that, however irksome they may prove at first, they at length become natural to them" (I, 292). He also notes wryly, "It is a difficult Matter for a Stranger to conform himself to their Notion of Politeness and Civility" (I, 278).

[16] Koreans, far less than many Chinese, have been accustomed to take their problems to the courts. See Du Halde, who observed of the Chinese, "In some Districts the People are so very litigious, that they mortgage their Lands, House, and Goods, and all that they have, for the Pleasure of going to Law" (I, 279).

[17] See Owen Wister's famous remark in *The Virginian:* "When you say that, smile"; and also note our concern, in large organizations, with "going through channels." Our difference with the Confucianists would seem to be one of degree, not of kind.

it established a dependable code of acceptable conduct, thereby eliminating a vast number of disagreements, preventing hurt feelings, and providing a medium through which differences of opinion would be resolved with equal satisfaction to both parties.

5.

The Wang School was founded by a Chinese scholar, Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528), and had wide influence in China, Korea, and Japan. It diverged from the Chu Hsi interpretation of Confucianism most basically by incorporating into it the monistic philosophy of Taoism. To Chu Hsi, primordial matter was one thing and the moral laws of the universe are separate from it. He believed that in order to understand what is true and just it is impossible to gain individual insight through experience and that individuals must, accordingly, study the classics and adhere to their conclusions.

Wang, on the contrary, believed that nature and nature's laws are one and indissoluble. This being so, man is, necessarily, a part of the oneness of nature. Being a part of the whole, an individual can gain access to the nature of truth through personal experience, which gives rise to insight.[18] The problem for an individual, he thought, is so to discipline himself that he will be attentive solely to relevancies, avoiding all distractions. This view led naturally to an austerity of life that is somewhat akin to the rigors of present-day Zen Buddhism.

Believing in the power of individual insight, Wang, of course, had little interest in either the elaborate ceremonialism of the School of Rites or the examination of the four principles and the seven passions that dominated the School of Li. His emphasis upon individualism led to the development of his following in areas remote from the Court, in the country districts. This fact, in turn, strengthened the tendencies of the school to ignore scholasticism (if only because libraries were not at hand) and to depend more and more upon analysis of individual experience.

The chief Korean disciple of Wang was Hagok (1647-1736), leader of the *Soron* faction, which had lost favor and been exiled from the Court. Forced to operate in the provinces, this rhetorical tradition became more concerned with practical problems, with analysis of facts, and with the persuasion of the auditor through appeal to his emotions. In this sense, it was closer than were the other schools to our own Aristotelian-Lockian rhetoric; and it undoubtedly exercised influence in the development of Korea's extensive system of village democracy. However, existing apart from centers of learning, its tenets have not been developed very fully in print —or at least few such writings have as yet been discovered.

6.

Similar to the Wang School in basic respects—but different from it in that it accommodated itself for a significant period within the Korean Court—was the Legalist School, which was founded by Cho Kwang-jo (1482-1519), who was a minister to King Chung-jong, and who was later canonized as one of the fourteen sages of the Yi dynasty. His most influential disciples were two brothers active in judicial and police administration, Kim An-guk (1478-1543) and Kim Chong-guk (1485-1541). All

[18] Note the resemblance to the views of Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose rhetorical principles have been analyzed in *Today's Speech* by Frank Mansuy, IV (April 1956), 6-9; and by William S. Tacey, VI (September 1958), 23-27.

three of these high officials were more concerned with reforming administration than they were in protecting the privileges of their class.

The central doctrine of the Legalist School was the need to clarify and codify the operations of the law in order to reduce the effects of favoritism and inefficiency. This school turned in distaste from the abstractions of terminological disputation, and sought to spell out regulations that would operate realistically in dealing with practical problems. New codes of punishment and penalties were adopted, and new rules of conduct were promulgated, not in terms of ancient ritual, but in conformity with actual conditions of every-day life.

With a view to reduce the evils of centralization of government and absentee rule, the founders of the Legalist School regularized the five-fold rules of conduct of the Confucian *Li* into a "village contract." To enforce this code—which became a kind of common law—the local scholars, or *Yangbans,* were elevated to positions of authority. Numerous guilds were also founded to provide a vehicle for self-government. Moreover, a system of secret inspection, by anonymous agents from the Court, was instituted to insure the just operation of the local governments. In connection with this new emphasis upon localism, schools and Confucian shrines were established in many localities.

The rhetorical influence of the Legalist School lay in its appeal from individual autocracy and from the traditionalism of a dead past to the defined codes of current law that were newly provided. Concurrently, the attention of scholars and administrators was turned from classical scholarship to immediate problems. Although the Legalists were finally driven from the Court by factional opposition, and Cho Kwang-jo was beheaded, the movement marked the beginning of genuine rural autonomy in Korea and provided an impetus of realism that ever since has been more strongly marked in Confucian rhetoric.

7.

The Sirhok School was the latest to develop and also the most original and independent of all the Korean modifications of Chinese Confucianism. Its founder was Pange (1622-73), author of the scholarly historic work, *Pange surok.* Pange was concerned with the fact that the great Ming dynasty in China had been overthrown by the much smaller Manchu faction. He was also troubled by the tragedies accompanying the invasion of Korea by the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi, in 1592-98, and again by the Manchus in 1627 and in 1636-37. Something, he felt, must be amiss with the mode of government; and he tried to discover what.

If the governments of China and Korea were effective, he felt, they could better have defended themselves. Their weaknesses, he concluded, arose from factionalism, rigidity of class distinctions, ultranationalism, isolationism, traditionalism, ritualism, and lack of concern for socio-economic problems. In other words, the traditionalism and abstraction of the old rhetorics had not provided suitable means for maintaining the welfare of the realm. The very process he engaged in (of seeking to determine what was wrong by examination of the facts, rather than by reference to abstractions and traditional scholasticism) ushered in a new rhetorical era.

Following Pange, other scholars such as Kim Yuk (1580-1658), Yi Su-gwang (1563-1629), Yi Ik (1682-1764), An

Chong-bok (1712-91), and Hong Tae-yong (1731-83) developed a new pragmatic tradition of inquiry into the nature of social and individual life in Korea, with criticism of past policies and recommendations of new courses of action. One factor of significance is that two of Pange's disciples were considerably older than he, which indicates the extent to which they transcended the old subservience of youth to age.

As one fruit of this new tradition, Chong Yak-yong (1762-1836) undertook a long and scholarly criticism of the works of Confucius, pointing out weaknesses and shortcomings in the Confucian treatises on economics, politics, medicine, phonetics, geography, and poetry. As a practicing engineer, Chong built great fortifications (still standing) at Suwon, twenty miles south of Seoul; and he fought for administrative reforms in the government. When he was finally cast out of office, he devoted himself to writings critical of the Yi dynasty administration, in which he suggested specific reforms. His example helped establish the cabinet form of government, in which the several ministers argued out the policies to be jointly determined.

Another of the Sirhok scholars, Pak Che-ga (1750-1805), wrote a treatise on *Learning from the North*, in which he opposed the isolationism of the Korean Hermit Kingdom, and advocated the importation of foreign ideas of education. A Sirhok novelist, Pak Chi-won (1737-1805), wrote a long novel dealing with social injustice. Unfortunately for Korea, the Sirhok School became involved in the political struggles revolving about the efforts of a great political leader, Taewan-gun, to prevent the Westernization of Korea; and after 1820 its influence waned. Even so, it had succeeded in injecting a whole new spirit of realistic practicality which prepared the way for the modern age.

8.

Since rhetoric, as Aristotle indicated, deals with the mode of thinking rather than with subject matter of its own, it is inevitably a product of (as well as a formative influence upon) the whole structure of a society. We could not understand Plato and Aristotle except in the context of our Western civilization. Similarly, it is impossible to delineate the rhetorical trends of the East (or of Confucian influences in Korea) except by the interweaving of philosophy with politics, of sociology and economics with psychology. Obviously, the subject is far too broad to permit more than a brief introduction in a single article.[19]

As an example of the complexities, while the scheme of this paper has kept us to a sequential consideration of the major schools of Korean Confucianism, there was outside this scholarly tradition a concurrent rhetorical influence of major proportion. This was the invention and promulgation, in 1446, by King Se-jong, of a new phonetic alphabet.[20]

King Se-jong was a learned and liberal ruler who helped create in Korea an era much resembling that of Elizabethan England, at least in its liberalizing dynamism. He established four

[19] Readers who may wish to look further into the complexity of these factors may consult my books: *Korea: Forgotten Nation* (Washington, 1944); *Why War Came in Korea* (New York, 1950); *Verdict in Korea* (State College, Pa., 1952); and *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York, 1954).

[20] Homer B. Hulbert, whose *History of Korea* (2 vols., Seoul, 1905) is the best in English (despite grave defects of scholarship), wrote, "This alphabet scarcely has its equal in the world for simplicity and strength of phonetic power" (I, 307).

colleges in the four corners of the kingdom, sponsored invention, discouraged traditionalism, and encouraged the spirit of free inquiry. Partly because of these aims, he sought to free the people of Korea from the incubus of the Chinese system of ideograms, which because of their difficulty imposed illiteracy on the masses and because of their lack of precision imposed the habit of abstract generalization upon the educated class.

With the help of two scholars, King Se-jong devised a new native alphabet composed on phonetic principles of 17 consonants and 11 vowels. In promulgating it, the King said: "Our national language differs from Chinese and has no affinity with written Chinese. Therefore, what our people wish to say cannot be said in the Chinese manner. And so, having compassion upon our people in this deplorable situation, we have devised a new writing of twenty-eight characters, so that our people may readily learn it and use it in their daily affairs."[21] The effectiveness of this *han-gul* alphabet, as it is now known, is demonstrated by the fact that the present-day Korean nation has achieved a literacy rate of some 95 per cent—one of the most favorable in the world.

When King Se-jong developed his alphabet, however, he found it opposed by the entire scholarly community—which, even to an absolute monarch, was no mean barrier. For two years he delayed its promulgation while he sought to win its acceptance by the scholars. Finally, over-riding their objections, he proclaimed that this alphabet should henceforth be the official mode of writing in the kingdom. His ukase, however, was largely ignored. To fifteenth-century Koreans the use of Chinese ideograms was as much identified with scholarship as was the use of Latin in medieval Europe. The works of Confucius were in Chinese; how could they be studied without that language, and of what did scholarship consist if not of the Confucian classics? The entire educational community was so solidly of this view that the *han-gul* was largely rejected. Had it been accepted, its very divorce from Confucian scholarship would undoubtedly have encouraged more concentration upon the practical problems of every-day life.

However, the alphabet did not perish. Banished from the schools, it was gladly received in the villages. Considered unworthy by scholars, it was quickly taken up by the chief social group that could not aspire to scholarship—the women. The *han-gul* became, then, the vehicle for the writing and publishing of folk-tales which could be retold to children, and secondarily for that large class of reading material which would appeal to women of small education. Thus the *han-gul* survived, infused with the idiom of the villages, until late in the 19th century, when it proved its efficacy in mass education.

Today, not only is the *han-gul* the alphabet of Korea (supplemented by 1,000 Chinese characters), but the spirit of inquiry into practical matters is also the dominant educative force. Oratorical contests on issues of the day flourish in all districts, culminating in national meets. Debating is a regular part of the school activities. Public speaking is even more widely practiced than in our own country. Appeal to the facts of the case and to the emotions of the audience are taken for granted as the most effective modes of arguing. In all this, the influence of Aristotle may be thought to have immersed the older Confucian rhetoric.

[21] Cited in Hazard, p. 146. In 1933 the *han-gul* was recast in its present form of 14 consonants and 10 vowels.

Nevertheless, although Koreans conduct their speech-making somewhat as we do ours, there remain significant differences that reveal the lasting influence of the old rhetorical theories. Decorum, propriety, and ritual are highly regarded. Audiences, if not speakers, remain largely impassive and unexpressive. Speech style tends toward the abstract. Even athletic contests are never started until after a suitable (and lengthy) opening ritualistic ceremony, in which the right persons are expected to say the right things in the right way. Arguments may become heated and feelings may be hurt—because some speaker, influenced by his Westernized education, pushes his argument beyond the bounds of propriety, or addresses his opponent without due regard for ceremonial politeness. Even in the conduct of its foreign affairs, the Republic of Korea is perhaps more influenced than we are by the form in which negotiations are conducted—not an insignificant question, especially when its dealings are with another Oriental nation; for still among the countries of the East, form, ritual, precedence, protocol, and ceremony constitute a language in which insults may be exchanged or respect demonstrated, to a degree that makes the "form" become in actuality a part of the "matter" that is being discussed.

* * *

SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE RHETORICAL CONTINUUM

Earl W. Wiley

Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much argument, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making.—JOHN MILTON

THIS paper deals with the kind of knowledge that is basic to effective public address. What is the source and nature of such knowledge? The question is old and explosive. Socrates raised it in the Agora and on it predicated a separation of "tongue" and "brain" that exists to this day. Astronomy, posed Plato, deals with the motions of the heavenly bodies and their relative velocity in space; and arithmetic deals with the properties of odd and even numbers; with what then, he continued as a clincher, does the public speaker deal? Cicero sought to reconcile the differences between thinker and speaker in his *De Oratore*, but the schoolmen of the Middle Ages kept the issue alive. Twenty-five years ago the quandary flared at The Ohio State University when a Department of Speech was proposed. "What," queried one skeptic, "is your corpus of knowledge?"

One result of this perennial challenge has been to give public address an hostile press. In our halls of education, Plato's blast continues to rumble, and Rhetoric has become the Peck's Bad Boy of the schoolroom, crowned with a dunce cap and hunched over on a stool in the corner, while scholars of the learned disciplines tiptoe by with averted eyes and sanctimonious looks. Recently off the press is an engrossing book titled *The Greek Experience*, by Sir Maurice Bowra, that treats the Hellenic orators and rhetoricians with a thunderclap of silence. Some vested-rights educators arrogate Rhetoric to the bargain basement of pedagogical knacks and quacks, and others pronounce oratory and debate as dirty words.

To escape this torment, our speech associates through the years have resorted to devious devices. Some cohabited with the Sophists and became declaimers. Some followed Ramus and became stylists. Others took Del Sarte to heart and became elocutionists, and others, who sought surcease in logic, came out with the debater's brief. Others took sanctuary in pyschology and learned how to make friends and influence people. Some foreswore controversy and took up with "togetherness" in discussion. Others went to the clinic and came out as therapists, while some abandoned the speech field altogether for more erudite studies. The rank-and-file of our profession, however, has steadfastly followed in the giant footsteps of Plato, Quintilian, and Whately, and, with qualifications that we shall later mention, like them assumed *all* knowledge as their rightful area of coverage.

Mr. Wiley (M.A., Ohio State, 1917) is Member Emeritus of the SAA and Professor of Speech (retired) at The Ohio State University. He has contributed liberally of his scholarship and philosophy to the pages of this journal. In this new essay he touches with good nature and historical sweep a problem whose longevity has become a commonplace.

Nonetheless, the generic character of public address content remains suspect to this day. That we may understand our professional perplexity the more clearly let us view it in terms of history. To this end, we go back to a cycle in time when the spoken word served mankind as the sole arbiter of verbal communication. This Golden Age of the oral continuum marked a civilization unhampered by the fixations of writing, since our alphabet had not yet been invented. Lacking an alphabet, it lacked a literary prose. Lacking a literary prose, it lacked a stockpile of special knowledge as we find it classified and catalogued in modern departments of learning.

Denied a fund of unitive knowledge, the Man of Words of that era premised his harangues, not on the verifiables of scholarship but on the variables of myth and folklore, of ceremonials and customs, of tradition and ritual. That is to say, a man's word was his bond in those bookless days, a village his universe, opinion the badge of his calling, and sensory experience the base of his conclusions. Patently, he was unrestricted in choice of subject matter, like the great Phoenix in Homer, who taught Achilles both effective speech and the liberal arts; or like Hippias of Elis, or Gorgias of Leontini, or the Sophists, themselves, who boasted competence in all areas of knowledge.

Exhortations produced in a soil of this kind, described as *ethical* and *pathetic* in classical terminology, lack the factual substance and objectivity of *logos*. Not that the Man of Words of the Age of Agamemnon, let us say, failed to reason in his discourse. Actually, he invented the rhetorical syllogism, the enthymeme (*ratio cognoscendi*) postulated on signs and probabilities and interlaced with the conventional behavior pattern of his community. Conditioned to fable, he escaped the exactions of critical reasoning; consequently, he was earthy in his oral strategy, as spurious, as arrogant, as whimsical, as pious, as threatening, as gracious, as coy, as expediency required of him at the momment. He dwelt in an orbit of "unmediated and non-necessary" subject matter, unconcerned with demonstrable concepts premised on reliability of source and consistency of context. Unappreciative of genuine knowledge and the simple enthymeme (*ratio essendi*) deduced from it, he ignored the disparities between the contingent concept and the non-contingent concept with a light heart; and he by-passed universals in keeping with the limitations of his provincialism.

It does not follow from this that the Man of Words of the Bronze Age lacked effectiveness in speech; for the function of elemental eloquence is not to instruct, nor to persuade, but to transport an audience into a state of wonder and pleasure untouched by the intellect. Gorgias understood this. He recognized no inevitable sequence between truth and effectiveness; and he discerned that hosannas and gobbledygook may charm the ear and storm the auditor's heart like truth itself. A typical commercial on your television screen illustrates his point.

It is well to remind ourselves at this point that a phonetic culture produced the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and that these classics reflect the refinements of perceptive and sensitive interpreters dedicated to the haunting beauties of the living word. In Homer we find arena oratory at its exciting best, the doric simplicity of Menelaus, the pathos of Nestor, the vehemence of Ulysses. Listening parliaments have thrilled to the pleas of statesmen modeling their efforts after these ancient lords who fought for

fair Helen at Troy, or, as seems more likely in today's perspective, to open the trade routes to Greek shipping. Homer became the Athenian schoolboy's anthologist; he became the classical rhetorician's source book of precepts we find embodied in modern treatises on Rhetoric. Homer symbolized the genius of an oral chronology that processed the vernacular oratory of the battlefield into the polished grandiloquence of epic poetry.

Nor was this all. A phonetic culture produced the world's most eloquent forum in the dialectic of Socrates, achieved eminence in the oratory of Pericles, and laid the foundation of a world theatre in the works of gifted dramatists, as the satire of Aristophanes, for example, underwrote the scores of Gilbert and Sullivan. It inspired Western civilization to assume world leadership in spiritual behavior, taught men the folkways of democracy, and revealed to mankind the sovereignty of the spoken word and common opinion in daily affairs. Epitomizing the oral dynasty at its proudest hour was Phedippides, the sure-footed courier, who, with his dying breath delivered the incredible message of Greek victory at Marathon (490 B.C.) to the anxious citizens in Athens.

Calmly evaluated, these achievements of an oral era scarcely justify the criticism that speeches posited on opinion and common knowledge lead only to the mouthings of demagogues and the sophistries of Throttlebottoms. These products of a phonetic culture memorialize a millennium that cultivated the memory powers of its people, encouraged the art of listening, nourished the imagination of its children, and demonstrated the worth of experience, and tradition, and intuitive knowledge, in the oral process. Said Aristotle in his *Rhetoric,* pinpointing the persuasive content of an auricular culture, "the speaker must frame his proofs and arguments with the help of common knowledge and accepted opinion."

Yet, thoughtful auditors naturally recoil from any pronouncement that lacks validity and reason. Man's instinct for basic values makes one and all of us restive and alert, and in the spirit of truth a fact-finder appeared in some unidentified Shrangri-la to pace his fellows to higher intellectual levels. His labors represented a direct attack on the superstitions of myth and fable. This resulted in a bold challenge to the leadership of poet and cleric and Man of Words. The authority of the gods on Olympus swayed precariously as liberal-minded men rejected the integrity of the Initiations, long shrouded in fogs of fakery. A votary to the Delphic Oracle, for example, after being immersed in holy water, sacrificed an animal to Apollo, and then waited to be inducted into a hallowed grotto. He there submitted his query to a priestess of Apollo, who, the better to answer it, sometimes chewed laurel or bay leaves. She sometimes went into convulsions and agonized in weird gibberish, while an accomplice transcribed her mumblings, sometimes into verse.

While proponents of the new rationale jeered at performances of this kind, factual-minded men sought to discover the nature of things around them, to learn the secrets of their history and origin, of their spiritual being. Thales of Miletus (fl. 590 B.C.), for example, identified water as the essence of material things; Anaximines designated air as the primal cause, and Pythagoras conceived of matter in terms of numbers. Xenophanes recognized a unity in God. The new dispensation proceeded apace, sometimes punctuated by snorts

of disgust from the reactionaries, as when Aristophanes, in *The Clouds*, ridiculed Socrates as a zany who could measure the jump of a flea.

The effect of this on Rhetoric was far-reaching. For one thing, a literary prose medium emerged that came as a bonus to the researchers, who found verse an awkward tool with which to tabulate their findings. Among the first to use the new form was Heraclitus, the philosopher, who, injecting a dash of sourness into his prose, proved early in history that if style is the man then *ethos* is his *alter ego*. Herodotus and Thucydides mastered the finesse of narrative prose, and Hippocrates captured the secrets of expository writing. Contributing to the development, however, was the adoption of the Athenian dialect as the vernacular of commerce and trade in the Middle East during the fifth century before Christ.

The deliberate fashioning of an artistic prose idiom suitable for Rhetoric affected the styling of words to this day. The Sicilian team of Corax and Tisias, for example, identified the divisions of a speech as proem, issues, subissues, and epilogue, and predicated argument on the doctrine of General Probabilities. Protagoras recognized language not as a gift from Olympus but as an organic growth of human discourse, and Prodicus pleaded for precision in the choice of words. Gorgias worked out a poetic-prose pattern built on balanced sentences, anthitheses, imaginative metaphors, and purple language. Modifying Gorgias's extravagances, Isocrates improvised a prose format suitable for the glitter of panegyric semantics. Practical orators of Athens like Antiphon, Lysias, and Isaeus, contributed further variations to the effort, and Demosthenes welded the parts into a whole that stands as a monument to his genius. *Elocutio* now took its place among the canons of the coalescing art of Rhetoric.

Possessed of a literary prose medium, scholars now found themselves developing a technology basic to scientific study. Thales, for example, seeking a method of problem-solving unrelated to the variables inherent in *ethos* and *pathos*, used the laws of trigonometry to measure the distances of ships from the shore, or to compute the heights of the pyramids by the lengths of their shadows. The Ionian researcher, seeking to observe the world free of everyday irrelevancies, had, in effect, set up a platform of the mind; and from this over-view he breathed the air of *logos*, a concept suggesting to the Greeks the potency of words, the gift of reason, the weapon sharper than the sword, and the catalyst by which man contacted God.

The new outlook led to startling results. Researchers, in course of compiling their findings into orderly and related sequences, observed that the rudiments of disciplines like physics, history, and mathematics, began to emerge as units of knowledge, each with its own terminology, techniques, and postulates; even the rules of dice fell into a pattern.

These fresh sources of material, more demonstrable, more systematized, more verifiable, than the fictions of the exhorters, began to filter into popular discourse; and, as arguments became more absolute, speaker and auditor found themselves drawn closer together on basic issues, for conclusions deduced from approved sources themselves become approved. Words became more precise, and so more precious, and speech structure became more compact. Something akin to demonstration took form, and, about the time of Parmenides (b. *circa*, 539 B.C.) what became known as

LOGIC began to serve as a criterion for evaluating argument. The Areopagus that abhorred the theatricals of orators as impediments to justice could now breathe easier.

In sum, the spirit of the necessary had penetrated the substance of public address through the facilities of scholarship. This epochal development meant, technically, that the objective concepts of *logos* now vied actively with the subjective concepts of *ethos* and *pathos* for place and position in the context of controversy; and the rhetorical syllogism of the exhorter, postulated on signs and probabilities, and concerned with the responses of human behavior to the spoken word, shared cogency with the non-rhetorical enthymeme of the scholar, postulated on genuine knowledge, and concerned with judgments of the mind: conviction as a non-hortatory genre of persuasion had come into being, and the subject matter of Rhetoric had lost its monolithic character.

This forced the rhetorician into an awkward position. A Man of Words, he must become a Man of Knowledge. Would those trained in the formulation of argument have the effrontery to discuss subjects rightfully belonging to the scholars? So, the issue was drawn, at least among the pedagogues. Plato, continuing where Socrates left off, urged speakers to avail themselves of the new learning and thus to convert the sterile knack of Rhetoric into the art of Psychagogy—the science of winning souls. He condemned the stuff of contemporary oratory as guile and ignorance, in a Jeremiad that revealed in microcosm the eternal struggle between men of thought and men of action.

Aristotle resolved the conflict realistically. Yes, a rhetorician should feel free to draw on special knowledge provided he had mastered the studies making up the arts and sciences. The deliberative speaker, for instance, should acquaint himself with the facts of political science like ways and means, peace and war, national defense, imports and exports, and legislation, and also should know the case histories of democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. Further, treatises on Rhetoric were not the appropriate places to dilate on special knowledge: that was the department of the scholar; already too much material had been mistakenly allocated to Rhetoric. Aristotle then said significantly:

> The more one tries to build up either Dialectic or Rhetoric not as a faculty, but as an exact science, the more will one inadvertently be destroying their nature, in the act of reconstruction, by encroaching upon sciences that deal with its own subject, and do not deal simply with forces of argument.

A glance into modern fields of special knowledge may help to illustrate what Aristotle had in mind. Take the problem of juvenile violence. The Man of Words may think hoodlumism can be curbed by a "get tough" policy. The Man of Knowledge recognizes that each case of juvenile deviation must be considered on its own merits. The Man of Words may think the policy of punishing the parents of offenders would serve as a deterrent to crime. The Man of Knowledge knows psychological disturbances cannot be outlawed. The novice may think a program to keep young people pre-occupied may alleviate their lawless tendencies. The expert knows the case-hardened culprit avoids any form of organized discipline or supervised play. The laity may point to the slums as breeding grounds of delinquency. The specialist has studies to challenge that theory. In a word, the fables of the commoner are matched by the postulates of the specialist, and the precepts of emerging disciplines become the bases

for more progressive methods of administration.

Stubbornly, legend recedes before fact as scholarship breaks the skyline of learning and projects our society into a welter of dividing, and then dividing again, vast areas of opinion into compartments of unified and specialized knowledge, each with its own vocabulary, mechanics, and postulates. This swirling cataclysm has now assumed the dimensions and intensity of a cultural revolution, spearheading man's determination to reject the superstitions of our age as Thales of Miletus rejected those of his generation.

A word from Aristotle comes to mind at this point. He would have approved if Casey Stengel used Euclid's hypothesis that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, in coaching a runner to reach home plate from third base. He would have demurred if Mr. Stengel posed as a geometrician. This is the crux of Aristotle's limitation on the Man of Words' use of learned material. The Stagirite envisioned a point of departure beyond which a speaker may not go, technically, in discussing learned subjects, without losing his identity as a man skilled in persuasion. To overstep this mark, he would speak not as a man skilled in formulating argument, but as a sciolist, treading in the quicksands of knowledge beyond his depth.

Time and circumstance, however, have shattered the barrier that circumscribed Rhetoric as a purely persuasive faculty. Signs of a break-through have appeared through the centuries, accelerated by the scientists of the 17th century, and again by the schoolmen of the 19th century, who partitioned writing into narration, description, exposition, and argumentation; since the works of George Campbell, at least, a methodology of oral exposition has been accumulating. This nascent growth, however, lacks completeness and codification. It now compares unfavorably with the comprehensive speech philosophy authored by the ancients for the faculty of persuasion. Until the mechanics of oral exposition are systematized into an adequate organon, the principles governing persuasion will continue to be distorted for informative speeches.

A comprehensive body of the theory governing entertainment speeches is another urgent need of our field. A statement of the factors of interest, an enumeration of the types of humor, together with illustrative material, can hardly be considered as schematically ample for this genre of public address. If audiences can be made to smile, they can be made to frown; if they can be made to laugh, they can be made to cry. Further, if they can be made to hope, they can be made to despair; if they can be made to hate, they can be made to love; if they can be made fearful, they can be made confident. Somewhere in the oral continuum, rhetoricians have chosen to ignore many of these emotions. The rhetorician of the future should command a place alongside the anthropologist, the economist, the political scientist, the historian, the psychologist, and the others who make up the elite of the world's behaviorial scientists.

The Man of Words, may we say in summary, unlike the Man of Knowledge, lacks a special fund of knowledge essential to his calling; but he is free to borrow for his purpose from the specialists: and his purpose is to influence the behavior of his auditors by the formulation, phrasing, and utterance of ideas. His subject matter is unprescribed and imprescriptible, with one imperative exception. Fundamentally, he deals with common knowledge and public opinion,

and when proficient he becomes a master of the variable and contingent concept. In a bookless society he is the creature of myth and fable derived from his tribal antecedents, and gives an open throttle to the imagination and memory in his exhortations. In Homeric days, he ran interference for an awakening civilization in the West. He created the beauties of the *Iliad*. He fixed the living word as the *sine qua non* of social adjustment and civic progress. Socrates nor Jesus of Nazareth submitted a single line of his ministry to writing.

In a literary culture, on the other hand, the Man of Words while unprescribed in subject matter, enjoys a latitude of choice unknown to his phonetic forebears. He may lift axioms from the mathematicians, fables from Aesop, illustrations from history, quotations from the poets, parables from Holy Writ, maxims from Marcus Aurelius, slogans from statesmen, jests from Joe Miller, statistics from learned papers, paradoxes from Chesterton, cynicisms from Shaw, tall tales from the folkways, postulates from the scientists, and facts from the encyclopedias.

These gleanings the speaker assembles to support his thesis. He touches the expanding theme with sparks of interest in deference to his auditors, fires it with fervor and sincerity in faith with himself, and styles it to his own habits of expression. Basically, he is the technician, the innovator, the improviser, a craftsman who reproduces in greater or less degree the images and creeds of others. In this role he is more the psychologist than the philosopher, more the reporter than the scholar. In a totalitarian state, he does little more than mirror the shadow of his masters.

In a free society, however, he deals with the opinions of citizens foregathered in the public square, in the shadow of the pulpit, in the legislative hall, at the political rally, in the school auditorium, in courts of justice, or in those places where people meet in the spirit of good will and panegyric or in moods of censure and alarm. He need not apologize for lacking a fund of special knowledge in the arts and sciences. The crowd is his source book, and with Milton he believes that every truth has its roots in the opinion of good men. At best, he perceives the universal in the particular and with the inner glow of the prophet sends it on its way.

At worst, the Man of Words takes many shapes. He may pontificate with the emptiness of a street corner medicine man. He may be as venal as Judas. He may call names and evade issues. He may clutter his remarks with platitudes and substitute fable for fact. He may be a son of the Sophists. Critics, naturally, spring up against him. Men of learning reject him for his shallowness and men of containment reject him for his discursiveness. Moralists frown on his addiction to controversy. Humble men resent his egotism and sensitive men deplore his gaucheries.

We in public address accept these chidings in good grace. We see in them the amber lights of caution that, if heeded, will direct us with greater certainty to the rostrum honored by Pericles in Athens, Luther in Worms, and Lincoln on Cemetery Hill.

YANKEE IN ENGLAND: JAMES HENRY HACKETT AND THE DEBUT OF AMERICAN COMEDY

Francis Hodge

ONE of the most significant, if least publicized, battles in the American war for cultural independence that reached a climax in the 1820's and 30's was fought on the stage of London's Drury Lane Theatre on Saturday evening, November 17, 1832.[1] The occasion was the London debut of James Henry Hackett, the first American actor, with the single and unusual exception of John Howard Payne, to play on the English stage. The program of the evening, which became the special target of attack, was Hackett's American-bred adaptation of English playwright George Colman's *Who Wants A Guinea?* with an anonymous afterpiece, usually attributed to Hackett, called *The Militia Muster*. Before the fighting was over it had involved the Lord Chamberlain's Examiner of Plays, who happened to be George Colman himself, Drury Lane's manager Alfred Bunn, the colorful English comedian William Dowton, the *Times* of London, and all the London critics from *Figaro in London* to *The Athenaeum*. No actual shots were fired or people killed as in the notorious Astor Place Riot in New York in 1849 at the peak of the feud between English actor Charles Macready and his American rival Edwin Forrest, but Hackett's debut marked a definite milestone in the development of American acting and a significant climax in American-English affairs of the stage. It was a disastrous evening from many points of view, but out of it grew the American right to independence in theatrical affairs and the recognition that American actors did exist and had to be reckoned with in the continuing battle, so virulent in the 1830's, over America's bid for cultural recognition.

When James Hackett stepped onto the stage that evening in his Yankee character of Solomon Swap, most London playgoers thought it his premiere performance in England. Yet this was not the first time London had seen him. Few could recall his one-night debut at Covent Garden Theatre on April 5, 1827, when, as a relatively inexperienced actor, he had played the English comedy of *Sylvester Daggerwood*, had done imitations of Kean and Macready, and had told the Yankee story of "Uncle Ben" to a puzzled house. Apparently the comedy and the imitations were passingly acceptable, but the bit of Americana in "Uncle Ben" was simply incomprehensible. "Imagine an unknown actor," wrote the critic for the *London Examiner*, "in an uncouth disguise, without ceremony or explanation, advancing to the front of the stage, and entertaining an audience with a cock-

Mr. Hodge, (Ph.D., Cornell, 1948) is an Associate Professor of Drama at The University of Texas. *The material included in this paper is part of a larger study in progress of American comedy and comedians during the period 1825-50.*

[1] Although the date usually assigned is any time between November 19 and November 23, the review appearing in the *Times* on November 19 as well as the advertisement in the issue of November 17, definitely corroborates the earlier date.

and-bull story, in relation to persons and peculiarities of which nine out of ten of the spectators had not a single previous conception."[2] The London *Times* thought the "American boors" exhibited by Hackett were "perfectly valueless as amusement, and Hackett's stories and jokes pointless to an extent perfectly extraordinary."[3] For about a quarter of an hour the audience listened attentively, evidently disposed to treat the American actor with favor, but their patience soon became exhausted, and cries of "Off! Off!" were heard from all parts of the house. And now the undaunted Hackett was back again, but it was a new Hackett who had come a long way in his profession since 1827. Those Englishmen who had followed American theatrical affairs in such journals of the arts as *The New York Mirror* would have known Hackett in 1832 as a theatrical innovator and the bright luminary of New York's Park Theatre. In the six years of his acting career Hackett had won top place as the American National Comedian as he toured from Boston to New Orleans with a trunkful of dialect parts ranging from Yankee Joe Bunker to French *emigré* Monsieur Morbleu, Kentuckian Nimrod Wildfire, and Dutchman Rip van Winkle. Wherever he had acted he had been loudly acclaimed. To *The New York Mirror* he was the new hope for American theatrical art, and just previous to his 1832 visit to England editors George Morris and Prosper Wetmore had honored him with an extravagant profile that lauded him as a pioneer in the search for American comedy and as "the patriarch of comic drama."[4] Thus when London saw Hackett on that eventful evening of November 17, it could not push him lightly aside as it had done on his first visit. He was a comedian of established reputation; that it was an American reputation made all the difference.

Hackett's version of *Who Wants a Guinea?* caused most of the trouble that night. *The Militia Muster,* as might be expected, provoked a great deal of abuse as it underwent the scourging of audience attack and critical diatribe, but Hackett's sacreligious maltreatment of the British drama in his adaptation of *Who Wants a Guinea?* outraged John Bull. His sin was simple: he had grossly altered Colman's comedy, shortening it from five to three acts and rewriting Yorkshireman Solomon Gundy, a minor character in the original, into the principal part of Yankee Solomon Swap. Further, he had the audacity to present his "mutilation" to the London public from the stage of its most important theatre, almost in the presence of George Colman himself. This was truly carrying the war to England where it could be fought out with the homeguard. Hackett was either as audacious as this outward view of the matter makes him appear, or so confident of his abilities as a comedian that he was convinced he could make the audience forget what he had done.

Trouble began several days before the opening when Hackett discussed the program with Alfred Bunn, Drury Lane's manager. Although Bunn indirectly throws the blame for the choice of plays onto Hackett with the comment that the alteration of Colman's play reflected "less taste than talent" in the comedian, in his position as manager he must have not only consulted with Hackett on the play but also actively

[2] *London Examiner*, April 8, 1827.
[3] *Times* (London), April 6, 1827.
[4] *New York Mirror*, June 2, 1832.

encouraged him in the choice.[5] Bunn was too independent a manager, too much the avid businessman, to have haphazardly left such an important decision to an actor alone. Drury Lane business had been suffering badly during the previous weeks and needed the most careful attention. Besides, from his American experience Hackett had positive proof of the play's ability to draw business, for he had been successfully acting his version since its premiere at the Park Theatre on December 3, 1828,[6] and it had proved a valuable property. So businessman Bunn undoubtedly came to terms with businessman Hackett, and the decision was made. At any rate, Bunn now took the first steps towards performance by setting up the company that was to act Hackett's pieces, and by applying to the Examiner of Plays for a license.

Now the fun began! George Colman, the Examiner of Plays, a much venerated playwright of the Sheridan-Goldsmith school of classical English comedy, had been providing entertaining plays for the English stage for half a century. As far as the London stage was concerned, Colman was considered John Bull himself. He was now asked to grant permission for performing a "mutilation" of his own play. And by a Yankee! Bunn realized the thin ground he was treading, for he approached Colman "in terms correspondent with those of the intimacy we were upon, merely inquiring if a license were necessary" for the alterations which he politely and respectfully delineated to author Colman as "rubbish." Colman's reply was as curt as it was prompt, and it clearly indicated his offended dignity. When Bunn opened the letter, so he innocently maintains, he experienced "considerable consternation" because of "the frigid monosyllable" with which the wit began:

Brompton Square
14th November, 1832

Sir,

In respect to the alterations made by *Mr. Hackett*—a most appropriate name on the present occasion!—were the established play of any living dramatist, except myself, so mutilated, I should express to the Lord Chamberlain, the grossness and unfairness of the manager who encouraged such a proceeding; —but as the character of *Solomon Gundy* was originally a part of my own writing, I shall request His Grace to licence 'the rubbish,' as you call it, which you have sent me.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant
George Colman[7]

The letter was clearly a cold reprimand of the Drury Lane manager, and a specific indication that, although Bunn might protest his innocence, Colman believed him as culpable in the matter as "mutilator" Hackett. The English playwright had not written any comedies for nearly a decade, but he was not about to be cast as the fool in a new one of Bunn's making. Nor in spite of his present illness (mentioned by his biographer) was his wit much dulled. But despite the outrageous affront, Colman did grant the licence,[8] and plans for the opening moved forward.

Yet all was not clear sailing. Rumbling began in another quarter. The acting sides, or lengths as they were sometimes called, had been distributed to the

[5] For Bunn's version of the affair see his autobiography, *The Stage* (Philadelphia, 1840), I, 81-2.

[6] George Odell, *Annals of the New York Stage* (New York, 1928 *passim*), III, 386.

[7] Bunn reproduces the letter. See also Richard B. Peake, *Memoirs of the Colman Family* (London, 1841), II, 406-7; also Jeremy Bagster-Collins, *George Colman The Younger* (New York, 1946), pp. 319-20.

[8] Allardyce Nicoll in his playlist, *A History of Early Nineteenth Century Drama, 1800-1850* (Cambridge, 1930), II, does not list the licensing of Hackett's adaptation although it was undoubtedly recorded about November 15, 1832.

actors who were to perform the two comedies with Hackett as star. It soon appeared that if the American comedian were to have his opening, it would have to be with the fullest cooperation and the kindest graces of the several actors who were to take part. What the other members of the company felt we do not know, but on November 16, the day before the opening, William Dowton, who was cast to play Torrent, showed himself to be as much irritated and affronted as Colman had been. In language not unlike that of the colorful, vigorous, audacious country gentlemen he so often took off in his comedy characters, he addressed himself to Manager Bunn:

T.R.D.L.
16 Nov. 1832

My Dear Bunn,

D—— all Yankee editions of *Who Wants a Guinea?* Mr. Hackett seems a civil man to me, and I wish to oblige him if I can; so I am studying three lengths of his alterations; he is the only actor by-the-by, that designedly cuts out all his jokes—perhaps it's the American fashion. Now after all this d——d nonsense, do give me an order for tonight.

Your's truly,
W. Dowton[9]

Comedian Hackett, so it would seem, had brought out the best wit in everybody. Dowton's irritation, however, was no laughing matter. He was an actor of first-class reputation in the classical school of comedy who, in the forty years that he had played on the London stage, had won high praise for his Sir Anthony Absolute, Sir Peter Teazle, Dr. Cantwell, Mr. Hardcastle, and Old Dornton.[10] Many thought him not only the best Malvolio but also, without question, the best Falstaff of his day. Leigh Hunt described him as a comic genius, Hazlitt praised him as "a genuine and excellent comedian," and playgoers considered him the most finished comedian then acting on the stage. On the Monday preceding Hackett's opening the *Times* had praised Dowton as "one of the most sterling actors of the day."[11] And this was Hackett's principal adversary. The transaction with Colman was a paper affair, but the inimitable Dowton, the comedian par excellence, would still have to be dealt with in very live fashion after the curtain went up on the Drury Lane stage. No matter how much warmth the English actor might profess for the American visitor, Hackett was still a potential rival as a comedian—and an American comedian, to boot—who had won his spurs much too easily and needed to be taught something about acting. The "d——d nonsense" boded no good.

Whatever the usually mild-mannered Hackett thought about all this is not recorded, but in view of his gentlemanly behavior during the opening performance, we can probably assume that he was fully aware of the rumpus he had stirred up and the difficulty he might have in quelling it. The situation was undoubtedly made even clearer when the two comedians came face to face in the rehearsal that preceded the opening. It would have been difficult indeed for Dowton to suppress his distaste for the entire affair. To turn from the plays he customarily acted to Hackett's "rubbish" was asking a great deal. Rehearsals in those days were hasty affairs, mere walk-throughs; consequently the enormity of what was to happen may have been only vaguely hinted at, if recognizable at all. But Dowton also had to reckon with a determined Hackett, who was not merely a pale stage representation of a Yankee but the genuine stubborn and clever "article" itself.

[9] Bunn, I, 81.
[10] D.N.B., XV, 408.
[11] *Times* (London), November 12, 1832.

When we look back at the existing corpus delecti, the extant playscripts, we find it rather difficult to understand what the fighting was all about. Both the original *Who Wants a Guinea?*[12] and Hackett's adaptation of it, *Jonathan in England,*[13] are dull plays whose stage life has been dead for a century. Colman's piece—certainly one of his weakest plays—is a situation contrivance in which a lecherous Irishman attempts to seduce an innocent and lovely orphan and is foiled at the last moment by a generous do-gooder, her bitter and cynical father, and her young fiancé. The creaking plot is helped along by a group of country types—a Yorkshireman, a gentle old man, a cantankerous housekeeper, and, of course, the character that Hackett adapted, Solomon Gundy, a cockney Malaprop, rat catcher, and *valet de chambre* who takes a trip to France to study the heads of the nation and returns "a very monkey that had seen the world," with a smattering of French phrases which he garbles throughout the play. As we look at Colman's play today, we puzzle at its busy life on the stage. We can accept it only when we recognize it as a vehicle for a gallery of comic stage types. When it was premiered in 1805, critics found it dull—"a tissue of plagiarisms" from Colman's own work, without "the slightest interest excited for an instant."[14] When the Elder Charles Mathews played Solomon in the 1820's, a gravely disappointed Samuel Coleridge reproved the comedian for wasting his time on a character which contained "not one element of genuine comedy, no, nor even of fun or drollery."[15] Nor is it easy to perceive from the playscript why it was considered offensive, although it is quite possible that the acting made it so. The most virtuous character in the play, Torrent (the part to be played by Dowton), utters a few "damns" and Sir Larry has a few "leering" lines that apparently in 1805 "seemed to give offence to some of the natives of Ireland," who, no doubt, did not like to be so unfavorably symbolized on the stage. Probably the proposed seduction of innocence by a lecherous reprobate was as distasteful then as it would be now. Although *Who Wants a Guinea?* was played only ten times in its first season, it remained in the English comedy repertoire and over the years was given many performances.[16] Hackett very possibly had seen Mathews play Solomon Gundy when he visited London in 1827.

Jonathan in England, on the other hand, despite what Colman, Dowton, and other critics thought about it, is from our view a stronger acting piece. Hackett's "mutilation" shortened the play to half its original length by eliminating the loquacious Heartley, by reducing in importance the rather unbelievable Torrent (undoubtedly part of Dowton's complaint), and by cutting Hogmore to a mere bit part. The comedy elements were strengthened by raising Solomon "Gundy" Swap to a major role. The dramatic action remains intact, and the comic characters are more sharply etched against it. From the moment that Swap enters in Act II, he dominates the proceedings until the final curtain. Solomon Gundy's French

[12] This play has been published several times. An interesting edition because of the preface is that published by John Cumberland (n.d., *ca.* 1828).

[13] *Jonathan in England,* Spencer's Boston Theatre, No. CC (Boston, n.d.). See also Dick's *Standard Plays,* No. 456, under the title *John Bull at Home,* or *Jonathan in England.* After 1832 Hackett usually played it as *Yankee in England.*

[14] Bagster-Collins, pp. 182-5

[15] Mrs. Mathews, *Memoirs of Charles Mathews* (London, 1839), II, 257.

[16] For an account of the success of this play see Peake, II, 413.

joke in the original is thin and wearisome, but the Swap dialogue, simple and naive though it may be, is much fresher and more various throughout. The New Hampshire Yankee who was hi-jacked to England by the British Navy is not only directly involved in the plot, but he also has opportunities to spin a yarn, make a joke, and exhibit Yankee wit such as his quip to Hogmore: "Why, consarn you, your soul is leetler than the leetle end of nothing whittled down to a pin." Or the exchange with Henry who asks, "Were you never at sea before?" "O, yes!" says Swap, "I used to sloop fruit and lumber down to New York." "What do you mean by fruit and lumber?" queries Henry, and Swap replies, "Why, punkins and broomhandles." Swap is rewritten throughout, and the whole piece is greatly tightened.

Opening night arrived. For several nights preceding Drury Lane audiences had been entertained with a succession of brilliant performances: Edmund Kean in *Hamlet* (Monday); Macready, Dowton, and Cooper in *School for Scandal* (Tuesday); Macready, Dowton, and Power in *Every Man in His Humour* (Thursday); and on the evening before Hackett's debut, Kean in *A New Way to Pay Old Debts*. And now it was the American's turn. Ever since the Hallams had brought their company of actors to America in the 1750's, British players had crossed westward to the wildness and frontier civilization that was America. But the American-born actor was a rarity indeed, and now one was actually impertinent enough to exhibit himself on Drury Lane stage. Washington Irving and James Fenimore Cooper might have won acceptance in the field of letters, but the stage was quite a different matter. One could be howled down and hissed off in a matter of minutes, a critical dictum as final as Job's coffin. But for Hackett the gamble was worth it. If he were even moderately successful, his reputation in New York and other stateside cities would be greatly enhanced, and with it his pocketbook. Hackett had learned a great deal about those unaesthetic matters during his years as a goods merchant in the upstate New York town of Utica before he had taken up acting,[17] and he viewed the London engagement with the practical eye of the character he was about to perform—shrewd bargainer Solomon Swap, "merchant in broom handles and other notions." The scene[18] is between Solomon and Andrew Bang, Yorkshireman:

SWAP. Well, come, I'll trade watches with you, unsight, unseen.

AND. Noa! Will ye, tho'?

SWAP. Yes; but mine's a first-rate watch, double patent pinchback. Now, I'll gin my watch—(aside) it hain't got no insides—for yours, if you'll gin me that guinea boat.

AND. I be to gi' you *my* watch and a guinea for yourn—doane!

SWAP. (Gives watch and takes guinea.— AND. going.—Calls him back.) Here, where's your watch?

AND. I ain't got no watch. I be Yorkshire. (Exit, R., chuckling.)

SWAP. (Alone) Well, I rec'on that Bang don't know more than the law allows. (SWAP laughs.)

What happened that evening of November 17 must be put together from the play criticisms of the next few days.[19] When Hackett made his entrance on the stage in his long-tailed coat, bright vest, striped trousers, and red wig, he was greeted by one of the worst houses

[17] For Hackett's background, among other sources see: Montrose Moses, *Famous Actor Families in America* (New York, 1906); William Winter, *The Wallet of Time* (New York, 1913); *Galaxy*, XIV (October 1872), 550 ff.

[18] Spencer edition.

[19] The best accounts are in *The Journal of Belles Lettres*, November 24, 1832; *The Athenaeum*, November 24, 1832.

of the season; but before the evening was over the courageous American had heard it run the full gamut of response. *Jonathan in England* had been well cast —Bunn knew his job in that respect— the entertainment was promising, and the performance began quietly enough. But soon confusion began to reign. Dowton, either out of poor study or with determined intention, began to drop lines. The prompter undoubtedly gave support in his usual manner. Dowton's failure increased and he began to say whatever came into his head. Tyrone Power, who was cast as Sir Larry, also began to fail in his lines, as did some of the others, and the play became confused and erratic. As the situation worsened, so did Dowton's improvisations. With his resourceful imagination at work, and probably with growing anger at the injustice done to him and to British drama in changing the script, and furthermore in making him play the "rubbish," Dowton's witticisms became more and more vulgar and indecent, "so gross and disgusting," reported one critic, "that no modest woman could listen to them without feelings of shame and disgust." In the midst of this predicament Hackett must certainly have realized what was being done to him, yet he continued as calmly as he could with a Yankee's determination to win the battle. Oath followed oath, so the report goes, "interspersed with witless ribaldry," until Dowton had shocked and irritated every "respectable person in the house." The audience, which had been growing more and more active in its protest, finally took a vigorous hand in the affair and hissed its indignation and reproof at Dowton for his bad taste. This action must have had its effect, for the play finally ended to applause.

The performance of *The Militia Muster* concluded the evening. This sketch[20] was undoubtedly just what the London critics claimed it was—an amplification of the song on militia mustering that top comedian Charles Mathews had composed and sung in his satiric travelogue, *Trip to America*, put together after his visit to the States in 1823-24.[21] Thus Hackett had British sources for both of his "American Yankee" plays. When Yankee Hackett first played Major Joe Bunker at the Park in 1830, *The New York Mirror* described it as a "farce consisting of some ten or a dozen scenes loosely thrown together without end or aim."[22] The down-East flavor was its personality, for it showed a "facsimile of the Maine militia trainer on a yearly field day, full of the old military saws and conceits."[23] Although American playgoers had found it laughable and droll, in view of its local context the reaction of the London audience is not unexpected. It listened attentively for a few minutes and then began to show its disapprobation. Again, as in his 1827 appearance, Hackett heard from the house the galling cries of "Off! Off!" As the most brutal of the critics remarked, "A vigorous hiss closed the melancholy exhibition, and the *debutant* looked as foolish as under the circumstances might be expected. Drury Lane is clearly going to the dogs, as fast as bad management can carry it."[24] *The Militia Muster* was a total failure, but who had won the battle of the entire evening would have to wait for the critics and time to decide.

[20] Nicoll records a Lord Chamberlain's entry for November 19, 1832.
[21] *The Athenaeum*, November 24, 1832.
[22] *New York Mirror*, May 1, 1832.
[23] Charles Durang, *A History of the Philadelphia Stage*, (published in the Philadelphia *Sunday Dispatch*, 1854-1860), Third Series, 13.
[24] *Figaro in London*, November 24, 1832.

When the reviews appeared during the ensuing days, the American fared much better than could have been expected, though vigorously damned as well as praised. *Figaro in London* lived up to its reputation of name-calling and dyspeptic diatribe, crying down Hackett's treatment of *Who Wants a Guinea?* as "a disgraceful mutilation of one of our best standard comedies," and labeling Hackett an "American mountebank." "Not having the talent to act a good part," asserted the critic, "an attempt was made to thrust him upon the public in a bad one," and the consequence was a "monstrous failure."[25] Likeswise the *Times* thought the "extravagant caricature" of Solomon Swap a damnable substitute for "amusing" Solomon Gundy. Not only was Swap's slang incomprehensible, but, when comprehended, "appeared to us to boast of no quality beyond sheer vulgarity." Equally irate, but from another point of view, were the critics for *The Athenaeum* and *The Journal of Belle Lettres.* The first directed an attack on Colman with the quip that *Who Wants a Guinea?* was "written by the present licenser when he was licentious, or rather when his only license was that poetical one which he now refuses to others." He then seriously castigated Dowton for his offences of the evening. "Mr. Dowton, when he will learn his part," he argued, "is a great acquisition to any theatre; but when he not only forgets his part, but forgets himself in the bargain, the very excellence of his acting increases the magnitude of his offence." The second critic, without mentioning Dowton by name, was equally incensed over the treatment Hackett had been subjected to "by the utter want of study or memory in several of the characters, who (hardly uttering one sentence of the author, but speaking extempore whatever came into their own heads) certainly placed the new actor . . . in a serious predicament." The reviewer threatened to name names if something were not done about such behavior in the future. To add insult to Hackett's injury the *Times* blandly praised Dowton and the other Drury Lane regulars, scarcely mentioning the imperfection in the lines.

But poor as the debut had been, critics who sided with Hackett on his mistreatment also found him praiseworthy as an actor. One argued that Hackett's personation of a "genuine" Jonathan was "life itself," and that his "constant watchfulness of eye, his gait, and his mingled cunning and boorishness, were very cleverly portrayed." He also thought there was much dry, quaint humor about him and that he was an "imitable teller" of American stories. Another thought him an actor of considerable humour and considerable ease," and maintained that his "genuine" Yankee portrait was highly relished by the audience "as was approved by their laughter and applause." This critic attested to Hackett's truthfulness in the Yankee character by recalling firsthand experiences with Yankees on a visit to the States several years previously. A third was "much delighted" with Hackett's personations and thought that he "hit" off the peculiarities of the Americans "very happily." He urged further that Hackett be signed for a regular engagement.

The Militia Muster was attacked by both those for and those against its principal actor. Reviewers saw in it an original American piece that, despite the borrowing from Mathews' sketch, would have to be judged completely on its own merits. The kindest comment

[25] *Ibid.*

thought it "poorly arranged for the stage," and, because of the similarity of phrases to those in the first piece, dull and "tiresome." *Figaro,* as expected, called it a "trashy opiate," as "equally glaring and tiresome" as *Who Wants a Guinea?* But the most interesting comment, although it was labeled "twaddle" by another critic, came from the reviewer of the *Times* who thought it not only a "stupid farce" but also "a gross piece of impertinence" and a serious reflection on the American character. The critic of *The Age*[26] disagreed with its giant friend and, with tongue-in-cheek, took the opposite view that it was "an insult to the British character, by endeavoring to point out to us 'the ragged rascals,' in the shape of soldiers, that say they beat the English 'regulars' in divers military rencontres. Honest John, thy head is now and then thick as a mill-stone." In the midst of hard feelings the best of the British sense of humor was not lost.

But despite the hard criticism of Hackett's materials, most of the reviewers found a good word for the comedian. Several thought Hackett a genuine actor and of the best class of low comedy—"that which depends for its success on its absolute truth and reality." Even the *Times* grudgingly admitted that he possessed "a certain portion of low humour, and would probably be seen to advantage in broad comedy or farce." In the overview, however, it was not what the critics and the public thought specifically of Hackett's choice of materials or of his acting. The hardest and perhaps the most honest criticism was the unstated but implied recognition of the difference between levels in theatre and cultural activity in general in England and America. Because this was the first attempt by an American to place himself in contrast with English actors on London's stage, no comparative criticism was possible although a great deal was implied. One critic preferred to make the point, and then make light of it, in the comment that the balance of account for good acting, "sold and delivered" between the two countries, "was very much against the Americans."[27] But "seeing how slender is our present stock of raw material, we don't care how soon they take measures for paying off." Though the difference was not overtly stated, many held Alfred Bunn's point of view which was called up later when London had seen Edwin Forrest, Yankee Hill, Mr. Barrett, Mrs. Sharpe, and Thomas Rice.[28] Bunn thought that Americans could not, or would not, "draw the line of distinction between the advanced degree of taste and refinement at which this country has naturally arrived, and the struggle which their own (like other countries in their infancy) is making to possess taste or refinement at all. We have had to go through the same fight ourselves when we were emerging from barbarism into civilization, and our children should learn from our example, that it is impossible to become perfect at once." Bunn's view was argued honestly and sincerely, and though he might have underestimated the American's humble view of himself, his was still the best statement of the case. The American's desire for recognition in stage matters was to continue for the rest of the century and was to have serious consequences in the Forrest-Macready controversy.

The Hackett-Dowton story was not without its ironies. When the "most finished comedian of his times" paid a

[26] *The Age,* November 25, 1832.

[27] *The Athenaeum,* November 24, 1832.

[28] Bunn, II, 34-5.

starring visit to the States four years later, his Park Theatre engagement was a financial failure.[29] No matter how much the critics might respect him, the popular audience could not accept his highly refined talents and abilities, and they turned easily to the broader drolleries of Hackett. The final ironic postscript is recorded at Dowton's last performance in America, when both comedians, on the eve of the disappointed Dowton's departure for England, appeared at the New York National Theatre's benefit for William Hamblin after the burning of the Bowery Theatre. *Henry IV* with the best cast that New York could muster was the major piece of the evening. It was to be followed by dancer Celeste and two afterpieces. Who performed Dowton's famous role of Falstaff? American comedian James Hackett! And Dowton played the second afterpiece.[30]

The subsequent history of Hackett's adaptation of *Who Wants a Guinea?* and *The Militia Muster* could hardly have been anticipated on the basis of their London reception. Hackett subsequently played Solomon Swap over five hundred times, and it was "borrowed" by other Yankee actors for probably an equal number of performances. With the possible exception of Samuel Woodworth's *The Forest Rose*, it was probably the most widely played theatre piece in America before 1850. In 1837 Hackett sought an injunction against rival actor George Hill to prevent his acting the play, but withdrew it when he saw its futility. "Set a thief to catch a thief," was Francis Wemyss's ironic comment on this "firago of nonsense."[31] Major Joe Bunker in *The Militia Muster* achieved almost as much popularity, and remained in Hackett's repertoire for a quarter of a century. The similarity of the two roles, as English critics had pointed out, apparently made little difference to American audiences. A *New York Mirror* critic probably spoke the public mind when he wrote: "We saw Jonathan Swap for the fiftieth time, more or less, and laughed with the same relish as when we first witnessed his amusing parody of New Englanders and their manners."[32]

James Hackett's eventful Drury Lane appearance thus had its happy consequences. If the London critics were dubious about what they had seen on that evening of November 17, they were soon to have more evidence to support whatever view they wished to take. Before Hackett left London the following summer, he had won a moderate success with a new version of *Lion of the West*, or *The Kentuckian*, as he then began to call it, with its colorful frontier character of Nimrod Wildfire modelled on Davy Crockett.[33] He had also paved the way to Drury Lane Theatre for other American actors. During the next few years London saw all of the new crop of native-born comedians and tragedians, a trans-Atlantic move eastward that truly began the establishment of an indigenous American theatre in birth and accomplishment as well as name.

[29] Odell, IV, 64 ff.
[30] Odell, IV, 140-1.
[31] Francis Wemyss, *Twenty-Six Years of the Life of an Actor and Manager* (New York, 1847), p. 130.
[32] *New York Mirror*, November 19, 1835.
[33] Francis Hodge, "Biography of a Lost Play," *Theatre Annual*, 1954, has an account of this play in London. Hackett also played one more performance of *Who Wants a Guinea?* on Nov. 23, 1832, in combination with *Monsieur Tonson*, another play in his regular repertoire.

JOHN BULWER: RENAISSANCE COMMUNICATIONIST

James W. Cleary

JOHN BULWER, seventeenth-century English physician, psychologist, and rhetorician, had a brief but prolific literary career. In a period of nine years, from 1644 to 1653, he wrote four curious and voluminous works: *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,*[1] a treatise on gesturing; *Philocophus,*[2] a commentary on the education of deaf-mutes; *Pathomyotomia,*[3] a study of the muscles of the head and their relation to emotion; and *Anthropometamorphosis,*[4] an indictment against those nations and races of men who, for the sake of custom, tampered with the natural form of the human body.

Bulwer's works are not unknown to scholars of Renaissance life and letters. The *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* however, has attracted the eye of modern rhetorical scholars. In his survey of English theories of public address, Professor Sandford analyzes the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia's* structure, describes its contents, and observes that the treatise is "the first English work limited to the treatment of the *actio* phase of delivery."[5] In her study of oral interpretation of literature, Professor Robb identifies Bulwer's work on gestures as probably the earliest example in English of "mechanical rules for action" in delivery.[6] Of opinion that the *Chirologia* is of considerable significance to the history of rhetorical theory, Professor Thonssen includes it in his anthology of rhetorical works by twenty-three acknowledged scholars from Plato to Genung and provides excerpts which represent the substance of the work.[7] In their account of the history of speech criticism, Professors Thonssen and Baird cite Bulwer's treatise on gesture as a manifestation of seventeenth-century English interest in delivery.[8] In an analysis of Elizabethan acting, B. L. Joseph examines the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* as a major index to the manner in which the English Renaissance actor managed his arms, hands, and fingers while performing on the boards.[9] When investigating the patterns of rhetorical theory in seventeenth-century England, Professor Howell points to the *Chirologia . . .*

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[1] John Bulwer, *Chirologia: Or, the Naturall Language of the Hand . . . Whereunto is added Chironomia: Or, the Art of Manuall Rhetoricke* (London, 1644, 1648).

[2] John Bulwer, *Philocophus: Or, the Deafe and Dumbe Mans Friend* (London, 1648).

[3] John Bulwer, *Pathomyotomia: Or, a Dissection of the Significative Muscles of the Affections of the Minde* (London, 1649).

[4] John Bulwer, *Anthropometamorphosis, Man Trasform'd: Or, the Artificiall Changling* (London, 1650, 1653, 1654). The 1653 edition is an expansion of the 1650 text. The 1654 edition is a reprint of the 1653 edition but with another title: *A View of the People of the Whole World.*

[5] William P. Sandford, *English Theories of Public Address, 1530-1828* (Columbus, Ohio, 1931), pp. 115-120.

[6] Mary Margaret Robb, *Oral Interpretation of Literature in American Colleges and Universities* (New York, 1942), p. 38.

[7] Lester Thonssen, *Selected Readings in Rhetoric and Public Speaking* (New York, 1942), pp. 189-206.

[8] Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism* (New York, 1948), pp. 127-128.

[9] B. L. Joseph, *Elizabethan Acting* (London, 1951).

Chironomia as a text unique in its emphasis on gesture.[10]

Despite acknowledgement for what he wrote in the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* Bulwer's reputation today does not extend beyond that of a minor figure. Since attention has heretofore been focused primarily upon his *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* one naturally tends to place Bulwer within the shadows of contemporary English rhetoricians, phoneticians, and speech scientists of great prestige. However, if one considers the content and significance not only of the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* but also of the *Pathomyotomia* and *Philocophus,* he will be prompted to assign him a more prominent position than historians heretofore have recognized, a position which enables Bulwer to cast his own shadow along with those of that relatively small group of Renaissance scholars who strove fruitfully to enlarge man's knowledge of communication.

1.

The content of the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia, Pathomyotomia,* and *Philocophus* reveals Bulwer as one interested in and sensitive to the problems of communication. With the exception of his *Anthropometamorphosis,* all of his writings discuss some notion basic to the conveyance of ideas or emotions through the medium of gesture or voice. His *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* and *Pathomyotomia* deal exclusively and exhaustively with bodily action; his *Philocophus,* partially and less thoroughly with voice management, vocal production, and pronunciation.

In brief, the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* is a treatise on gestures of the arms, hands, and fingers.[11] The work actually consists of two separate essays bound in one volume. The *Chirologia,* the first essay, attempts to survey all possible movements of the hands and fingers which are external expressions of man's intellectual and emotional nature. Its basic presumption is that a given action of the hand or fingers is common to all men who express that action's correlative thought or emotion. Thus, the stretching out of the hand is common to all who entreat and ask for mercy; the joining of the palms with fingers pointed heavenward, to all who pray; the shaking of a fist, to all who are angry. The *Chironomia,* the second essay, attempts to prescribe the actions of the arms, hands, and fingers which are suited to effective public speaking. The actions, taken largely from Quintilian, are adapted to the pulpit, forensic, deliberative, and occasional oratory of Bulwer's day.

Though the *Chirologia* is important as the footing for his study of gesture in public address, it is the *Chironomia* which contributes to Bulwer's reputation as a rhetorician. In the *Chironomia,* Bulwer divides the study of gesture into four parts. The first part, "The Canons of Rhetoricians Touching The Artificial Managing of the Hand in Speaking," tells the prospective speaker how to manage his arms and hands when expressing gross emotions or thoughts such as showing shame, refusing, grieving, and demanding. The second part, "Indigitatio: Or, The Canons of the Fingers," tells the prospective speaker how to manage his fingers when expressing more refined concepts such as numbering arguments on the fingers, treating a matter lightly, and distinguishing con-

[10] Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1300-1700* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), pp. 340-341.

[11] Bulwer describes the movement of the arms as well as that of the hands in the gestures of gross action.

trary ideas. The third part, "The Apochrypha of Action: or, certaine Prevarications against the Rule of Rhetoricall Decorum," specifies the actions which are unsuited to the hand of an orator, actions such as gesturing with one's elbow, wildly waving one's arms and hands in all directions, and playing and fumbling with one's hands and fingers. The fourth part, "Certaine Cautionary Notions," discusses some of the basic principles common to all gestures, principles relating to such factors as timing, aptness, and variety.

The *Pathomyotomia* rounds out Bulwer's thinking on bodily action. Like the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* the work is composed of two essays, one on the significance of the muscle in human motion, the other on the intricate actions of the head and its anatomical parts. It is the latter of these two essays which brings Bulwer once again to the study of action as an external expression of emotion and thought.

In the essay on the action of the head, Bulwer arranges his discussion according to ten gesticulative agents of the head: (1) the head as an agent in and by itself, (2) the face, (3) the forehead, (4) the eye-lids, (5) the eye, (6) the ears, (7) the nose, (8) the cheeks, (9) the lips and mouth, and (10) the tongue. For each of these ten topics, Bulwer describes the action of the agent when one expresses a given emotion or thought. Hence, when rejecting, one turns away his head, when showing shame, one casts his eyes downward, and when expressing anger, one quivers his nostrils.

The *Philocophus* offers evidence to indicate that Bulwer's thoughts on communication were not confined to bodily action. Although its general topic is the education of deaf-mutes, and although it lacks the depth and precision which characterize the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* and *Pathomyotomia,* the *Philocophus* presents a discussion of voice unique for the age in which it was written.

The major portion of the *Philocophus* consists of a series of "Observations" in which Bulwer comments upon the significance of Sir Kenelm Digby's famous seventeenth-century account of a deaf and dumb Spanish lord's learning to "hear" and "speak."[12] But Bulwer prefaces this commentary with a lengthy essay which discourses on the nature of voice and pronunciation. The essay is composed of fifteen chapters. Chapters I through VII discuss the production and management of voice; Chapters VIII through XIV, pronunciation. Chapter XV merely retells Digby's narration. The chapter headings alone disclose at once the range of his analysis of voice.

Chapter I. *That the Mouth is the Adequate Organ of Speech.*

Chapter II. *Of the use and necessity of such a structure of instruments for Speech.*

Chapter III. *Of the convenience and excellent scituation of the Mouth for the more visible appearance and manifestation of Speech.*

Chapter IV. *That Speech is a voluntary Action, and therefore perform'd by Motion.*

Chapter V. [On motion and the tongue, and words as species of motion.][13]

Chapter VI. *Of the excellent choice of Nature in the Appulsive Motions of Speech.*[14]

Chapter VII. *That the Motions of those parts which Create words, excell the signifying faculty.*

Chapter VIII. *That Speech is an Articulate*

[12] Kenelm Digby, *Treatise on the Nature of Bodies* (London, 1644), p. 254. Cited by Harry Best, *Deafness and the Deaf in the United States* (New York, 1943), p. 656.

[13] The bracketed words are mine. Pages 18 and 19 in which the chapter heading appears, are missing in the Harvard Library copy of the *Philocophus* which I examined. Judging from the context in pages 20, 21, and 22, the bracketed description is accurate.

[14] Here, "Appulsive" evidently means "articulative."

Voyce formed by the Conjugation of certain Letters.

Chapter IX. *That Letters, the true Elements of Speech,* quatenus *they are pronounced, are natural.*

Chapter X. *That the Motions of Instruments of Speech which go to the making the* Alphabet *of* natural letters, *are worthy Enquiry.*

Chapter XI. *That the formes of Letters, and so consequently of words, may be punctually observed and took notice of.*

Chapter XII. *That the Ancients took the essential difference of Letters, from the various motions of the Mouth.*

Chapter XIII. *That the Motions of the parts of the Mouth in Speech are so remarkable, that some have (not without successe) attempted to imitate them by Mathematicall motions.*

Chapter XIV. *That* Articulate Speech *doth not necessarily require the audible sound of the voyce, but may consist without it, and so consequently be seen as well as heard.*

Chapter XV. *That it is neither incredible nor impossible, that a man borne Deafe and Dumbe, should be taught to heare the sounds of words with his eyes, and thence learn to speak with his tongue.*

Bulwer was apparently satisfied with what Cicero, Quintilian, and the Neo-Ciceronians of his own day had written on the canons of invention, disposition, style, and memory. Indeed, his *Chironomia* suggests in two ways Bulwer's quiet acceptance of classical rhetorical theory. First, he uses Quintilian, as well as the contemporary French classicist Ludivico Cresollius, as his primary sources in the regulation of gesture in public address. Second, he relates gestures to traditional conceptions of rhetorical forms; for example, suiting the action of the hand to the exordium[15] or the narration;[16] adapting action of the fingers to the disposition of arguments;[17] accommodating the fingers to the demands of style, such as the pompous style;[18] devising appropriate action to distinguish the "punctuation" of the language and the "breathing" parts of a sentence.[19]

Bulwer wanted simply to extend man's knowledge of the importance and function of the elements of delivery basic to the act of communication. Yet, he was more than the self-styled appellation "Chirosopher" would indicate. As the *Chironomia* and portions of the *Pathomyotomia* and *Philocophus* demonstrate, he was one interested in the intellectual and psychological workings of man and in the communicative problems of expressing ideas and passions through both gesture and voice.

2.

One need only examine the number of distinguishing features which mark the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia, Philocophus,* and *Pathomyotomia* to realize that Bulwer was no ordinary communicationist content to mouth the thoughts of others. Bulwer's inspiration emanated from the respect he held for Francis Bacon and from the thirst for learning which Bacon did much to cultivate.[20] Yet his works significantly contribute to the long story of man s endless efforts to understand fully the precise nature of communication.

The *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* as a whole, typifies Bulwer's endeavor to shed new light on an ancient subject. The work enjoys the historical distinction of being the first systematic and thorough treatise in English devoted exclusively to the art of gesturing in public speaking. Moreover, so far as can at present be determined, it is the first treatise on

[15] *Chironomia,* 70 and 71.
[16] *Ibid.,* 71.
[17] *Ibid.,* 74 and 83.
[18] *Ibid.,* 73 and 79.

[19] *Ibid.,* 44.
[20] Bulwer freely admits in the Preface to the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* that he has taken his "Hint" for the entire *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* from Bacon's observation that gestures of the body disclose the dispositions and inclinations of the mind. See *Chirologia,* sigs. A4v-A6r.

gesticulation which employs pictures to demonstrate various positions of the hands and fingers, a graphic aid of which Bulwer seems unabashedly proud when he says that one

> wishes for Types and Chirograms, whereby this Art [of manual rhetoric] might be better illustrated then by words. Which defect in this Art I have here attempted to supply (and as I hope) with reasonable successe. If I have miscarried in any, it is the more pardonable, since in all my search after these subtleties of the Hand, I never met with any Rhetorician or other, that had pictured out one of these Rhetoricall expressions of the Hands and fingers; or met with any Philologer that could exactly satisfie me in the ancient Rhetoricall postures of *Quintilian*.[21]

The persuasive power of the gesture had been recognized by rhetoricians long before Bulwer wrote his *Chirologia . . . Chironomia*. But no one had been quite so emphatic about its place in public address as Bulwer. Writing in the *Praeludium* to the *Chironomia*, he surveys, with too much enthusiasm perhaps, when the art of gesturing is most useful, then points an indicting finger at contemporary orators who believe "that Gestures are perfect enough by Nature," and finally sweeps to the grand pronouncement that artistic gestures are the "very Palme and Crown of Eloquence." Indeed, the undertones of the Canons, Prevarications, and Cautionary Notes which follow in the body of the essay convey Bulwer's strong opinion that the art of gesturing is an essential and all powerful implement of persuasion.

As we have indicated, the *Philocophus* is addressed to the deaf-mute. Yet the work contains some innovations which significantly contribute to the general store of man's knowledge of communication.

Concerned with communication among those handicapped with loss of hearing, Bulwer designs in his *Philocophus* what well may be the first hand alphabet for the deaf. The alphabet appears in a plate of 25 Chirograms which picture all the vowels and consonants (excluding *j* and *v*) under the title of "Dumbe Speech or Language of the Fingers." The plate, easily overlooked, appears on an unsigned leaf which does not figure in the collation of the book[22] and provides evidence to indicate that Bulwer's alphabet precedes that of Dr. George Dalgarno, to whom many ascribe the distinction of being the first to design a hand alphabet for the deaf-mute. Dalgarno's alphabet appeared some 32 years after Bulwer's in a work whose title is curiously parallel to Bulwer's, *"Didascalocophus, or the Deafe and Dumb Mans Tutor."*[23]

Writing to the Gostwicke brothers in the dedicatory epistle of the *Philocophus*, Bulwer also introduces, for the first known time, the concept of "hearing" sound through the medium of the teeth. He observes that a deaf person may sense vibrations conducted through his teeth, vibrations which are transmitted to the inner ear by bone conduction, and then neurologically to the

[21] *Chironomia*, p. 26. [Bracketed words are mine.] Bulwer apparently took his notion of picturing gestures of the hands and fingers from Giovanni Pierio Valeriano's *Ieroglifici* (Venetia, 1625). In the *Ieroglifici*, Pierius presents a plate of engraved hand pictures when discussing finger digitation (see *Ieroglifici*, p. 480). Bulwer incorporates the very same plate in the *Chironomia* when discussing the same topic (see *Chironomia*, p. 91). Bulwer's prestige, however, lies in his adaptation of "Chirograms" to explain the art of gesticulation. In addition to the one plate taken from the *Ieroglifici*, Bulwer includes in the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* five plates especially designed to illustrate his gestures.

[22] In the Harvard Library copy, the plate appears on the *recto* of a leaf immediately preceding page 1 of the text proper.

[23] George Dalgarno, *Didascalocophus, or the Deafe and Dumbe Mans Tutor* (London, 1680). Cited by Harry Best, pp. 377 and 519, and by Hallowell Davis, ed., *Hearing and Deafness, A Guide for Laymen* (New York, 1947), p. 344.

brain. Bulwer calls this phenomenon "Orall and Dentall Audition."

> Having well scanned this Magnale naturae, I found it to be one of the subtlest pieces of Recondit learning, and that it bordered upon other avenewes unto the brain; as *Orall* and *Dentall Audition*, of which wee have discovered sufficient ground to raise a new Art upon, directing how to convey intelligible and articulate sounds another way to the braine then by the eare or eye; shewing that a man may heare as well as speake with his mouth.[24]

Though Bulwer fails to substantiate his theory, one Father Robertson, a monk in the Scots College of Ratisbon, Germany, proved the theory workable early in the nineteenth century when he found that persons partially deaf could use this dental medium as the source of instruction and musical enjoyment.[25]

When discussing the "Motions of Instruments of Speech" and their relation to an "Alphabet of natural letters," Bulwer reveals a sensitivity to the need for and value of an international phonetic alphabet. He observes that when certain letters are placed in juxtaposition, the sound they will suggest will differ from the sound each individually represents. The letters "m" and "t" in juxtaposition suggest a "p" sound; "n" and "b," an "m" sound. Thus, Bulwer urges the production of "such an Alphabet as should put an end to all Doubts in this matter."[26]

The alphabet Bulwer envisions, however, is not the kind which many of his English predecessors had employed in studying pronunciation. Rather, his alphabet is one which is constructed upon the manner in which the instruments of speech function when a given sound is produced. In reality, he would prefer to use, when recording spoken discourse, a set of "visible speech symbols" universal in application rather than the conventional symbols or letters used in written discourse and limited to those languages which employ these symbols. Specifically, he suggests the exhibition of

> the motions of speech in the capital Characters or Letters of our Alphabet, which as notes and images, with the quality and quantity of their lines, do very aptly serve the natural Letters, in whose pronunciation, the parts of the mouth obtain a various Figure, and every Figure consists of certaine Lines: or in the representative motions or postures and Figure of the mouth marshalled like the Alphabets of gesture in our Chirologia.[27]

Unfortunately, Bulwer fails to provide the reader with an application of his counsel. Yet, the phonetic theory he advances and the phonetic alphabet he commends to the practical phonetician approach the same theory and alphabet which the eminent seventeenth-century phoneticians John Wilkins and William Holder expounded and devised some 20 years later.[28] Indeed, they seem to anticipate the same theory and alphabet which Alexander Melville Bell[29] refined and which Alexander Graham Bell[30]

[24] *Philocophus*, sigs. $A4^v$-$A5^r$.

[25] "The Works of George Dalgarno, of Aberdeen," *The Edinburgh Review*, LXI, April . . . July (1835), 409. Although modern otologists do not consider the teeth as a prime medium for conduction of sensation, they do believe that hearing by bone conduction in partially deaf persons, the same principle which Bulwer implies in this quotation, is worthy of clinical study. See Ben H. Senturia and Alfred R. Thea, "Bone Conduction in Audiometry," *Laryngoscope*, LII (September, 1942), 675-687; and W. J. McNally, T. C. Erickson, R. Scott-Moncrieff, and D. L. Reeves, "Clinical Observations on Bone Conduction," *Journal of Laryngology and Otology* (May, 1937), 295-336; (June, 1937), 375-430.

[26] *Philocophus*, p. 39.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[28] E. J. Dobson, *English Pronunciation 1500-1700* (London, 1957), pp. 254, 261-262. Dobson's study is a thorough and scholarly piece of work. The fact that he overlooks Bulwer and his *Philocophus* when surveying major and minor seventeenth-century phoneticians and their writings exemplifies the obscurity into which Bulwer has slipped.

[29] Alexander Melville Bell, *Visible Speech: the Science of Universal Alphabetics* (London, 1867).

[30] Alexander Graham Bell, *The Mechanism of Speech*, 4th ed. (New York, 1910), pp. 51-83.

adapted to the teaching of the deaf over 200 years later.

The *Pathomyotomia* also enhances Bulwer's prestige as a Renaissance innovator of communication theory and practice. In the work, despite lack of encouragement from his colleagues, Bulwer becomes the first to explain in English the subject of "metaposcopy" or the study of the muscles of the face and their relation to emotion, a subject of much concern to the elocutionists of the following century. Although James Parsons, an eighteenth-century physiologist, claimed to be the first to expound this subject, it is clear that Bulwer's *Pathomyotomia* antedates Parsons' endeavors by nearly one hundred years.[31]

The *Pathomyotomia* is important in still another way. The work may well serve as a clue to what Bulwer might have said in the unwritten, companion treatise to the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia,* namely the *Cephalelogia . . . Cephalenomia.*

In a sort of headnote to the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* which he calls "To The Candid and Ingenious Reader. This Copy of my Idea; or The Hint, Scope, and generall Projection," Bulwer makes it clear that his study of gesture will embrace more than what the *Chirologia . . . Chironomia* presents. Ambitiously, he sets forth his total scheme:

> Two Amphitheaters there are in the Body, whereon most of these patheticall subtilties are exhibited by Nature, in way of discovery or impression, proceeding either from the effect of sufferance, or the voluntary motions of the Minde, which effect those impressions on the parts which wee call the Speaking Motions, or Discoursing Gestures, and naturall Language of the Body, to wit, the Hand and the Head; in answer whereof, I intend two receptacles of the observations, falling within the compasse of their particular Districts, under the generall Titles of Chirologia and Cephalelogia, The naturall language of the Hand, and The naturall language of the Head; and these two comprise the best part of the expressions of Humane Nature. Chironomia, or the Rule of the Hand is adjoyned as the perfection and sublimation of Chirologie; as Cephalenomia, or the Rule of the Head, is to appeare with Cephalelogia, as being the qualification of all Cephalicall expressions, according to the Lawes of Civill Prudence.[32]

In all probability, the *Cephalelogia . . . Cephalenomia,* had it been written, would have enjoyed the historical distinction of being the first English treatise devoted exclusively to gestures of the head. There is, however, no known evidence to indicate that the plan ever reached even the manuscript stage. Yet, in the *Pathomytomia,* descriptions of the movement and position of various parts of the head when expressing a given emotion show that Bulwer did not entirely abandon his thoughts on this subject. When speaking of anger, for example, he describes certain actions which might well have appeared in the unwritten *Cephalelogia . . . Cephalenomia.* He tells us that the angry person is apt to

> bend the Brows from the Sinciput to the Eyebrows, which are then knit about the Nose.[33]

> blow up and downe his nostrills with wind, with which sudden and fiery sufflations the nostrills seeme to smoke[34]

> open the Mouth, and lift up their upper Lips.[35]

> gnash and grind with their teeth and to set them so firmly together that the Cheekes are drawn into adverse partes.[36]

Quite conceivably, other actions expressive of pity, fear, pride, derision, deliberation, and the like would also have found their way into the *Cephalelogia*

[31] James Parsons, "Human Physiognomy Explained: In the Crounian Lectures on Muscular Motion, Being a Supplement to the Philosophical Transactions . . . ," *The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London* (London, 1747).

[32] *Chirologia,* sigs. A7r-A8r.
[33] *Pathomyotomia,* p. 147.
[34] *Ibid.,* p. 196.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 213.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 228.

. . . *Cephalenomia.* And it is also conceivable that in applying these actions to public speaking in the *Cephalenomia* Bulwer would have come much closer to what the elocutionists of the following century wrote concerning the total concept of action on the platform.

Other than what can be gleaned from his writings, little is known of Bulwer's personal life. We know, though, that in 1653 he bade the literary world farewell. In a Latin postscript to the 1653 edition of the *Anthropometamorphosis* he announces the end of his writing career and appraises the contributions he has made to the world of letters and science. Translated the postscript reads:

> I have thus far obeyed the holy impulse of my mind which works upon my intellectual outlook. Meanwhile, my mind has turned to things alien to my profession. I have erected works not of a superfluous character but rather as supplements to the increase of the sciences, wherein I consider that I have merited somewhat of the Republic of Letters. Of the making of many books there is no end and the reading of the same is tiring to the flesh. Henceforth, I will exert all my effort to consulting on the health of myself and others. For the rest, there are lovers of human nature.[37]

Bulwer's works as "supplements to the increase of the sciences," are cause enough to admit him to the "Republic of Letters" to which he lays claim. The historian may do more than acknowledge these meagre claims. Knowing that Bulwer was the first to systematize the study of gesture, that he was the first to devise pictures by which the art of gesticulation could be better taught, that he was unique in his stress upon the persuasive power of the gesture, that he was the first to design a hand alphabet for the deaf, that he was a pioneer in the study of international phonetics, and that he was the first to handle in exhaustive detail the intricate movements of the head in the expression of basic emotions, he should recognize John Bulwer as a communicationist of singular achievement.

[37] *Anthropometomorphosis, verso* of the last leaf.

* * *

ARISTOTLE'S ENTHYMEME REVISITED

Lloyd F. Bitzer

ARISTOTLE has said that enthymemes are "the substance of rhetorical persuasion."[1] In view of the importance he has given the enthymeme, we might reasonably expect to find it carefully defined. However, although there are many hints as to its nature, the reader of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* will find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme. The problem is perplexing to one of the ablest of Aristotelian scholars, W. D. Ross, who writes, "The enthymeme is discussed in many passages in the *Rhetoric,* and it is impossible to extract from them a completely consistent theory of its nature."[2]

The problem is no less perplexing to scholars in rhetorical theory. Some of them have attempted to formulate clear definitions of the enthymeme, based on Aristotle's descriptions. The most notable recent attempt of this sort is James H. McBurney's.[3] Other attempts include definitions by Lane Cooper,[4] Charles Sears Baldwin,[5] Thomas De Quincey,[6] and E. M. Cope.[7] With the exception of Cooper, each attempts to define the enthymeme by showing how it differs from the dialectical or the scientific syllogism. My purpose in this paper is to point out some difficulties in the interpretations given by these men and to suggest a possible definition which does not run counter to Aristotle's descriptions. Since Aristotle's statements, however, seem to permit some variety of interpretation of the enthymeme, further criticism and exploration seem justified.

Consider first Lane Cooper's remarks about the enthymeme. He notes the difficulty of determining Aristotle's meaning and suggests that we simply look at good speeches in order to understand what an enthymeme is. "The arguments good speakers actually use in persuasion are enthymemes," he says, and that "is the answer to our question, 'What is an enthymeme?' "[8] Cooper defines the enthymeme, not by stating its characteristics and telling how it differs from other kinds of arguments, but by pointing to where it may be found—in persuasive speeches actually made by good speakers. This notion is important in a respect I will try to indicate later; for the moment, however, Cooper's definition is put aside because it does not help us understand precisely what the enthymeme is. It does not tell what characteristics make the enthymeme the substance of rhetorical persuasion.

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[1] *Rhetorica* 1354[a]14-15. Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the Rhys Roberts translation of Aristotle's *Rhetorica* in Vol. XI of *The Works of Aristotle,* ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1946).

[2] W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), p. 409.

[3] James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," *SM,* III (1936), 49-74.

[4] *The Rhetoric of Aristotle,* translated and with introduction by Lane Cooper (New York, 1932).

[5] Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1924).

[6] Thomas De Quincey, "Rhetoric," *The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey,* ed. David Masson (Edinburgh, 1890), X.

[7] Edward M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867).

[8] Cooper, p. xxvii.

Baldwin is more specific. He approaches definition of the enthymeme by contrasting it with the syllogism. He holds that by enthymeme Aristotle

> means concrete proof, proof applicable to human affairs, such argument as is actually available in current discussions. The enthymeme is not inferior to the syllogism; it is merely different.[9]

Baldwin later says that "abstract deduction is summed up in the syllogism; concrete deduction, in the enthymeme."[10] Apparently he believes that the enthymeme is quite different from the syllogism and that the mark of difference is its concreteness.

Both Cope and De Quincey argue that the essential feature of the enthymeme is its foundation in probability and that this feature separates it from the regular syllogism. De Quincey writes:

> An enthymeme differs from a syllogism . . .; the difference is essential, and in the nature of the matter: that of the syllogism proper being certain and apodeictic; that of the enthymeme simply probable, and drawn from the province of opinion.[11]

In *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric,* Cope rather cautiously says the same: "It appears . . . that the only *essential* difference between the two is that the one leads to a necessary and universal, the other only to a probable conclusion."[12] Later, however, it will be noted that Cope changes his opinion in a startling way.

McBurney defines the enthymeme

> as a syllogism, drawn from probable causes, signs (certain and fallible) and examples. As a syllogism drawn from these materials . . . the enthymeme starts from probable premises (probable in a *material sense*) and lacks *formal validity* in certain of the types explained.[13]

The essential part of this definition is the statement that enthymemes are drawn from probabilities and signs.[14] McBurney emphasizes two other important features of enthymemes—the basis of the premises in probability and the lack of formal validity in many enthymematic types. On these two points, he says:

> Both dialectic and rhetoric are differentiated from scientific demonstration in the fact that they deal with probabilities and do not attempt apodeictic proof in the sense that it appears in scientific demonstration.[15]

> Perhaps no other passages in Aristotle bring out more forcibly the point that several forms of the enthymeme are *formally deficient* than these explanations dealing with the refutation of enthymemes. This is an exceedingly important point that is almost universally overlooked. Many rhetorical arguments which are perfectly legitimate in reasoned discourse and which may establish high degrees of probability, are formally deficient; i.e., they cannot be thrown into a formally valid syllogism. Many enthymemes which are wholly acceptable from the standpoint of cogent speech are formally deficient from the point of view of the apodeictic syllogism.[16]

Thus, except for Cooper, these writers among them hold that the enthymeme is distinctive on account of (1) its basis in probability, (2) its concreteness, and (3) its usual formal deficiency. Too, they hold that the definition of the enthymeme usually found in textbooks on logic is totally inadequate. That definition, which will be discussed later, makes the enthymeme simply a syllogism having a suppressed premise or conclusion. The task now is to show how the definitions offered by Cope and De Quincey, Baldwin, and McBurney may not adequately distinguish the enthymeme from the other kinds of syllogism (demonstrative and dialectical), al-

[9] Baldwin, p. 9.
[10] Baldwin, p. 13.
[11] De Quincey, p. 90.
[12] Cope, p. 102.
[13] McBurney, p. 58.
[14] McBurney, p. 66.
[15] McBurney, p. 52.
[16] McBurney, p. 65.

though the definitions do undoubtedly name characteristics which enthymemes usually possess.[17]

Cope and De Quincey try to distinguish between the syllogism and the enthymeme on the grounds that the enthymeme always must be probable, whereas the syllogism always must be certain and necessary. But a major fault attends these definitions. They fail to take account of those descriptions of the enthymeme in which Aristotle expressly states that sometimes the enthymeme does begin with certain and necessary propositions and that sometimes the conclusion is necessary. At 1357[a]30-32 Aristotle says,

> It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary,' will most of them be only usually true.[18]

And at 1356[b]14-17 he writes,

> When it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, *whether invariably or usually*, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. [Italics mine.][19]

Also, at 1396[a]2-4 he says, "We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties."[20] From these statements, it seems clear that there is no sharp distinction between syllogism and enthymeme on the basis of probability since the propositions of enthymemes may be certain and necessary.[21]

[17] It is important to note that these authors recognize that the enthymeme is a species of syllogism. When they contrast the enthymeme and the "syllogism," they mean by the latter either the dialectical or demonstrative syllogism. Therefore, the question is not, How does the enthymeme differ from the syllogism? Properly speaking, the question is, How does the enthymeme, which is one type of syllogism, differ from the dialectical and the demonstrative syllogism? Aristotle clearly holds that the enthymeme is a kind, or species, of syllogism. At 1355[a]6-8 he refers to the ethymeme as "a sort of syllogism"; and at 1356[b]3-5 he says, "the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism."

[18] Lane Cooper translates this passage as follows: "Let us grant that only a few of the premises of rhetorical deduction are necessarily admitted, and that the majority of cases . . . may lie this way or that." The translation by Freese (*Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric*, Cambridge, Mass., 1939) reads as follows: "Few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are."

[19] Cope's translation of this passage may account for his view that probability of premises and conclusion is the essential feature of the enthymeme. Cope's understanding of the passage is substantially different, commencing with the italicized portion: ". . . either universal or general and probable, is called in the former case a syllogism, in the latter an enthymeme." He follows immediately with: "So that it appears from this . . . that the only *essential* difference between the two is that the one leads to a necessary and universal, the other only to a probable conclusion" (Cope, 102). Translations by Cooper, Freese, and Jebb agree with Roberts, however. "To conclude from certain assumptions that something else follows from those assumptions (something distinct from them, yet dependent upon their existing) either universally or as a rule—this in Dialectic is called a syllogism, and in Rhetoric an enthymeme."—Cooper. "When, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme."—Freese. "When certain things exist, and something else comes to pass through them, distinct from them but due to their existing, either as an universal or as an ordinary result, this is called in Dialectic, a Syllogism, as in Rhetoric it is called an Enthymeme."—Jebb, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1909).

[20] Cooper's translation reads: "And he must argue not only from necessary truths, but from probable truths as well." Freese's translation reads: "Conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule."

[21] Grote's explanation of the enthymeme indicates that some rhetorical arguments may begin with propositions which are universal and necessary and may produce conclusions which are universally true: "The Enthymeme is a syllogism from Probabilities or Signs; the two being not exactly the same. *Probabilities* are propositions commonly accepted, and true in the greater number of cases; such as, Envious men hate those whom they envy. Persons who are beloved look with affection on those who love them. We call it a *Sign*, when one fact is the antecedent or consequent of another, and therefore serves as mark or evidence thereof. The conjunction may be either constant, or frequent, or merely occasional: if constant, we obtain for the major premise of our syllogism a proposition approaching that which is universally or necessarily true. . . . The constant conjunction will furnish us with a Syllogism or Enthymeme in the First figure. . . . We can then get a con-

McBurney recognizes as the essential part of the enthymeme's definition the same description Aristotle gives in the *Prior Analytics:* "Now an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs."[22] He shares with Cope and De Quincey the view that the premises of enthymemes are merely probable;[23] in addition, he seems to hold that the usual formal deficiency of most enthymemes is an important identifying feature. Yet I think it can be shown that neither of these features absolutely distinguishes the enthymeme.

First, McBurney correctly observes that both dialectic and rhetoric deal with probabilities, with the contingent. As Aristotle often repeats, neither discipline deals with "things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be."[24] Neither do these disciplines treat subjects which are invariable.[25] Therefore, McBurney is correct in his statement, "Both dialectic and rhetoric are differentiated from scientific demonstration in the fact that they deal with probabilities. . . ."[26] But he infers (without sufficient warrant, I believe) that the premises upon which enthymemes are built must therefore be probable. He says, for example (continuing the sentence just quoted), that dialectic and rhetoric "do not attempt apodeictic proof in the sense that it appears in scientific demonstration." However, Aristotle indicates that there is one kind of enthymeme that meets the conditions for scientific demonstration. At 1402^{b}18-19 he says, "Enthymemes based upon Infallible Signs are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable." Further, at 1403^{a}10-17 he says:

> It will be impossible to refute Infallible Signs, and Enthymemes resting on them, by showing in any way that they do not form a valid logical proof. . . . All we can do is to show that the fact alleged does not exist. If there is no doubt that it does, and that it is an Infallible Sign, refutation now becomes impossible: *for this is equivalent to a demonstration which is clear in every respect.* [Italics mine.][27]

Therefore, whenever we find enthymemes based on infallible signs, we have before us truly demonstrative arguments, resting on inevitable and invariable premises. Such arguments, proper in both rhetoric and science, are (or may be) both materially certain and formally valid.

Further, there is some doubt about the belief, implicit in McBurney's interpretation, that scientific demonstration must always begin with universal and necessary premises. Ross points out that Aristotle is willing to construct a science

clusion both affirmative and universally true." See George Grote, *Aristotle* (London, 1880), pp. 202-203.

Cope's position remains a puzzle. At several places he recognizes that enthymemes sometimes include universal and necessary propositions, yet he holds that the probability of premises and conclusion is the essential feature of the enthymeme. For example, in *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (ed. John Edwin Sandys, Cambridge, 1877), he says, "The certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is the only *necessary* argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are . . . only probable." (See p. 225; also p. 271, *Introduction.*) We will note later that Cope removes some confusion by altering his position substantially.

[22] *Prior Analytics* 70^{a}9-11. Aristotle expands this definition in the *Rhetoric* (1402^{b}12-14) to include examples along with probabilities and the two kinds of signs, fallible and complete proofs.

[23] Walter J. Ong, S.J., has recently expressed a similar view. In *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), Father Ong writes that Aristotle always understands the enthymeme as a "syllogism defective in the sense that it moves from premises at least one of which is only probable, to a merely probable conclusion" (p. 187).

[24] *Rhetoricia* 1357^{a}1-7.

[25] *Topics* 104^{a}3-8.

[26] McBurney, p. 52.

[27] Jebb's translation of this passage reads: "Infallible Signs, and the Enthymemes taken from them, will not admit of refutation on the ground that the reasoning is not strict. . . . It remains to show that the alleged fact does not exist. If it is shown that it *does* exist, and that it is an Infallible Sign, then there is no further possibility of refutation; for this amounts to a manifest demonstration."

upon premises that are "for the most part true." He writes:

> It is noteworthy that, while Aristotle conceives of demonstration in the strict sense as proceeding from premises that are necessarily true to conclusions that are necessarily true, he recognizes demonstration (in a less strict sense, of course) as capable of proceeding from premises for the most part true to similar conclusions.[28]

It is clear, then, that scientific syllogisms may be constructed out of highly probable premises and that enthymemes may be constructed out of certain and necessary premises. From this it follows that we cannot claim probability of premises or probability of conclusions as the essential characteristic of enthymemes.

McBurney's second point of emphasis is that many enthymemes are formally invalid, but that they still constitute rhetorical proof. He finds this significant as a distinguishing feature between enthymemes and scientific syllogisms. His point loses its significance, however, when we note that a great many scientific syllogisms are also invalid. For example, of the sixty-four possible first-figure syllogisms, only four are valid. Yet in ordinary talk we often infer successfully from several of the invalid forms. If it is true that enthymemes are usually formally deficient, it is equally true that many dialectical and scientific syllogisms, as used in ordinary discourse, are formally deficient. Hence, formal deficiency may characterize both the enthymeme and the syllogism.

Baldwin's treatment of the enthymeme —the enthymeme is concrete whereas the syllogism is abstract—is also questionable. Many syllogisms have particulars as the subjects of their conclusions, and many enthymemes have abstract ideas as the subjects of their conclusions. The classic example of the syllogism has "Socrates is mortal" as its conclusion. It could hardly have a more concrete subject. Also, an enthymeme with "Let justice be done" as its conclusion could hardly have a less concrete subject.

Perhaps Baldwin's statement that enthymemes are concrete means that such arguments, when successful, always require a specific human commitment or action. But concreteness in this sense is not peculiar to the enthymeme alone, since dialectical syllogisms sometimes require commitment to conclusions and action in accordance with those conclusions. Indeed, Aristotle says that dialectical inquiry "contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge."[29] If the conclusions of dialectical arguments contribute to truth and knowledge, then intellectual commitment to conclusions is required of those who accept premises. If the conclusions contribute to choice and avoidance, then acts of choice and avoidance are logically required. Therefore, concreteness is not an essential feature of the enthymeme, although, as Baldwin suggests, most enthymemes probably are concrete.

In summary, the following points may be made about the enthymeme. (1) The enthymeme is a species of syllogism which differs in some way from the demonstrative and the dialectical syllogism. (2) The essential difference is not to be found in the probability of its premises, because Aristotle's statements indicate that (a) some enthymemes have as their premises propositions based on "the inevitable and invariable," and (b) some scientific syllogisms may have as their premises propositions that are "for the most part true." (3) Neither is the essential difference to be found in the formal de-

[28] Ross, p. 74. See also *Posterior Analytics*, Book II, Ch. 30.

[29] *Topics* 104b1-3.

ficiency of enthymemes, because (a) Aristotle holds that some enthymemes (those based on infallible signs) are equivalent to strict demonstrations. Furthermore, (b) in ordinary discourse we often infer successfully by using formally deficient dialectical or demonstrative syllogisms. (4) Finally, the essential difference is not to be found in the concreteness of enthymemes, because (a) this feature does not always characterize enthymemes and (b) it sometimes characterizes other kinds of syllogism.

It is no doubt true that most enthymemes are probable, formally deficient, and concrete. Since not all enthymemes exhibit these features, however, it is impossible to claim any or all of them as the distinctive mark of the enthymeme. Precisely what, then, is the difference between the enthymeme and the demonstrative or dialectical syllogism? If we answer this question, we may be in a good position to formulate a consistent definition of the enthymeme. In the following paragraphs I wish to suggest an interpretation which I believe is in agreement with Aristotle's statements.

In the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of premises—the demonstrative and the dialectical. Because his distinction provides an important clue to interpretation of the enthymeme, I quote the passage in full.

> The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premisses, but lays them down), whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary's choice between two contradictories. But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism in either case; for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else. Therefore, a syllogistic premiss without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we have described; it will be demonstrative, if it is true and obtained through the first principles of its science; while a dialectical premiss is the giving of a choice between two contradictories, when a man is proceeding by question, but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted, as has been said in the *Topics*.[30]

In this passage there are two features which distinguish demonstrative premises and syllogisms from dialectical premises and syllogisms. First, the demonstrator *asserts*, or *lays down*, his premises without regard to the wishes of any opponent. On the other hand, the dialectician *asks for* his premises. Instead of laying them down, he seeks the consent of his adversary about them; he gives his adversary "a choice between two contradictories." The first and most important distinction, then, is that the demonstrator lays down his premises, whereas the dialectician asks for his premises.[31] Second, the main requirement for demonstrative syllogizing is that a premise be "true and obtained through the first principles of its science." On the other hand, the main requirement for dialectical syllogizing is that a premise be apparent and generally admitted.

We should note here that, although the premises of dialectic and rhetoric need not be true and need not be obtained through the principles of some science, it is quite possible that some of them are of this character. Scientific propositions—such as Newton's laws—are often popularized and made part of the class of statements from which the orator draws his premises—the class of

[30] *Prior Analytics* 24a21-24b12.

[31] Cope writes that the philosopher, or investigator, proceeds without regard to any respondent; "the man of science is not allowed to choose which side of an alternative he will take." However, the dialectician "depends upon the concessions of his opponent" (*Introduction*, pp 75, 78).

statements which are apparent and generally admitted. Also, the orator may use special lines of argument which properly belong to other disciplines, including the sciences.[32]

Several statements in the *Rhetoric* indicate that enthymemes differ from demonstrative syllogisms in the same way that demonstrative premises differ from dialectical premises. At 1355[a]27-28 Aristotle says, "We must use as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody." Also, at 1395[b]31-1396[a]4 he writes:

> We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined—those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize. . . . We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties.

And at 1402[a]33-34 he says: "The materials of [rhetorical] syllogisms are the ordinary opinions of men." The practitioner of rhetoric, then, does not lay down premises, but like the dialectician he asks for them. The premises he asks for are notions already possessed by his audience.

We have, then, two kinds of syllogism, demonstrative and dialectical-rhetorical. One important difference—perhaps the essential difference—between the two lies in how premises are secured. In demonstration they are laid down; in dialectic and rhetoric they are asked for. We need now to distinguish between the dialectical syllogism and the enthymeme.

The difference between the dialectical syliogism and the enthymeme is partly the consequence of a difference in the functions or purposes of the arts. Dialectic, says Aristotle, "is a process of criticism," and criticism is its chief function.[33] On the other hand, rhetoric discovers the available means of persuasion, and persuasion is the chief function of rhetorical discourse. Both dialectic and rhetoric ask for their premises (which may or may not be certain and necessary); but they ask for premises with different ends in view. Dialectic must ask for premises because criticism cannot begin until the parties involved agree on some propositions. Rhetoric must ask for premises—must begin with premises held by the audience—because persuasion cannot take place unless the audience views a conclusion as required by the premises it subscribes to.

The dialectical syllogism differs from the enthymeme also according to the kind of response made by the respondent and by the audience when each is asked for premises. The nature of this difference will be noted shortly. For the moment, let us distinguish among the three species of syllogism in the following way: (1) Demonstrative syllogisms are those in which premises are laid down in order to establish scientific conclusions; (2) Dialectical syllogisms are those in which premises are asked for in order to achieve criticism; (3) Rhetorical syllogisms, or enthymemes, are those in which premises are asked for in order to achieve persuasion.

It was stated near the beginning of this paper that recent theorists, including E. M. Cope, have tended to reject the definition of the enthymeme as a syllogism having one or more suppressed premises. In his *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Cope holds that the essential difference between the syllogism and the enthymeme is that the former "leads to a necessary and universal, the other only to a probable conclusion." He holds also that the definition of the enthymeme as a syllogism having a sup-

[32] "In proportion as a speaker uses specific arguments, he is deserting the province of rhetoric; but in view of the comparatively small number of general arguments available Aristotle allows the speaker to use specific arguments as well" (Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 271).

[33] *Topics* 101[b]2-4.

pressed premise, is totally inadequate, since the suppression of a premise is not essential to the enthymeme. These views are presented in the text on pages 102 and 103. In a lengthy footnote on page 103, however, Cope alters his view drastically:

> The view of the distinctive characteristic of rhetoric given in the text was adopted mainly in deference to the decided opinion expressed by Sir W. Hamilton. I am now however convinced that he is wrong, and return to the opinion which I have myself previously formed upon the question. If the only difference between the rhetorical enthymeme and the syllogism lay in the probability of the one and the certainty of the other, it would leave no distinction remaining between the dialectical syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme: besides which the position is not true of the dialectical syllogism, whose materials and conclusions are all probable and nothing more. Plainly the difference between the two latter is one of *form*. The syllogism is complete in all its parts; the enthymeme incomplete; one of the premisses or the conclusion is *invariably* wanting.

Thereafter, in the text, Cope refers to the enthymeme as an "imperfect syllogism"[34] and reiterates the view expressed in the footnote quoted above. For example, at one place he writes:

> The enthymeme is deduced from a few premisses . . . and often (always, I believe; else what remains to distinguish it from the dialectical syllogism?) consists of fewer propositions (including the conclusion) than the primary or normal syllogism.[35]

Cope's change of opinion seems to have been prompted chiefly by his recognition that, given his earlier definition, he could not distinguish between the dialectical syllogism and the enthymeme. Earlier he had said that the enthymeme leads to a probable conclusion, whereas the syllogism leads to a necessary conclusion. However, he observed that the dialectical syllogism also leads to probable conclusions. Therefore, the enthymeme is confounded with the dialectical syllogism. In order to separate the two, he returned to the position he had previously repudiated—that the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism. In justifying this latter view, he writes that there is no need for the rhetorician to state all his premises,

> because if any of these is already well known—and the propositions of the rhetorician *are* well known, being popular and current maxims and opinions, and generally accepted rules and principles, which he uses for the major premises of his arguments—there is no occasion to state it at all; the listener will supply it for himself.[36]

There are two difficulties in Cope's revised definition of the enthymeme, provided we consider the enthymeme as the chief instrument of rhetorical persuasion. First, if we understand the enthymeme as simply a syllogism having one or more suppressed premises or a suppressed conclusion, then we have to maintain that whenever Socrates omits a premise or whenever he lets his adversary draw the necessary conclusion, he is at that moment practicing rhetoric instead of dialectic, regardless of how concise and rigorous his argument. We must also maintain that whenever an orator fully states his premises and conclusion, he is at that moment practicing something other than rhetoric.[37] Because of these difficulties, it seems to me that the definition of the enthymeme as

[34] Cope, *Introduction*, p. 105.
[35] Cope, *Introduction*, pp. 157-58.
[36] Cope, *Introduction*, p. 158.
[37] Cope's position leads him directly to this consequence. Note especially the last line of this quotation from his *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, p. 221: "I will repeat here, that the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism only in *form*. The materials of the two are the same, *probable* matter, and of unlimited extent. . . . The difference between the two is simply this, that the dialectician rigorously maintains the form of the syllogism, with its three propositions, major and minor premiss and conclusion: the rhetorician *never* expresses all three—if he did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogism."

an incomplete syllogism must be rejected, unless we use the term "incomplete syllogism" in a special sense.

The second difficulty in Cope's definition is the inadequacy of the reason he gives to support it. He holds that the orator need not state all his premises because the listener already knows most of them and will supply them for himself. Undoubtedly this is a good practical reason which adequately explains why most enthymemes do in fact have suppressed premises. But is this reason strong enough to explain Aristotle's claim that the enthymeme is the substance of rhetorical persuasion? It seems to me that the reason is not strong enough, because rhetorical persuasion can occur whether an orator vocalizes both or only one of his premises. The success or failure of rhetorical persuasion does not turn upon the suppression of a premise but upon something more fundamental, which I will try to point out shortly.

If we use the term, "incomplete syllogism" in a special sense, however, I believe it expresses very nearly what Aristotle means by the enthymeme and avoids the difficulties which attend Cope's definition. Let us understand the term in this sense: To say that the enthymeme is an "incomplete syllogism" —that is, a syllogism having one or more suppressed premises—means that the speaker does not *lay down* his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock of opinion and knowledge. This does not mean that premises are never verbalized, although to verbalize them often amounts to redundancy and poor rhetorical taste. Whether or not premises are verbalized is of no logical importance. What is of great rhetorical importance, however, is that the premises of enthymemes be supplied by the audience.

The same thought may be expressed in a different way. An orator or a dialectician can *plan* a rhetorical or dialectical argument while sitting at the desk in his study, but he cannot really *complete* it by himself, because some of the materials from which he builds arguments are absent. The missing materials of rhetorical arguments are the premises which the audience brings with it and supplies at the proper moment provided the orator is skillful. The missing materials of dialectical arguments are the premises which the respondent supplies when he chooses between contradictories. The relationship of practitioner of rhetoric to audience and of practitioner of dialectic to respondent is precisely the same: In either case, the successful building of arguments depends on cooperative interaction between the practitioner and his hearers.

But we must note an important difference between the forms of interaction which occur in rhetoric and in dialectic —a difference which further clarifies the distinction between the dialectical syllogism and the enthymeme. In dialectic, the interaction between speaker and respondent takes the form of question and answer, and the respondent vocally contributes premises for the construction of dialectical syllogisms. The aim of dialectic is criticism—often the aim is criticism of the respondent's own position; since arguments are formed from premises supplied by the respondent, dialectical arguments have the virtue of being self-critical. Probably there is no more effective way of appraising one's own opinions than the activity of dialectic, because when one assumes the role of respondent and answers the dialectician, one supplies premises from which damaging conclusions may be drawn. The respondent in fact builds a

case for or against his own position; he criticizes himself.

The interaction between speaker and audience must have a different form in rhetoric, however, because continuous discourse by the speaker does not allow him to obtain premises from his audience through question and answer. The speaker uses a form of interaction which has its "counterpart" in dialectic, but instead of using question and answer to achieve interaction, he uses the enthymeme, which accomplishes for rhetoric what the method of question and answer accomplishes for dialectic. The speaker draws the premises for his proofs from propositions which members of his audience would supply if he were to proceed by question and answer, and the syllogisms produced in this way by speaker and audience are enthymemes.

The point to be emphasized, then, is that enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs. The aim of rhetorical discourse is persuasion; since rhetorical arguments, or enthymemes, are formed out of premises supplied by the audience, they have the virtue of being self-persuasive. Owing to the skill of the speaker, *the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded.* I believe this is the reason Aristotle calls enthymemes the "substance of rhetorical persuasion," and it may be the reason for Lane Cooper's remark that we will find enthymemes in the *actual* speeches of good speakers.[38]

In this paper I have examined three common interpretations of the enthymeme. One interpretation emphasizes the content of its propositions and holds that the distinctive feature of the enthymeme is the material probability of premises and conclusions. A second interpretation emphasizes its formal structure and holds that the enthymeme is distinctive because usually it is formally deficient. The third interpretation emphasizes its relationship to human affairs and holds that the distinctive feature of the enthymeme is its concrete relationship to human thought and conduct. These interpretations were rejected because each failed to separate the enthymeme from other kinds of syllogism. Each failed to name a truly distinguishing feature.

I have suggested a fourth interpretation which emphasizes the manner of construction of the enthymeme, rather than content, form, or relation. In addition to avoiding the difficulties which attend the other interpretations, I think this view succeeds in focusing upon the unique function of the enthymeme in rhetorical persuasion. This view holds that the enthymeme succeeds as an instrument of rational persuasion because its premises are always drawn from the audience. Accordingly, I offer the following as a tentative and exploratory definition. The enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and examples, whose function is rhetorical persuasion. Its successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker and audience, and this is its essential character.

[38] It may be worthwhile to note that this interpretation of the enthymeme—and of the whole sphere of rhetorical discourse—provides a sound theoretical justification for that kind of speech criticism which studies the audience and relevant aspects of its context as carefully as it studies the speaker and his preserved speeches. According to this interpretation, a recorded speech is only partially a speech. The complete speech is the actual speech which occurs when speaker and audience interact, either cooperatively or not. Therefore, a sound speech criticism of past speeches must reconstruct the actual speech, and this requires detailed study of the particular audience to determine the premises it would or would not have supplied.

THE ENTHYMEME AND LOGICAL VALIDITY

Charles S. Mudd

IT is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the enthymeme in Aristotle's system of rhetoric. He tells us himself that the enthymeme is "the most effective among the various forms of persuasion,"[1] and that "whenever men in speaking effect persuasion through proofs, they do so either with examples or enthymemes; they use nothing else."[2] In spite of this, however, Earl Wiley can point to what he calls the "professional paradox" of speech teachers. He says, "Although the enthymeme stands out as the logical idiom of persuasion, it occupies a lowly place in the body of our rhetorical theory and speech criticism. That is not to say it is entirely obscured. It is to say that it lacks anything like the prestige accorded it by Aristotle as a medium of persuasion." Professor Wiley finds evidence in speeches from Socrates to President Eisenhower to support the contention that the enthymeme is indeed the "logical idiom of persuasion." He concludes that ignoring the enthymeme is like playing *Dragnet* without Sargeant Joe Friday.[3] In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle makes somewhat the same complaint. He says that the writers of textbooks in argumentation "say nothing of enthymemes, the very body and substance of persuasion."[4]

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[1] *The Rhetoric of Aristotle,* trans. Lane Cooper (New York 1932), p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 10.

[3] Earl W. Wiley, "The Enthymeme: Idiom of Persuasion," *QJS,* XLII (February 1956), 19-24.

[4] Cooper, p. 1.

If the rhetorical theory upon which we operate is Aristotelian, and if the enthymeme is the heart of this rhetoric, we should expect to find the enthymeme at the very basis of our teaching of argumentation and persuasion. Such, however, is not the case. It is true, as Professor Wiley says, that the enthymeme is not completely ignored, for any but the most basic textbook in public speaking, argumentation, or persuasion will include some discussion of it. Nevertheless, these discussions are brief and are given only minor importance. Even more worthy of note is the rather startling discrepancy we find in contemporary texts between the Aristotelian conception of this form and the understanding we have of it today. James H. McBurney demonstrated this condition quite clearly more than twenty years ago. The thesis he advanced then still holds a great deal of truth for us today. He said, "Contemporary rhetorical theory is essentially Aristotelian; the enthymeme is the focal point in the rhetoric of Aristotle; and the enthymeme is seriously misunderstood today."[5]

In this article I want to try to make clear in what sense our understanding of the enthymeme deviates from Aristotle's conception of it; secondly, I want to show how this misconception affects our teaching of argument.

1.

Aristotle recognized two basic characteristics in oral communication. First,

[5] James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," *Speech Monographs,* III (September 1936), 50.

the complete syllogism, the formal structure of deductive inference, is seldom used in speaking. Logically, the syllogism is an ordered structure of simple beauty, but stylistically it leaves much to be desired. A speaker, then, does not often use the syllogism as a means of communicating argument. Instead, he omits whatever premises the audience can infer without trouble and gives only those parts of the argument that are needed to make it clear. Aristotle tells the reader of the *Rhetoric*, "You must not begin the chain of reasoning too far back, or its length will render the argument obscure; and you must not put in every single link, or the statement of what is obvious will render it prolix."[6]

The second factor Aristotle saw in public speaking was that when people deliberate on policies, their premises usually are only probable rather than necessarily true. To accommodate these two characteristics of rhetoric to the rigors of formal reasoning, Aristotle described a logical form which he called the enthymeme and defined as a "rhetorical syllogism."[7] From the *Rhetoric* and the *Prior Analytics* we learn further that the materials of enthymemes are probabilities and signs.[8] Examples of enthymemes are to be found in both the *Rhetoric* and the *Analytics*. In every case, these are examples of arguments in logically valid deductive form. According to Aristotle, then, the enthymeme is the logical form of valid deductive argument, used in speaking, and drawn from premises that are either necessarily true or generally true, or accepted as being true. For the sake of style, one of the propositions may be omitted.

As I have said, this is not the sense in which we view the enthymeme today. The general practice among contemporary writers in speech is to seize upon the accidental matter of elision and to define the enthymeme as *a shortened form of the logical syllogism*. Aristotle, on the other hand, makes it quite clear that the abbreviation of the rhetorical syllogism is a matter of style and not of necessary form. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills have a word to say about this. The enthymeme, they say,

> is almost universally understood by rhetoricians and logicians alike as an elided or truncated syllogism; *i.e.*, as a syllogism with one of its premises or the conclusion omitted. Such an omission (usually the major premise) is characteristic of rhetorical discourse . . . but it is *not* the essential difference between the syllogism and the enthymeme as originally conceived and *as it should be conceived today*. The real difference is in the certainty of the matter and the form. The logical syllogism is built on premises which are "materially" true. . . . The rhetorical syllogism or the enthymeme is built on "probable" premises.[9]

Basically, then, contemporary writers recognize the enthymeme as a logical form but for the most part fail to note the *essential* characteristics of the enthymeme as a syllogism based on probabilities and signs.

The failure to see that the real difference between the enthymeme and the logical syllogism is in the degree of the certainty of the premises is not the only deviation of contemporary rhetorical theory from the Aristotelian concept of the enthymeme. Of much greater significance are two other widely held ideas which should be clearly recognized, for they, it seems to me, are a source of real difficulty.

[6] Cooper, pp. 155-156.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 13, and "Analytica Priora," trans. A. J. Jenkinson, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, I (London, 1955), 70a.
[9] James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills, *Argumentation and Debate* (New York, 1951), pp. 119-120. Italics theirs. McBurney traces the history of this misconception in his excellent monograph cited fn. 5.

Pick up at random, if you will, literally any group of textbooks currently used in teaching public speaking, argumentation, or persuasion. Examine what they have to say about the enthymeme, and in almost every case, the two following ideas will be found.

1) The value of the enthymeme as a piece of proof is to be tested according to the principles of formal deductive logic. The method of testing to be used is to apply the rules of the syllogism. If the enthymeme, itself a logical form, meets these criteria, it is to be considered a valid argument.
2) All-inclusive or all-exclusive (*i.e.*, universal) statements are dangerous and should be avoided.

It is not difficult to see the reason for this rejection of the universal either as the end point of induction or the starting point of deduction. The growth of science and the change of our attitude toward reliable knowledge is a familiar story. Even if we don't go further back than Francis Bacon, the list of those who have attacked the Aristotelian dialectic as a method of inquiry is a long one. With each new piece of information we have gathered, the older authoritative generalizations have become more and more suspect. Very rarely, the argument goes, do we find a case where perfect induction is possible. Lacking this, any generalization we make will necessarily be tentative. The most we can hope to know is what is probable. A. Craig Baird speaks the mind of many when he includes among his tests of syllogistic reasoning this question: "Is the major proposition logically and factually satisfactory? Is it, for example, free from all-inclusive terms, such as *all* or *every*?"[10]

[10] A. Craig Baird, *Argumentation, Discussion and Debate* (New York, 1950), p. 158.

Now, let's see what happens when we apply these two ideas. Rejecting any universal premise, we will submit the deduction to the rules of formal logic.

2.

In order to test the enthymeme, one must first restructure it into complete syllogistic form by supplying whatever propositions have been omitted. To make this syllogistic form meaningful, many writers examine the syllogism in some detail, listing and explaining the rules that govern it. Two of these rules are most pertinent to what I am saying. First, the middle term must be distributed; that is, it must be used in a universal sense in at least one of the two places in which it appears in the syllogism. By using diagrams and other means, writers of textbooks in both logic and rhetoric explain why an argument that fails to distribute the middle term is invalid. The second rule of the syllogism that is pertinent here is that no valid conclusion can be drawn from two particular propositions. A particular proposition is a statement that includes anything less than all the members of the class it refers to—anything from one to all but one. I needn't go into detail if I can let it suffice to say that a deduction based on two particular premises will be invalid.

The important point behind these two rules is that the syllogism, as the form of deductive inference, cannot operate validly without universal terms and universal propositions. Aristotle tells us that in deduction "unless one of the premises is universal, either a syllogism will not be possible, or it will not refer to the subject proposed, or the original position will be begged."[11] Indeed, he says in the *Topics* that without universals it is impossible to reason

[11] Jenkinson, 41b.

at all.[12] Recognizing this, contemporary writers will almost invariably use as their examples of valid deduction *categorical syllogisms in the first figure.* This is nothing more nor less than the prototype of the "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man" kind of argument.

The contradiction is evident. We are told, first, that the universal statement is virtually worthless. Then, we are advised to test the logic of our arguments by the rules of the syllogism. But since the syllogism demands universals in order to be valid, we must be shown how to test deduction through examples of valid syllogisms built on precisely the kind of universal propositions that have been roundly denounced.

In modern rhetoric, then, we are faced with this essential dilemma. If, in our efforts to find material truth, we reject universals, we invalidate our logic; if we use universals, we cannot know they are really true, and thus we sacrifice the necessary truth of our conclusions. The influence of "scientific method" on our thinking has been enormous. It has forced us to reject the universal in favor of material truth, and to accept the necessary illogic that comes with it.

Contemporary writers are not unaware of this logical difficulty. The solution they usually give is to suggest that since particular propositions must be used as the premises for our deductions, the conclusions must be considered only "probable." But instead of solving the problem, this merely begs the question and fails to show the rationale for testing by "logical" means a deductive form patently invalid under the ground rules we set up for it.

Some explanation will help to clarify what I mean. The premises from which a speaker argues may or may not be objectively true. If they are, and if he knows they are, he can be said to have certainty. But we have learned from sad experience that as new evidence is found many of our premises are seen to have been built on unstable ground. Even when our analyses are responsible and mature, our lack of total knowledge in any given case forces us to recognize that many of our predications are far from absolute. Our trust in the material truth of the statements we make is especially weak when we make predications about the entire class our statements name. Because of the uncertainty of our knowledge, then, we have come to fear universals.

In our attempts to avoid premises that claim more than we can support, we hedge our judgments about with qualifications. Instead of using such universal terms as "all men," we use particulars such as "many men" and "most men." In this way, the notion of the absolute proposition, that is, a judgment involving necessary, certain, or apodeictic knowledge, has been confused with the universal statement. Admittedly, a statement qualified by "many" or "most" is no longer a universal, but it is not one whit less absolute, for such a qualification can make a statement absolutely true. Thus, on the altar of material truth we sacrifice the probable universal in favor of the particular absolute. The conclusions we call "probable" are themselves absolute and not probable at all. Let me give an example.

We know that the statement, "All college professors are men," is not materially true. Statistical evidence assures us, however, that it is materially true to say "Most college professors are men." Given the fact that Professor Smith teaches in college, we would come to the conclusion that Professor Smith is

[12] "Topica," trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, Ross, I, 164a.

probably a man. The point I am making is that while the statement, "Most college professors are men" is particular rather than universal, it is no less an absolute and no more a probability than the universal proposition. The conclusion that Professor Smith is probably a man is in no way a probability in the Aristotelian sense. As a matter of fact, it is absolutely and necessarily true that we have statistically a better chance of finding that Smith is, in truth, a man. In a logical sense, the argument shows nothing more than any other syllogism which fails to distribute the middle term —that it is possible for Professor Smith to be male. And this is something we knew before we began.

I have found very few exceptions to the pattern just described. Howell and Smith avoid the difficulty by considering a proposition that includes "substantially all" members of a given class as a universal statement.[13] McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills say that the middle term in the enthymeme does not have to be distributed.[14] Wayne Minnick is in substantial agreement with McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills. He says that the average man will use premises from which no conclusion can logically be drawn.[15] None of these solutions is ideal, but at least each recognizes the problem. I suggest that there is a way to use the enthymeme without violating either the probability concepts of Aristotelian rhetoric or the precepts of logic.

3.

First, let me make it clear that my purpose is not to defend Aristotle's logic as a system of either inquiry or demonstration. Neither dialectic nor rhetoric has to follow the guidelines established in the Organon. In the western world, however, it happens that for the most part they do. Whether or not we are Aristotelians, then, is of little concern. The important point is that rhetoricians universally recognize their dependence upon some system of logic as an arbiter of proper reasoning.

Aristotle divided knowledge into the areas of the certain and the uncertain. But for dealing with those areas where knowledge is unsure, there is no logical system distinct from that used for considering areas where knowledge is necessary or certain. In other words, the syllogism is the *form* for deductive reasoning regardless of the degree of certainty of the *matter*. In the Aristotelian system, the apodeictic syllogism is used to demonstrate the necessary truths of certain knowledge; the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is used to demonstrate the dialectical truth of opinions in the areas of uncertain knowledge such as ethics and politics. But both are syllogisms, and to be valid each must meet precisely the same set of criteria.

By submitting rhetoric to the rigorous demands of reason, Aristotle supplied a valid answer to Plato's attack on the sophistry of his own time. In the enthymeme he found a logical form that at one and the same time would meet the problems of material truth that beset the persuasive speaker and give him a rational framework for the heavily emotional proofs the humanness of his audiences forces him to use. But after more than two thousand years, we still smart from the sting of the Platonic lash. In our efforts to escape the epithets of cookery and gymnastics, we have won the battle of material truth and lost the war against irrational thought.

Aristotle chose the other of the two alternatives in the dilemma. He was

[13] William S. Howell and Donald K. Smith, *Discussion* (New York, 1956), p. 145.
[14] P. 120.
[15] Wayne C. Minnick, *The Art of Persuasion* (Boston, 1957), p. 167.

aware of what had gone on in the law courts of Sicily, and he knew that in the areas where social problems are met man's knowledge is only tentative. Moreover, it is doubtful that the man who wrote the several books of the Organon would be content to fall into the very kind of logical fallacy in his rhetorical system that he had described as invalid in his system of logic. Recognizing the necessity for universals and at the same time seeing that they were not absolute, he retained logical integrity by defining the concept of probability. For him, the enthymeme was a *logically valid* syllogistic form based on universal premises that were only probable rather than being absolutely true.

If what I say is true, then we are faced with the question of where to get the required universals. The answer, again, is to be found in the *Rhetoric*. We create them, we find them, we *invent* them on the basis of what we know about the nature of our audiences as groups of individual men. We might ask ourselves why, if this is not true, did Aristotle put so much stress on invention in his rhetorical system, and why did he devote a whole book to a discussion of the nature of man? I submit that it was because the great problem in rhetoric has always been to find *universal* premises that will be accepted by an audience for whom they are "true" because they are *believed* and from which we can argue *logically* to a probable conclusion.

4.

To summarize: When Aristotle wrote the *Rhetoric*, he complained that the writers of textbooks in public speaking failed to give adequate consideration to the enthymeme. That same complaint is being echoed in our own time. The textbooks that we now use in argumentation show not only that the enthymeme is being slighted but also that it is, as Professor McBurney says, seriously misunderstood. I have tried to describe in our present day rhetorical theory a conflict between logic and rhetoric that grows out of this failure to understand the enthymeme, the very core of Aristotelian rhetorical theory.

Underlying our teaching of the enthymeme are two main ideas. These are:

1) The universal is unacceptable in deductive argument.

2) The enthymeme is to be tested by the rules of formal logic.

The conflict that grows out of our attempts to apply these mutually incompatible ideas results mainly from our failure to make a clear distinction between the "universal" and the "absolute." The solution to the difficulty seems to lie in a revision of our concept of probability. If we base our arguments on premises that are probable universals rather than particular absolutes, we avoid difficulties of formal validity without violating the requirements of material truth. At the same time, I think, we more closely approximate a correct understanding of the enthymeme as it was originally conceived by Aristotle. In this way, deductive reasoning legitimately finds its way into public address.

NEWMAN'S DIALECTIC IN *THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY*

"He Can Ask A Question Pertinently"

John M. Gill

"I assure you I have no security to myself that the Lectures will not be from beginning to end a failure—from my not knowing my audience."[1] So wrote John Henry Newman to a friend a month before the delivery of his "Nine Discourses" to the Catholics of Dublin. Newman knew that when he should deliver his lectures in May and June 1852 he would be addressing not only his immediate audience of Irish Catholics on the projected Catholic University of Dublin, but all of England as well on the more comprehensive topic of "The Scope and Nature of a University Education," as he entitled these lectures in their publication in the same year. Published later, with some alterations and the addition of "Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members of the Catholic University," as *The Idea of a University*, these lectures not only reflect the felicity and richness of his prose style, but they also remain an ever-stimulating analysis of "the *aims* and *principles*" of higher education.

The purpose of my paper is to analyze one facet of Newman's style in this now-classic statement of the meaning of a liberal education. Newman was deeply concerned with winning his audience to his views; his style, always flexible, was shaped by the necessities of the occasion. Behind the facade of that grace and charm so characteristically his own, he manipulates in the "Nine Discourses" of *The Idea of a University*[2] the ponderous controversy with resolute control. His organic technique is essentially to dichotomize: his own statements, resolutions, and summaries emerge only through the hypothetical questions of his listeners or the quoted propositions of his opponents. He achieves his thesis only through its antithesis.

The very first sentences of the Preface establish the dichotomous technique of the whole "Nine Discourses." Defining a University as "a place of *teaching* universal *knowledge*," Newman asserts:

> This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement. If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students; if religious training, I do not see how it can be the seat of literature and science.[3]

In order to move his ideas into exact focus, Newman thus divides his world into black and white, and his black is made black by the essential presence of the white. And, further, to achieve this dichotomy, Newman's characteristic

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[1] Quoted in A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect* (New Haven, 1955), p. 143.

[2] John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University*, ed. Charles Frederick Harrold (New York, 1947). I have confined my attention to Part I, the "Nine Discourses Delivered to the Catholics of Dublin." All subsequent page references are to this edition.

[3] P. xxvii.

technique in these Discourses is to begin with a series of actual questions or imagined suppositions.

On the next page of the Preface, for example, Newman notes that "some persons may be tempted to complain" that his concept of a University may produce nothing better or higher than a gentleman. Then, asserting that he has "anticipated this charge," Newman typically presents to any Catholic who prefers the charge a series of probing questions beginning "I would have him first of all ask himself the previous question, *what* he conceives to be the reason contemplated by the Holy See in recommending just now to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Catholic University?"[4] This is followed by six questions, each consecutively unfolding the direction of Newman's thought and leading inevitably to his answer and conclusion. The crux of the method is that the answer is augured, is, indeed, pre-shaped by the questions themselves. Newman, in short, does not flatly state his thesis: he makes it appear logically inevitable through the rhetorical technique he is applying. Thus, advocating the inclusion of the "science of Religion" in the University curriculum, he characteristically propounds quick questions which not only control the immediate answer suggested but direct the reader inescapably to his precise thesis:

> Are we to limit our idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our senses? then we exclude ethics; by intuition? we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics.[5]

This stichomythic dialogue illustrates the dichotomous nature of Newman's technique oriented in probing and shaping questions.

On the simplest level this technique means presenting the comprehensive questions which will indicate the overall direction of his ideology. Thus Newman begins Discourse II, for example, by indicating two questions (on the exclusion of Theology from the curriculum and on the utility of education) "to which I draw your attention, Gentlemen," questions which will, he announces, "form the subject of what I have to lay before you."[6] The first of these questions, with its theological implications, concerns the speaker in the second through the fourth Discourses; to the second of these questions he returns in Discourse V: "And now the question is asked me, What is the *use* of it? and my answer will constitute the main subject of the Discourses which are to follow."[7] In the remaining Discourses he returns to some of the expanding implications of this, specifying exactly, again characteristically through questions, the direction he will take:

> . . . and, with a view of assisting myself in this undertaking, I shall recur to certain questions which have already been touched upon. These questions are three: . . . are *acquirements* and *attainments* the scope of a University Education? or *expertness in particular arts and pursuits?* or *moral and religious proficiency?* or something besides these three? These questions I shall examine in succession.[8]

These shaping questions must be sharply distinguished from the simple rhetorical questions ("How is this to be explained?") dotting the whole. It is, moreover, significant that in summarizing in the last Discourse Newman indictates that he has been inquiring "what a University is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearing."[9] His discussion of literature also culminates

[4] P. xxviii.
[5] P. 23.
[6] P. 18.
[7] P. 90.
[8] Pp. 112-113.
[9] P. 189.

in a crucial thesis-bearing question. "What is a clearer proof of the truth of all this than the structure of the Inspired Word itself?"[10]

On this level then perhaps the easiest way of comprehending Newman's *The Idea of a University* is to understand the relevancy, the implications, the inevitability of the questions he is attempting to answer.

Newman, moreover, is always ready to inquire for his own purposes into divergent points of view, some sympathetic or similar to his own but falling short of logical completeness, others contradicting his own, which for him in these Discourses means lacking logical consistency. This shows, on the one hand, a delicate empathy with his specific audience, and, on the other, keen psychological insight in comprehending and rigorous honesty in presenting, for his dialectic, views diametrically opposed to his own.

The final sentences of the Discourses illuminate the former of these, his grasp of the predilections and preoccupations of his listeners, dwelling at the end on his being, perhaps, "unequal to anticipations in which you have been too kind."[11] This is more than rhetorical humility; "anticipation" here reveals Newman's characteristic technique in these Discourses of attempting to answer legitimate if unarticulated questions from an audience whose temperament and tradition he knew well.

Though Newman used this technique throughout the "Nine Discourses," we may see it to best advantage, I think, in the first. Here he presents four reasons for consulting the history of Protestant institutions in speaking of the object and nature of a university education. Concerned with the practical and expedient on the one hand, and immutable truth on the other, Newman knows that his views may be opposed by his listeners because historically other methods of education had been adopted by the Catholic Church in other times and circumstances, including the Irish Bishops' own sufferance at one time of Mixed Education. Yet he concludes by relying on the decision of "the highest authority" (*i.e.*, Rome) for the plan "abstractedly best" being "in this time and country also most expedient." Immediately, however, he discusses the legitimate expectancy of Ecclesiastical authority in the matter at hand. He notes —and this is the technique under display—that he can fancy that there may be some among his hearers disposed to agree with his principles of education while yet noting their impracticality. This point, he asserts, "I can hear you say to yourselves"; he then proceeds to analyze the reasons of these objectors and in a scintillating passage presents "your deep misgivings" about his project. Newman, in short, must argue against the self-doubts of his own followers by analyzing and answering the debilitating apprehensions of his Catholic audience. Some "good Catholics" will, he knows, oppose him. "They will express themselves better than I can speak for them in their behalf," he continues; yet he eloquently presents their side before drawing from it to his own position, "St. Peter has spoken."[12] To his Catholic audience this must be the irrefutable argument.

Besides anticipating the difficulties of his Catholic audience, Newman refutes objections in his attempt to attain to his own specific thesis. Thus before refutation comes the clear intent on his

[10] P. 204.
[11] P. 211.
[12] Pp. 10-13.

part to understand, and to have his audience understand, the concepts of his opponents. "Reflect, Gentlemen," he says in one of the "Occasional Lectures" of *The Idea of a University,* "how many disputes you must have listened to, which were interminable, because neither party understood either his opponent or himself."[13] Before his own rebuttal and the presentation of his own position, Newman continually demonstrates his clear perception of the ideas of his adversaries. Thus, for example, against Henry Brougham who in his 1825 Glasgow Address had advocated separating secular and religious knowledge, and against an "Inspector of Schools" who had suggested that Religion is not knowledge and should be excluded from a University curriculum, Newman begins with quotations (giving specific page references) but he also summarizes their arguments—"Something like this seems to be the writer's meaning"—before his own rebuttal. To understand the objections in full, moreover, he insists that "I must ask an abrupt question" and then demands to know what his opponents mean by the word *God,* for he doubts that the word "means the same thing on the two sides of the controversy." The technique leads him directly to his own conclusion that these opponents are essentially short of Monotheism.[14]

In the same vein, then, dubious friends are persuaded and ancient enemies—Locke, Julian the Apostate, and the Religion of Reason; Lord Shaftesbury and the Religion of Philosophy; the "low" Utilitarians of Education; those infected with "moral malady" and unwilling to admit it—are represented, queried, refuted, the whole overshadowed in the compelling dichotomy in which Newman seemed to find himself, "a civilized age in its warfare against Catholicism."[15]

Walter Pater in his *Appreciations* cited these Discourses as an example of "the perfect handling of a theory." The dialectic I have examined in these Discourses accomplishes a double function. On the one hand, abstruse ideas are personalized for Newman's Catholic listeners, dubious about a Catholic University in Ireland, by the colorful animation of conversational persuasion. The Discourses quicken to life because of this rhetorical movement.

On the other hand, and reconciled with this colloquial vivacity, the precision of logical strenuousness is attained because of the continual probing of theme-bearing, shaping questions. One of the attributes of Newman's liberally educated man is that "he can ask a question pertinently."[16] Direction is indicated in these Discourses and effects consummated through Newman's dichotomous method.

[13] P. 370.
[14] Pp. 28-32.
[15] P. 200.
[16] P. 157.

EVALUATING THE ETHICS OF A SPEAKER IN A DEMOCRACY

Edward Rogge

ALTERNATELY disturbed and entertained, Vance Packard wrote a book describing the professional persuaders' zestful wielding of the findings of psychology and psychiatry to sell baubles, bangles and beads and ideas. Curious, and perhaps slightly frightened, Americans bought enough copies of *The Hidden Persuaders* to make it a best seller.

Packard re-emphasized and added to the hoary tradition of skepticism developed by careful observers who have often noted that man does not always justly use his powers of manipulating his fellow men. Although Plato recognized that there could be "honourable" speaking, he had Socrates glumly observe to Callicles: "But you have never yet seen this kind of rhetoric." Plato's honourable speaking "endeavours to make the soul of the citizens as good as possible, and strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers." Plato wished rhetoric to conform to standards of goodness and rightness, the traditional areas of ethics.

Fear of "isms" has moved Americans to extremes of attack and defense which have caused teachers and critics of public address to examine their discipline so that they might discover whether in their concern with effect they have ignored important considerations of goodness and rightness. Robert D. Clark, Richard Murphy, and others have marshalled compelling rhetoric to establish that a concern with effect is not sufficient assumption of responsibilities by either the teacher or critic of public address.[1]

Historians and journalists, too, show a concern for ethics. Richard Hofstadter's evaluation of John C. Calhoun, Allan Sindler's estimate of Huey Long, and Richard Rovere's appraisal of Joseph McCarthy all underwent modification from consideration of persuasive methods and objectives. Surely most Americans would agree that the configuration of the public figure's niche in history should be partially determined by an estimate of whether the persuader subscribed to deleterious methods and purposes.

Given the function of evaluating a speaker's ethics, the critic must change an ethical system into a moral system. He may agree with Jeremy Bentham that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of right and wrong"; but he must then apply that principle to specific situations. The critic is not accorded the luxury of philosophical detachment from worldly affairs that an English philosopher, visiting and lecturing in the United States, thought he merited. When students lis-

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[1] See, for example, Clark's "These Truths We Hold Self-Evident," *QJS*, XXXIV (1948), 445-450; and "Lessons from the Literary Critics," *Western Speech*, XXI (1957), 83-89; and Murphy's "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," in *The Rhetorical Idiom . . . .*, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, New York, 1958), pp. 125-143.

tened to lectures on ethics and then sought him out for practical advice, the astonished scholar explained that he was an ethicist, not a moralist. The teacher of public speaking must be an ethicist; the critic must be a moralist.

Much of the writing on ethics of speechmaking is intended to guide the teacher. To try to apply the principles in criticism presents frequent difficulties. Hence, this attempt to suggest an ethical (or moral) approach for the critic. Since speakers are studied not only to evaluate their role in history, but to clarify and define rhetorical principles of effectiveness for use in teaching, perhaps standards of "rightness" and "goodness" developed by the critic will also be useful to the teacher.

2.

The basic premise of this paper is that in a democracy the standards of value by which a speaker and a speech are evaluated must be the standards established by the society. That premise, or a variation of it, is accepted by many rhetoricans concerned with ethics. Karl Wallace, for example, after examining the close relationship of rhetoric to politics that has been established from the time of Aristotle to the present, concluded that "communication inevitably must stand for and must reflect the same ethical values as the political society of which it is a part."[2] Franklyn S. Haiman asserted that our standards of value must come from "the democratic ethic."[3]

Consistency suggests that any person who supports democracy should insist that standards of value should devolve from the people, not from a "higher authority." The electorate directly and indirectly acts on legislation governing conduct. Legislation governs both the objectives a citizen may seek, and the methods he may use. He is permitted to hold property; but he may gain his property only in certain ways. Democrats subscribe to group decisions on legal means and ends, practical applications of the traditional deontological and teleological aspects of ethics. By extension, democrats should be willing to accept the group's decisions on mores governing extralegal conduct of public persuaders.

While many writers believe that the values governing persuasion should be consistent with democratic values, the belief is not always extended as far as it is in this paper. Neither Wallace nor Haiman, for example, turns to the "workings out" of democratic theory to construct his ethical system; he determines his values from the theory of democracy as he understands it. Thus Haiman believes that persuasion, unless it facilitates a rational freedom of choice —and therefore eschews such devices as suggestion—is not consistent with the democratic ethic. Haiman's evaluation remains uninfluenced by considerations of whether the majority of persuadees willingly submit to suggestion. As the principle of democratic determination is applied in this paper, suggestion, if knowingly and willingly submitted to by a majority of persuadees, is an ethical method of persuasion.

Starting with the basic premise, an empirical consideration of ethics suggests several important conclusions.

First, the standards, mores, or rules governing the conduct of the public persuader vary as any factor in the speech situation varies. If spoken by a political science professor to a freshman class, the

[2] Karl R. Wallace, "An Ethical Basis of Communication," *The Speech Teacher*, IV (1955), 5.

[3] Franklyn S. Haiman, "A Re-Examination of the Ethics of Persuasion," *The Central States Speech Journal*, III (March, 1952), 5.

following paragraph would merit severe condemnation by moralists:

> Its [freedom's] destruction is threatened today by spending and taxation and excessive power of big government in Washington. . . . We can only preserve our liberty by putting into office men and women imbued with a hatred of that totalitarian philosophy of spending and power.[4]

Given by Senator Robert Taft over a television network in the midst of a spirited presidential campaign, the statement perhaps merited no more severe condemnation than a nearly indifferent: "That's just so much campaign rhetoric!" In each instance the statement contains the same loaded words, the same exaggeration. The difference in evaluation would come from the belief that in the first instance the professor had gone beyond the sanctioned methods of an educational lecture, while in the second instance the Senator had applied the rules of a political campaign. The listener to a political speech expects hyperbole; the listener to a college lecture expects "truth" without the flourishes of such an obvious rhetorical device.

Whether a speaker conforms to the mores of persuasion has great practical significance for our society. Aristotle asserted that "things that are true and just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites" *if* truth and justice enjoy the support of a defender at least as skilled as the advocate of falsity and injustice. Unless the picture of truth and justice is kaleidoscopic, through the ages the advocates of truth have often been less capable than their adversaries. For the speaker to utilize a private set of values to determine the methods he will use might assist in the defeat of his proposition. A contemporary reader of Quintilian's *Institutes* is doubtless shocked to read that the man best known for his definition of the orator as "the good man speaking well" offers advice on how to question a friendly witness who has agreed to commit perjury.[5] Quintilian's discussion of court methods suggests that for a Roman pleader to have failed to instruct witnesses to counter perjury with perjury might have ensured that justice would go down before injustice. To those who would say: "Let justice go down if only perjury will save it," I would ask, "If perjury is a recognized practice of the democratic society, by what right do you question its use?"[6]

It appears that the same principle holds for contemporary speakers. To caution a candidate for political office against lying may earn heavenly grace for good intentions, but not necessarily for good works. To convince the most just of politicians that he should not select his evidence so that it best pictures his point of view, that he should not exaggerate—and who has temerity enough to say that he can discover the point distinguishing the applauded figure of hyperbole from the abhorred figure of prevarication?—may well contribute to his defeat. Many chagrined Democrats in 1952 felt certain that their candidate's defeat came partly from his unwillingness to adhere to traditional ways of campaigning. As they analyzed the reactions to the speeches, they believed that voters demonstrated a conviction that a national presidential campaign is

[4] Robert A. Taft, "Freedoms Responsible for Country's Progress," *Vital Speeches of The Day*, XVIII (1952), 548.

[5] *Institutes of Oratory*, V, vii, 13.

[6] Kurt Baier, an ethicist who derives his system from consideration of how an action affects society, arrives at a similar conclusion via a different route. He questions the soundness of expecting an individual to "go ahead with a good example and not wait until the rule-making powers of the group are used." *The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics* (Ithaca, New York, 1958), pp. 212-213.

an inappropriate place for extensive use of humor.

The keynote addresses to the 1956 Democratic and Republican national conventions well illustrated the significance of a varying standard of expectation by an audience. Each keynoter addressed the delegates and a national radio and television audience. Neither speaker could deliver the kind of address that would be maximally effective with both groups. Governor Frank Clement decided to overcome delegate apathy and, reportedly, to convince the delegates that he should be the Vice Presidential nominee. Observed a *New York Times* reporter: "The steel rafters quivered and Democrats howled with delight." Forty-four times enthusiastic listeners interrupted the speaker.[7] A week later Republican Governor Arthur Langlie spoke primarily to the television audience. His speech, said the *Times*, was "delivered in a calm and almost reflective tone, [and] was received by his fellow partisans for the most part with a relaxed, confident kind of applause."[8] A number of conversations suggested to this writer that many listeners, as they sat in the quiet of their living rooms, found themselves disturbed by Clement's hyperbole, gross over-simplification, rude motive appeals, and spectacular figures, especially when compared with the more restrained—though still political—speech of Langlie's. Neither address epitomized recrimination-free, reasoned argument. Yet Clement cannot fairly be classed less ethical simply because he adopted the standards of convention speaking.

If a speaker flagrantly and obviously alters the rules of the speaking situation, he may receive his recompense through immediate audience response or reaction over a longer period—a period that many thought unbelievably long for Joseph McCarthy. It is when the speaker covertly alters the rules, when his listeners expect an educational lecture and he alters, selects, and builds a persuasive speech, that he merits severest criticism. Insistence that persuaders operate within the framework of mores provides the basis for much of our fear of communist teachers in our schools. We believe that under the sanctions of education they will use the methods of unrestrained persuasion.

If the audience is to know how to react to a speech, it is imperative that the rules governing the occasion be their rules, not those of the speaker. One instance, however, when our society seems to permit a speaker to go beyond the expectations of his listeners occurs when the group has become a crowd in a sociological sense. Radhakamal Mukerjee, in his book *The Dynamics of Morals*, draws a comparison between group and individual morals which is useful here. Crowds and mobs, he explains, "partake in catastrophic psychopathic behavior."[9] Just as our society feels justified in using various methods in thwarting the wishes of the psychopathic individual, the society feels it necessary to thwart the actions of the psycopathic group such as a lynch mob.

Thus, because the mores differ as any factor in a speech situation differs, a critic of the ethics of a speech must begin his criticism by seeking to discover what mores applied at the time a speech was given. He must then determine whether the speaker operated within the prevailing system.

Such an analysis is more difficult than an attempt to discover whether a speaker adhered to lists of universal pro-

[7] August 14, 1956, p. 1.
[8] August 21, 1956, p. 1.
[9] (London, n.d.), pp. 14-35.

scriptions and prescriptions. However, as Brembeck and Howell have made clear, there are apparently exceptions to all of the purported "do's" and "don't's" of ethical codes of speechmaking.[10] Because of the varying standards, the ethics of a situation cannot be determined by checking any timeless, universal set of standards.

3.

An attempt to discover the mores that prevail reveals that our society not only establishes standards of methods, it also establishes standards governing the objectives sought. Further, there is an interrelation between objectives and methods that is often denied or disparaged by teachers and critics. Robert T. Oliver, for example, suggested that a student not delude himself into "feeling that the end justifies the means."[11] Thomas R. Nilsen asserted: "It would seem obvious that the critic would go rather far afield if he were to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of the terminal action sought by a speech unless such action might have a bearing on the process of speech itself. . . ." Nilsen would have the critic attempt "to reveal the way of acting and believing fostered by the speech and the possible consequences thereof."[12]

The relationship between ends and means might be illustrated in matters involving patriotism. Although we often emphasize the value of individual freedoms and rights, most of us would perhaps agree with this statement by Mukerjee:

> An assumption of rights without "moral costs" or obligations is socially indefensible, if not perilous, and the state is justified in demanding that the so-called rights of men shall be understood to be conditional on the common weal without which such rights cease to exist.[13]

As danger to the common weal increases, concern for individual rights of men lessens. Our educational system deeply instills into a youngster the concept that he has an obligation to his country. In times of national danger the individual's freedoms—his life itself—are forfeit if their loss will help to preserve the nation. While Merton's study of Kate Smith's bond-selling techniques during World War II raised urgent questions about methods used even in behalf of the nation during times of great danger, much of the misrepresentation, concealment, and irrational argument that characterized the propaganda inciting the nation to Herculean efforts at production and violence went largely unquestioned during the war and since. Presumably survival of our society required use of such methods. Our high-handed removal of Japanese-Americans from the Pacific coast during the war has caused us recent embarrassment. The shame, however, follows more from a suspicion that the situation did not justify such methods than from simple repugnance toward the method.

Our society's concern with survival applies much more forcefully to the whole than to any part, although the actions of a segment become of special interest if they seem to be endangering the whole. Part of the fear of communists results from a conviction that the communists will not seek change according to the rules of persuasion sanctioned by the society, but part of it,

[10] Winston Lamont Brembeck and William Smiley Howell, *Persuasion . . .* (New York, 1952), pp. 448-449.

[11] *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1957), p. 31.

[12] "Interpretive Function Of the Critic," *Western Speech*, XXI (1957), 71 & 76.

[13] *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 371.

too, stems from a certainty that the larger the membership in the party the greater the actual danger to our society. Thus, the ethics of a speaker cannot be estimated except by determining whether his objectives coincide with the objectives and goals of his auditors, and how these goals compare with the aspirations of the larger society.[14]

Although survival of the society is the highest public value, general expected usefulness of an action or proposal also partially determines the sanctioned modes of persuasion. We permit, for example, fund-raisers for charities or sellers of "good" children's books to approach adults through the school and the school children. Such a technique brings anguished protests from many parents when shoe or cereal salesmen attempt the same thing with television serving as the medium through which the sellers reach the children first and then the adults.

4.

An examination of practice reveals that the sanctioned standards vary not only according to the ends, but also according to the speaker's relationship to his listeners. Rhetoricians often emphasize that the speaker must recognize the worthiness of man, his "capacity for wisdom and rational choice," to use Nilsen's phrase. Occasionally this consideration is extended to a condemnation of motive appeals in rhetoric, even though from the time of ancient Greece such elimination has been established as impossible. As Bertrand Russell argues: "Desires, emotions, passions (you can choose whichever word you will), are the only possible causes of action. Reason is not a cause of action but only a regulator."[15]

More often, however, ethicists insist that the speaker is obligated to develop his topic in such a manner that the listener can make a rational choice. He might do this, Haiman suggests, by avoiding any process which serves to "short-circuit the listener's critical thinking processes." Such tactics as suggestion, deliberate omission or minimization of materials contrary to the speaker's case, and the deliberate use of non-rational motive appeals are ways of short-circuiting thinking processes.[16]

If pressed as valid in all circumstances, such a view ignores the unique function of the leader in our society. Although myth has it that the founding fathers constructed a Constitution based on the premise that all men are equal, historians writing since Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* have pointed out that the fathers did not believe in the innate equality or judiciousness of man. The fathers provided for limited popular participation in government, and they established the methods for leaders to come forward. Both by virtue of law and attitude, Americans—while believing in equality—have recognized that they must be led. As government becomes more complex, the basis for decision more complicated, and the necessity for quick decision more imperative, Americans

[11] Albert Mueller-Deham has constructed an entire ethical system around the survival concept. There are three basic connections, he argues, that are indispensable for society to exist. How well an individual respects and operates within those connections determines the morality of his actions. The connections are: unition, "to be bound by emotional ties, by 'consciousness of kind,' not only by shared interests"; reciprocity, "giving and taking on an equal basis"; work-association, "willing partnership in an objective aim, plan, or work." *Human Relations and Power* . . . (New York, 1957), pp. 353-381.

[15] *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* (New York, 1955), p. vii.

[16] Haiman, p. 4.

have granted greater and greater responsibility to leaders.

An important responsibility of that leader is to make a decision and then to rally the people to its support. Oftentimes only indirectly and over prolonged periods of time can the citizens expect to affect a policy.

President Eisenhower, for example, in March, 1959, made a policy decision regarding West Berlin. He announced and supported the decision in a national television broadcast on March 16. Nowhere in that address is there a suggestion that public opinion might alter policy. Even if all citizens were capable of intelligently evaluating the information relative to the decision, considerations of time made it impossible for them to do so. Certainly the President suppressed information, he carefully selected his appeals—he "short circuited" the listener's critical thinking process. And yet in so doing he assumed the precise functions of a president and commander-in-chief.

The function of a leader has two other aspects relevant to ethics of speechmaking. Haiman disparaged President Truman's "short-circuiting type of motive appeal" which proved so effective in 1948.[17] Truman believed, and the polls recognized, that there were more Democratic than Republican voters. As Truman's adviser Clark Clifford explained, the President's tactic was to play a razzle-dazzle game and get people to the polls rather than try to change their beliefs.[18] Governor Clement's function at the 1956 convention was to overcome apathy. To insist that such speeches must be evaluated by how accurately the speaker used the methods of reasoning, or how frequently he short-circuited thinking, seems irrelevant. One of the functions of the leader is to overcome apathy.

Almost universally condemned is the "personal attack" in politics. Yet as Janowitz and Marvick state:

> Much of the meaningful deliberation of the electorate involves weighing the merits of the rival candidates. Since national presidential elections occur only every four years, the citizens' estimates of the personal stature of the presidential candidate are in some respects more crucial than are their views on party promises and proposals which are certain to require modification under the impact of emerging events.
>
> Political deliberation which places important emphasis on the merits of rival candidates is quite compatible with competitive democracy reflecting a process of consent. . . .[19]

If we grant the value of the leader, and his right to make decisions for the group, then discussion of the worthiness of the candidate, his character and qualifications, seems in order and ethical.

In summary, the extension of the democratic principle suggests that speech critics must evaluate the ethics of a speech by the standards developed by the society. The critic must recognize that the standards vary as factors in the speech situation vary, that they vary as the necessity for the implementation of the persuader's proposal varies, that they vary as his degree of leadership varies. As a citizen, the critic may lament the state of public morals, and he may seek to alter the public standards,[20] but as a critic, unless he is convinced that an audience has become a crowd, he must agree with Cicero: "It is plain that what the multitude approves must win the approval of experts."[21]

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[18] *The New York Times*, November 4, 1948, p. 8.

[19] Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIX (Winter 1955-56), 391.

[20] Haiman, in a stimulating article entitled "Democratic Ethics and the Hidden Persuaders" (*QJS*, XLIV, 385-392), suggests standards and methods of altering the public standards.

[21] *Brutus*, L, 188.

A NOTE ON FARCE

John Dennis Hurrell

FARCE is one of the oldest theatrical forms, and the audience for it is almost world-wide. But criticism—and dramatic criticism is no exception—dearly loves a hierarchy, and farce, having once been relegated to the lowest level of the series headed by tragedy, has been continually taken for granted as something if not actually beneath criticism, at least beneath the need for critical discussion. Everybody knows what happens in farce: a dozen definitions in standard reference books testify to the fact that it is a "low" form of theatrical presentation, the sole object of which is to excite laughter. It is inferior in every way to "true" drama: it makes use of excessively complicated plots, improbable situations, and type characterization. It is highly unrealistic, purely ephemeral in interest, and no fit subject for serious consideration as dramatic literature.

Yet farce has enjoyed great popularity during several long periods of dramatic history; it has occupied the attention of Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Molière, and Wilde, to name but four major dramatists. It is easy to say that farce caters to a poorly educated, artistically degenerate public, but the facts do not bear this out. The farces of the Roman comedians were performed in Renaissance England by and for the university population; there is evidence to suggest that at least one early farce of Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors*, was designed for and appreciated by an audience of lawyers; Molière's audience was certainly not composed solely of the uneducated; and the taste for Wilde has never been a vulgar one. The taste for farce has been continuous, too, not limited to any one historical period. There has probably not been a season in London, Paris, or New York without a successful farce on the boards, new or revived, and it has been a staple of the cinema since that medium's earliest days.

Clearly there is something in the nature of farce that seems to defy its dismissal by academic critics. We all enjoy it in the theatre, yet we concur in accepting "farce" as a term of abuse. We have been made to laugh, but we feel that the laughter has not been legitimately directed. On this point there seem to exist two schools of thought. One, which gives tacit recognition to the didactic purpose of art, is fairly represented by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica's* definition of farce: "Farce is a form of the comic in dramatic art, the object of which is to excite laughter by ridiculous situations and incidents rather than by imitation with intent to ridicule, which is the province of burlesque, or by the delineation of the play of character upon character, which is that of comedy."

This attack (and almost every available definition of farce constitutes a form of attack) is double-edged. Farce is a lower form than burlesque because it has no satiric purpose, and a lower form than comedy because it relies on

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situation rather than character for its theatrical effects. We are left laughing, apparently, like lunatics, without cause, and after our indulgence we experience a sense of shame at our behavior. We have seen the serious business of the world (usually love, honor, and marriage) treated as though moral laws did not exist, and when the lights go up in the auditorium we are aware that for a brief spell we have not been seeking the highest. The world is a well-ordered place, thanks to our hard-won sense of morality, and we have allowed ourselves temporarily to forget this. According to this theory and its implications, then, farce exists and is enjoyed because of the dual nature of man, and for this very reason can never be openly accepted as having any relationship to that image of our morally directed lives which we keep constantly before us, especially in our art.

This leads us to the second school of thought about the legitimacy of our laughter at farce, whose views have been expressed most recently in an admirable essay by Mr. Eric Bentley.[1] His view is the Freudian one: farce permits us to look on while our repressed desires are acted out before us. The relation of farce to life is almost equivalent to that between the dream world and the waking world. The improbabilities of plot do not matter, for the action of farce is purely symbolic. At the center of our society is the institution of marriage and the family, and farce is an outlet for our repressed desire to desecrate these holy places. Farce must, therefore, rest on a basis of moral society. Man is not naturally, however, a moral creature (here the two views seem to coincide) and would like to break the laws which he has created to preserve the structure of his society, and in farce this dream of freedom is fulfilled: "in farce, as in dreams, one is permitted the outrage but is spared the consequences."[2] Farce is, to use Mr. Bentley's term, a "safety valve." Neither is it an unrealistic form of art, except for distortion of "the external facts." We all have the desire to outrage our society: this is the Freudian truth, and farce adheres to it, so "to the inner experience, the farceur tries to be utterly faithful."[3]

This is perhaps the most penetrating comment on farce that has yet appeared; but while it explains the relation of farce to the inner life of man, it does little to explain its relationship to the other dramatic forms, or to drama as a reflection of man's waking life. Mr. Bentley skillfully illustrates the illegitimate nature of our laughter at farce, but he is committed, by the logic of his argumnt, to the precept that it *is* illegitimate. He glosses over the improbabilities of plot in farce by his theory of adherence to the truth of "inner experience." While accepting almost all of his remarks as justified comment on the *psychology* of farce, I think it is possible to suggest a theory that goes beyond this to its *philosophy*, enabling us to formulate a definition of farce that has no pejorative undertones.

Briefly, my argument is that farce, like other dramatic forms, is a comment on the human situation, and that it represents a tenable theory, expressed through its artistic form, concerning our relationships with our fellow men in the society we have created. Tragedy functions in the area of moral solutions to the problems which constantly suggest themselves to creatures conscious of a higher purpose than day to day

[1] Eric Bentley, "The Psychology of Farce" (introduction to *Let's Get a Divorce and other plays*, ed. Eric Bentley, 1958).

[2] Eric Bentley, p. xiii.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. xv.

existence: tragedy is thus highly selective, dealing with those men who are capable of, or capable of being driven to, purely moral choices. Comedy takes as its province a wider area of man's activities, concerning itself with the laws, written or unwritten, which govern men in their communities rather than those which link man with a higher force outside himself. Farce ignores both the moral and the social laws, not because it denies their existence, but because it sees an alternative to this constant reference to laws, moral or social, an alternative followed by the majority of mankind. The common denominator of farce characters is *ingenuity*, and it is on this level that in farce as in life most problems are solved. In the classic and typical situation, common to all forms of drama, of adulterous relationships, the question to be asked is not as in tragedy, "Having sinned against moral laws, how can I redeem my soul?", or as in comedy, "Having sinned against the sanctity of a social institution, how can I preserve my reputation?" (tragedy being concerned with *character*, comedy with *reputation*, as Shakespeare well knew), but "Being caught in this predicament, how can I *contrive* escape or concealment, so that our world can continue smoothly and safely as it did before human weakness asserted itself?" Farce recognizes that there are alternatives to the solutions provided by tragedy and comedy, and that it is these alternatives that shape the majority of our decisions. The character in farce is barely conscious that he is a moral creature; he is always conscious that he is a thinking and devising creature.

It is in this connection that the term "lower" can be aptly applied to farce without any pejorative connotations; we are concerned with a hierarchy still, but it is a hierarchy of human abilities, moral and mental, not of dramatic types. It is, in fact, possible to speak of a "good" farce and mean considerably more than that the play in question was amusing. Farce has a particular aspect of human existence to present, and its form, far from being accidental or uneconomical, is designed specifically to present that aspect. One might argue that farce, with its temporary reversal of the well-ordered and morally-directed world, is a kind of assertion of man's continual capacity for setting his house in order through the ingenious use of his capacity to make practical, rather than ethical decisions. One sentence might sum up the action of any successful farce: a situation or a relationship gets out of hand and somehow, inefficiently perhaps but eventually successfully, it is put right.

In this respect, then, farce concerns itself with a wider area of human activity than either comedy or tragedy. It may be an accurate representation of man's suppressed inner life, as Mr. Bentley suggests, but it is also, and more obviously and intentionally, an allegory of man's outer life. I use the term "allegory" advisedly, since the relationship between the typical situation in farce and its counterpart in life is not one of imitation but of symbolization. This symbolization is not only that of the inner life, but also of the form and pattern of outer life. The common term for what I have called symbolization is, of course, "improbable situation," but this is unsatisfactory, for it does not suggest where the nature of the improbability lies. Mr. Bentley's answer to this question is prompted by his "safety valve" theory of farce. "While, certainly, the external facts are distorted, the inner experience is so wild and preposterous that it would probably be impossible to exaggerate it.

To the inner experience, the farceur tries to be utterly faithful. This fact raises the question whether farce is as indirect a form of literature as it is commonly supposed to be."[4]

This statement surely avoids the question that must be asked if farce is to be regarded as a responsible form of drama: in what way are the external facts distorted? Farce is rarely completely fantastic (*i.e.*, impossible) but only improbable, and the improbability seems to me to reside, in most cases, not in the farce-situations themselves but in the fact that these situations are carried to their logical conclusions. Taken this far they are, in terms of everyday life, absurd. The actions of most farce characters are, for the duration of the play, the actions of monomaniacs. Indeed, this is one of the chief sources of dramatic unity in farce, although it is popularly assumed to lack any unity at all. For example, the practical solution to Fadinard's problem in *An Italian Straw Hat* is the finding of a hat; this is a situation which has, at the beginning, only a touch of the improbable about it. But when, as the action progresses, Fadinard is committed to this single solution, his behavior becomes absurd, simply because it constitutes reason followed beyond any possibility of compromise. This carrying of a situation to its ultimate conclusion provides the unity for the play; but it also places Fadinard, and the characters with whom he comes into contact, in other situations from which they must extricate themselves, and again the practical, or what seems to be practical, method is chosen, disaster being averted time after time until a point is reached where this kind of solution is no longer efficacious and the dramatist has only two ways open to him—morality or coincidence. Taken to this extreme the situation is, in terms of real life, absurd, distorted. But a human situation carried to such an extreme that it stands out recognizably *as* a situation, with a form and shape of its own, and not merely as a part of the irresolute, untidy, compromising flux of daily life, becomes in a sense not so much unreal as *abstract*, and so the term "allegory" seems to apply.

Another element in farce, noted by most critics, is one form or another of the "chase." The common view is summed up neatly by Leo Hughes.

> The chase has the advantage of providing suspense without at the same time distracting our attention too much from the discrete episodes. At the same time it allows the dramatist to maintain a pace too fast for the leisurely examination which the wildest flights of fancy do not readily survive. The suspense-packed movies of Mr. Hitchcock, to cite a parallel case, have exploited the advantages of fast pacing to forestall a too close scrutiny of motivation. Professor Greig has even suggested a similar benefit from the same device on a somewhat higher literary plane: our acceptance of evil in a Falstaff or a Gargantua, he believes, is earned so easily simply because the vigorousness or the furious pace does not permit us to examine the darker side of our ambivalent attitude too closely.[5]

Here again, then, the question of ambivalence, of the duality of human nature, is brought to bear on the subject of farce. But is this really necessary? The "chase," too, can be regarded as allegorical, the abstract representation of the constant forward movement of life, the tendency to solve problems not by contemplation of their moral significance but by ingenuity and action. Yet the example of Falstaff certainly is relevant. Falstaff's views on honor are, as most Shakespearian scholars have rec-

[4] *Loc. cit.*

[5] Leo Hughes, *A Century of English Farces* (1956), p. 25. Hughes quotes from J. Y. T. Greig, *The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy* (1923), pp. 147-149.

ognized, a corrective to Hotspur's and to Hal's. If these "nobler" characters are reminders to us that man can direct his life according to principles beyond mere survival, Falstaff is always there to show us that survival is, after all, a prerequisite without which the principles would have no point. Those who accept the view that farce has as its purpose nothing but the excitement of laughter might well ponder the essential sanity of a Falstaff in a world where the honor of nations is placed before the survival of the race. There is surely something to be said for *l'homme moyen sensuel,* the perennial hero of farce, who frequently knows that he can get along very well with his ingenuity, without recourse to morality, for he is aware that the average man must pit his wits against a world that seems always ready to collapse about his ears, and that he must do a great deal of running to stay in the same place. If farce ignores morality it is because, to be an artistically effective reflection of the life of the average man, it must do this. The writer of farce knows that morality is what we turn to when all else fails, but he is a man who has not been made cynical by this knowledge.

Our definitions of farce need not, then, be in any way pejorative or apologetic. It is not necessarily a lower form of drama simply because it portrays what, for want of a better term, we must continue to call a "lower" human faculty. It does not deny morality: it simply isolates it and leaves it for treatment in a different form. It is not comedy which has failed to come off, since it does not undertake to criticize life in any way, and constantly refuses to generalize. Where, then, does it stand in the hierarchy in relation to tragedy? The answer is simple. It stands to one side and makes the very positive and valuable statement that tragedy might not even be necessary and might, even, be a little ridiculous.

* * *

HORATIO SEYMOUR: STUMP SPEAKER IN 1868

Wilmer A. Linkugel

EVERY four years presidential candidates travel thousands of miles and deliver addresses before audiences throughout the land. Yet it took many years before campaign canvasses by presidential candidates became accepted practice. William Henry Harrison conducted a colorful campaign in 1840; General Winfield Scott made his celebrated speeches upon his Blue Lick tour from New York to Kentucky in 1852; and Douglas and Breckinridge both spoke in 1860.[1] Nevertheless, decorum still dictated that the candidates should remain withdrawn and let their supporters do the stumping; people thought that the high office of the presidency suffered a loss of dignity if its aspirants actively sought election.

In 1868, when Horatio Seymour was the Democratic candidate and Ulysses S. Grant the Republican candidate, the custom requiring presidential candidates to remain passive worked to the advantage of the Republicans. Whereas General Grant was an inept public speaker, Horatio Seymour was a powerful and eloquent orator.[2]

When Seymour, tall and erect, stood on the platform, the audience saw a bewhiskered man with a broad, expansive forehead who was physically fragile but oratorically eloquent. He held complete possession of his audience. He was fluent, his articulation was clear and distinct, and his voice was pleasant even when delivering his most emotional passages.[3] The partisan *New York World* called Seymour "the most powerful and impressive orator in the United States," and added the poetic tribute:

> One blast upon his bugle horn
> Is worth ten thousand men.[4]

Indeed, the hostile *New York Tribune* sarcastically announced: "If speech-making were the whole duty of Presidents, what a man this would be for the Executive chair."[5]

When Seymour received the Democratic nomination, friends urged him to stump for himself. Seymour, however, chose to remain passive. He too felt that a presidential candidate should stay in the background. Up to October 13 the only speeches he made after his nomination were relatively non-political ones at Albany and at the Saratoga Agricultural Fair.[6]

Republican gains in October elections and the resulting signs of panic in certain Democratic quarters caused Seymour to abandon his passive attitude and to decide to stump for himself. His friends applauded his decision. Even President Johnson, who was lukewarm to Seymour as a candidate, sent the Governor a note approving his canvass, and trusted that Seymour might speak with an inspired tongue.[7]

Nonetheless, Seymour's action stirred up considerable controversy. Censure

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[1] See *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, Oct. 28, 1868.

[2] William B. Hesseltine, *Ulysses S. Grant* (New York, 1935), p. 125.

[3] Alexander J. Wall, *Horatio Seymour, 1810-1886* (New York, 1929), p. 68.

[4] *New York World*, Oct. 21, 1868.

[5] *New York Tribune*, Oct. 28, 1868.

[6] *Utica Observer*, Sept. 10, 11, 1868.

[7] *The Democrat*, New York, N. Y., Oct. 24, 1868.

came from various quarters, especially from his Republican opponents. Republican orators called Seymour's action a disgrace to the high office of the presidency and said this was another reason why the people should vote for the discreet General Grant, who knew the dignity of the high office he was seeking and therefore remained withdrawn. Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, in a speech at Indianapolis, described Seymour as a "novel and painful spectacle of a candidate for the presidency going about like a common stump orator, lecturing for himself, and assailing the character and positions of his opponents."[8]

Newspapers also debated the issue. *The Chicago Times,* like most Democratic papers, defended Seymour's canvass. It pointed out that the only possible objection was that of unconventionality. "The supposition is both natural and reasonable," the *Times* continued, "that presidential candidates are among the ablest men in the country, and that their abilities are of that order which peculiarly fits them for the office." The candidates ought to be men whose knowledge of political issues best enables them to instruct the people. Such being the case, General Grant ought to emerge from retirement also and enter upon a joint discussion with Governor Seymour. This, the *Times* caustically added, would give the General a chance to disprove the slander, originating in partisan malevolence, that his "paucity of speech arises from poverty of intellect."[9] The challenge went unheeded; the Republicans were not in the least interested in having the inarticulate Grant go on the platform with the talented Seymour.

Seymour's itinerary soon took shape. He was to leave his home at Utica and begin by speaking briefly at Syracuse and Rochester and from there to proceed to Buffalo for the tour's official inaugural speech. After Buffalo the itinerary read: Cleveland, October 23; Chicago, October 24; Indianapolis, October 26; then on successive days at Columbus, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and Reading, Philadelphia, and finally on October 31 at Wilkes-Barre. Short speeches were planned for smaller cities and towns along the way.[10]

At each stop Seymour was greeted by a large, enthusiastic throng. People were eager to hear and see the candidate. Despite inclement weather, 8,000 people gathered at the skating rink in Buffalo to hear Seymour's speech.[11]

The largest turnout came at Chicago, where the weather co-operated. On Friday it was cold and blustery. Since the speech was to be given out of doors, Democratic leaders were worried. Saturday morning brought no change, but by noon frost and dew disappeared, and the bitter wind subsided. The evening was warm and pleasant. The turn of the weather prompted *The Chicago Times* to say, "It may be justly claimed that the Almighty is on the side of the democracy." A prominent Republican, Police Commissioner Titsworth, admitted it was the largest meeting he had ever seen. The *Times* reported that eminent men estimated the crowd at not less than 75,000. Since but one day's notice had been given of Seymour's intended visit to Chicago, the *Times* called it a "spontaneous outpouring" of people. The crowd was so immense and so closely bunched that "there seemed at one time, great danger that those around the stand would be crushed to death by the tremendous pressure towards the centre of attraction." The anxiety to hear him was so great that, "with the commence-

[8] *Chicago Times,* Oct. 27, 1868.
[9] *Chicago Times,* Oct. 25, 1868.
[10] Wall, *Seymour,* pp. 100-101.
[11] *New York Tribune,* Oct. 23, 1868.

ment of every new sentence, with every gesture of the speaker's hand, the audience swayed to and fro like a field of wheat before the storm."[12]

An immense gathering met Seymour at the railroad depot in Philadelphia. The Academy of Music, where Seymour was to speak, was crammed at seven o'clock in the evening, and half an hour before the meeting was organized the doors were closed. *The Democrat* estimated that 30,000 people turned out for the occasion.[13] Similar demonstrations of enthusiasm were exhibited at other stops.

Unfortunately, the rigorous schedule and the outdoor speaking in cold, blustery weather proved too much for Seymour's voice. At Chicago he began his speech in husky tones, and "was not for a time distinctly heard, even by those comparatively near the stand. But as he proceeded, his enunciation became clearer, and his remarks more easy to be heard."[14] At Columbus, the Honorable Allen G. Thurman in his introduction of Seymour pleaded for complete silence during the speech. "Governor Seymour," he told the crowd, "has been speaking to immense audiences within the last week, and his voice is necessarily hoarse from exercise, and therefore I crave your patience for a while, if in the first few minutes of his remarks he shall not be heard by you all."[15] On occasion his voice failed entirely and someone else had to complete the speech.

A. The Issues

Seymour's controversial canvass occurred in the turbulent era of reconstruction. Fighting had stopped several years before, but wounds left by the war on the national scene were still unhealed. In June 1868, Congress accepted seven Southern states into the Union, on condition that they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they never change their constitutions to exclude Negroes from the ballot. This left three Southern states—Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas—still unrepresented in Congress.[16]

The bloody shirt remained a strong emotional symbol in the North, and Republican orators were using it in the election to brand the Democrats as traitors. This stigma was a handicap to any Democratic candidate, and perhaps even more to Horatio Seymour, because in a speech in New York City in 1863, he had accused the government of discriminatory draft policies. A riot ensued, and Seymour received the blame for it. He was labeled a Copperhead.[17]

Reconstruction, Negro suffrage, financial considerations, and the tariff were the chief issues in 1868 from which Seymour could choose to construct his arguments.[18] Since people still felt strongly about the war, Seymour tried to divert their minds to financial issues. He calculated that people might be willing to allay passions and prejudices for the sake of their purses.

He centered his arguments on three financial issues. First, he attacked what he called the unfair distribution of the currency. The Republican government eliminated state banks by burdening them with oppressive taxation. To provide new currency, Congress enacted the National Bank Act, which gave the exclusive right to issue paper money to national banks. Under this act the government neglected the West, where the currency was needed the most, and

[12] *Chicago Times*, Oct 26, 1868

[13] *The Democrat*, New York, N. Y., Oct. 31, 1868.

[14] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 26, 1868.

[15] *The Crisis*, Columbus, Ohio, Nov. 4, 1868.

[16] Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868* (New York, 1933), pp. 17-18.

[17] Hesseltine, *Grant*, p. 124.

[18] Coleman, *Election of 1868*, pp. 13-48.

concentrated it in the East. Massachusetts got 57 millions; Illinois, which had far greater population than Massachusetts, got less than 10 millions. Secondly, Seymour alleged that the heavy tax the Republicans levied on cotton after the war was damaging to a genuine reconstruction of the South. The tax ruined the planters financially, and as a result the unpaid African laborer became hostile to his employer. Thirdly, he arraigned the party in power for corruption and incompetency in dealing with the country's finances. From its inception to the time of Republican rule, the United States government had spent only one billion seven hundred million dollars, yet during that time two foreign wars had been conducted and an extent of territory twice as large as the original area of the States had been purchased. But from 1860 to 1864, the Republican party spent three billions, and during the four years of peace, up to June 1868, they spent nearly one billion six hundred millions, a total which almost equalled that of the seventy years previous; yet the Union was not even restored.

Seymour called these financial questions the "real and vital" issues of the campaign, and accused the Republicans of dodging them. He told the voters that the Republicans were attempting "to turn away the public mind from the questions of finance and taxation, and to fire the Northern hearts against the Southern states by saying the spirit of rebellion still exists there in full force."[19]

In all his speeches, Seymour begged the people to set aside passions and prejudices. At Indianapolis he asked, "Cannot we set aside our passion for patriotism, when so many have sacrificed their lives from patriotic motives."[20] He concluded his Chicago speech by telling the people of Illinois: "You cannot afford to decide these questions in a way merely to gratify your passions or your prejudice against men. It is one that comes home to you in all your business affairs. Your decision will affect me less than it will yourselves."[21] Clearly, Seymour hoped to get people to dispose of the bloody shirt and to decide the election on financial issues.

He devoted more time to reconstruction early in the canvass than he did later. Since he tried to get people to forget sectional strife between North and South, he only discussed reconstruction issues he deemed vital to his cause. The most notable such issue was the Republican charge that if the Democrats were elected they would involve the country in war again. They based their argument on charges concerning General Francis P. Blair, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate. General Blair believed that the "real and only issue in this contest was the overthrow of reconstruction, as the radical Republicans forced it in the South." The president-elect should declare these methods unconstitutional and "trample into the ground the usurpations of Congress," and furthermore should refuse to enforce the reconstruction acts by compelling "the army to undo its usurpations at the South."[22] During the campaign Blair discussed one factor: reconstruction. His central theme was that the radical reconstruction acts were unconstitutional, and to document his claim he cited Supreme Court decisions, notably *ex parte* Milligan, Cummings vs. Missouri, and *ex parte* Garland. Un-

[19] *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1868.
[20] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 27, 1868.
[21] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 24, 1868.
[22] *New York World*, July 3, 1868. On June 30 Blair stated his attitude towards reconstruction in a letter to Colonel James O. Brodhead of Missouri.

like Seymour, Blair tried to meet the Republicans on their own ground.

In the tour's inaugural speech at Buffalo, Seymour felt compelled to face the charge that he was to be sent to his final account by his political supporters and that General Blair was then "to trample beneath his feet the reconstruction laws." Instead of underwriting Blair and his views, Seymour argued that Blair would be confronted by a Republican Senate and House of Representatives, by the Army of the United States flanked by the Loyal Leagues, and by "the grand armies of the Republic under the command of their own [Republican] candidate for the presidency." Blair would be standing alone, shackled by Congressional restraints, and would have to crush all this opposing power in order to plunge the country into civil war. Seymour concluded, "If this is true then General Blair is either the most vigorous man who has lived in the history of the world, or Republican Senators, members of Congress, and commanders of armies are the most imbecile men who ever disgraced public positions."[23] Seymour soon dropped this issue from his speeches; financial reforms, not reconstruction, comprised his message.

B. Special Appeals

1. *Audience Adaptation*

Throughout the canvass, Seymour was a master of audience adaptation. He skillfully revealed to his audiences what effect the issues of the campaign had on their vital interests. He told his Western audiences that the currency shortage caused by the government's distribution policies hurt them in two ways: (1) a lack of currency was damaging to commerce in the West generally; and (2) if the Westerner went to the bank to borrow money, the borrower had to pay an exorbitant interest rate, because the Western banker, lacking currency, had to go East and borrow, thereby forcing the borrower to pay interest to two banks. Seymour told his Illinois listeners, "Illinois pays interest to Massachusetts upon what should be its own money; the west is tributary to the east for a circulation which rightfully belonged to the west."[24] He also said to his Western audiences that the cotton tax ruined the planter financially, and, as a result, he could not buy corn or pork from the farmers of the West. "The export duty on cotton," Seymour stated in Chicago, "proved to be an export duty on corn."[25] At Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, he told the laborer that it was unjust to have one kind of money for the bondholder and another kind for the laborer.

2. *Emotional Appeals*

Seymour's first few speeches in the canvass were relatively free from emotional appeals, except for the appeal to the impelling motives of profit and security. He used more *pathos* as the canvass progressed. After his Chicago speech, he usually opened his address with emotional descriptions of the beauty and wonder of the country he had traversed.

Sometimes his emotional appeals were awkward. For example, at Indianapolis he said, "May the spirit which animated our soldiers when they went forth to battle for our union; and the spirit which animated them as they lay bleeding upon the battle field, looking upon and loving the nation's flag, as they were suffering and dying, animate us as we are now entering upon duties as sacred as those in which they were en-

[23] *New York Tribune*, Oct. 23, 1868.

[24] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 24, 1868.

[25] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 24, 1868.

gaged."[26] It is doubtful if dying soldiers paid much attention to the nation's flag.

Emotional proof was not a strong factor in Seymour's speeches, logical support was dominant.

3. *Ethical Appeals*

As was mentioned above, Seymour had been involved in the New York draft riots of 1863 and was thought a Copperhead. To remove this stigma, he repeatedly tried to build his *ethos* by associating himself with patriotism and love for country. At Indianapolis he solicited, "I do want you to look upon me as a man that loves his country, and as a man that would sacrifice his all for its welfare."[27] At Philadelphia he declared that after traversing the West he could not help feeling a new admiration for his country, and a new desire to serve it in any way within his power. He proclaimed, "God knows I love my country."[28]

Seymour also sought to convey that in seeking the presidency he was not self-seeking. He had tried to avoid his nomination. When his name was presented to the Democratic convention, Seymour had come forward, announced that his name was not to be used, and instructed the convention secretary not to record his vote. Vallandigham of Ohio and Kernan of New York spearheaded a successful move to nominate Seymour.[29] When he embarked on his canvass, Seymour said, "I go forth as your candidate not, because I sought it, but because you bade me to do so."[30] On other occasions he stated: "I stand before you now in no self-seeking spirit," and, "I have studied its [our country's] affairs, and have no word, or sentiment, or argument to advance tonight that were not my sentiments . . . before I became a candidate for public office. I should distrust myself if these convictions had been formed under the influence of any personal or selfish interest."[31]

C. Stylistic Devices

Seymour's simple style, coupled with good organization, made his ideas clear and easy to understand. He seldom spoke figuratively, but employed the rhetorical question effectively. Sometimes, in order to emphasize his point of attack, he asked several rhetorical questions in succession. Frequently he used a question as a transition, and in his next point he answered it. Although his speeches were not noted for humor, at times he provoked laughter with a witticism. *The Chicago Times* reported that Seymour incited laughter three times in his speech at Chicago.[32] He achieved his greatest effect from vigorous and animated language. The following passage from his speech at Buffalo is a good example: "The first words uttered by the Republican Convention in their resolutions congratulated the country upon the success of their scheme of reconstruction; the last words uttered by their speakers and their presses declare that reconstruction is a failure, that the South is still in a condition of rebellion, that its social disorders demand the presence of great armies, and that the first duty of congress when it meets will be to turn reconstructed Georgia out of the Union again" (Applause).[33]

D. Conclusions

Seymour constructed his speeches to achieve three main objectives during

[26] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 27, 1868.
[27] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 27, 1868.
[28] *Public Ledger*, Philadelphia, Oct. 31, 1868.
[29] Coleman, *Election of 1868*, pp. 215-245.
[30] *New York World*, Oct. 23, 1868.
[31] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 27, 1868.
[32] *Chicago Times*, Oct. 24, 1868.
[33] *New York Tribune*, Oct. 23, 1868.

the canvass: (1) To persuade Westerners that their interests were not represented in the radical Republican government, and that a vote for a Republican was a vote for Eastern interests, whereas a vote for a Democrat was a vote for Western interests; (2) To persuade people to allay the passions and prejudices aroused by the war and to view the political scene objectively, so that they might realize that financial matters, not reconstruction, were the vital issues of the campaign; (3) To build his *ethos*.

In carrying out these objectives, he usually used the same topics. He constructed his speeches differently (what he used one time for an introduction he might insert the next time into the body of the speech), and adapted them to his different audiences, but he reiterated the ideas on which he thought the campaign hinged.

As a whole, the speeches Seymour made on this canvass were good speeches. He developed his issues with logical adequacy and cited evidence in support of his stand. Occasionally he made assumptions and unsupported assertions, but generally he showed ability to make his points solid. His greatest skill lay in his ability to adapt his arguments to his listeners.

The Democratic candidate assailed the Republicans and their record with vehemence, but refrained from using personal invectives. He did not try to belittle his opponent, General Grant, who had little preparation for a political career as the nation's chief executive. The popularity of the General, who had been a principal figure in bringing the war to a close, no doubt caused Seymour to stick to the issues. A blistering attack on the political capabilities of Grant, the symbol of victory and peace, might have confirmed in the minds of many people the charge that the Democratic candidate had been a traitor during the war.

E. Results of the Canvass

Without question, Seymour's speaking on this canvass assured his place among the outstanding orators of the day. The immense crowds which turned out to hear the candidate attest to his eloquence. Furthermore, a special dispatch from Chicago to the *New York World* reports that Seymour's speeches stimulated considerable thought: "The effect of Governor Seymour's speeches, delivered during his late tour, has been tremendous upon the business community. The Columbus speech, especially, has been the chief topic of conversation for the past three days in the Board of Trade."[34]

It is also certain that Seymour's canvass helped to establish the custom of the presidential candidates meeting the voters face to face and stating their views, thereby giving a large number of people an opportunity to make a personal evaluation of the candidates. After 1868, it was less controversial for a presidential candidate to stump for himself.

But what of the election itself? Did Seymour's speechmaking place any votes in the column of the Democracy?

On October 27, 1868, Gideon Welles wrote in his diary, "Horatio Seymour has gone West making speeches. He talks very well, but his speeches are likely to be unavailing."[35] Welles' remark proved prophetic, for Seymour's eloquence failed to bring victory. Grant received 214 electoral votes; Seymour 60.

[34] [Special Dispatch to the *World*], Chicago, October 31. A clipping found in the Scrapbooks of Horatio Seymour, Vol. 12, 1865-1870, New York State Historical Society Library, Albany, N. Y. The date of the *New York World* is not recorded.

[35] *Diary of Gideon Welles* (New York, 1911), III, 462.

Grant carried twenty-six states; Seymour but eight. An examination of the voting in the states in which Seymour spoke yields no startling results. The Democrats won New York, Seymour's home state, by 10,000 votes, but lost Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to the Republicans. The narrowest margin was in Indiana, where approximately 10,000 votes separated the candidates; the widest margin was in Illinois, where Grant won by 51,000 votes.[36]

The results, as Welles' comment indicates, were not surprising. Seymour had been pitted against a popular war hero who by 1868 had become the symbol of peace. Much was made of Grant's concluding words from his letter of acceptance: "Let us have peace."[37] The radical press and orators echoed the theme, "Grant and peace," "Seymour and Blair and war."

In many respects, Seymour was an ill-chosen candidate. Not only was his allegiance to the Union during the war questioned in various quarters, but also his ideas on finance differed greatly from those of the party. He repudiated the Ohio idea regarding currency which the Democratic Convention had written into the party's platform.

Numerous dignitaries regarded Seymour as a weak candidate. President Johnson thought him to be the worst man who could have been nominated.[38] Horace Greeley went so far as to write in the *New York Tribune* that the Republicans themselves could not have selected more satisfactory candidates for the Democrats.[39] For a time there even was discussion of replacing Seymour and Blair with other candidates.

When the early October elections went decisively against the Democrats, the obvious conclusion was that the presidential election was already decided. It was then that pressure was brought on Seymour to take to the stump. *The New York World,* realizing Seymour's oratorical skill, called for his active participation in the campaign. Leading members of the party communicated with him and also urged his active candidacy.[40] Seymour answered the call and pushed the campaign with a new vigor. The Democracy was aroused.

It is almost certain that the canvass boosted the Democratic cause, for Seymour, who initially seemed to have little appeal, ultimately received greater support from the voters than a first glance reveals. Grant's popular majority was only 309,500 votes, out of a total of 5,716,000 votes cast, and he barely won California, Connecticut, and Indiana. It should not be overlooked that Seymour won the majority of the Nation's white vote; Negro votes defeated him.[41] No speaking canvass could have gained the Negro vote for the Democrats at this moment in history, and to offset the large Republican Negro vote, Seymour needed to win an unusually high percentage of white votes.

The situation kept Horatio Seymour, the reluctant but eloquent candidate, from becoming president. Had he been elected, he too would have had to face the avenging radicals in Congress who all but devoured President Johnson. Perhaps in defeat there was victory.

[36] See Coleman, *Election of 1868*, p. 484.

[37] Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, *The United States Since 1865* (New York, 1949), p. 27.

[38] *Welles*, III, 398-401.

[39] *New York Tribune*, July 10, 17, 1868.

[40] *New York World*, Seymour Scrapbooks, date not recorded.

[41] William B. Hesseltine, *The South in American History* (New York, 1943), p. 516.

THE FORUM

EDITORIAL

Beginning with the next number, *QJS* will carry a new set of editorial names on its masthead. The constitutional provision for a triennial change in the editorship and the consequent reconsideration of editorial policy appear eminently wise. The manifold and disparate interests and preoccupations within the SAA, and the inevitable limitations in the scope and capacities of any board of editors, make frequent redistribution of editorial responsibility not only essential for the survival of editors but salutary for the welfare of learning in our profession. With confidence in the soundness of these propositions we turn the *Journal* over to our successors.

Any editor of *QJS* sets himself the goal of preserving and improving the excellence of the publication to which he is to devote the major portion of his extracurricular time, energy, and thought for upwards of three years. In neither function is he likely to find himself altogether satisfied with the result. The retiring editor is no exception. At the beginning of his term, however, he and his colleagues set out to conduct for SAA a scholarly journal of such scope and such quality as the accessible resources might support. At the same time, so far as the special province of *QJS* among the publications of the Association should warrant, we sought to provide for those other pervasive concerns of our readers: pedagogy, policy, and professional practice. How far we have fulfilled our intention, others may judge. Of its soundness in principal we remain convinced.

On another page, with a *Hail and Farewell,* Editor-Elect Richard Murphy announces the succession to the chair of Shop Talk, which he has filled with grace and distinction for the past three years. With equal fanfare and much satisfaction we print the names and designations of the new editors as the last words of our valedictory.

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MEMORANDUM OF THE 1761 EDITION OF JAMES BURGH *THE ART OF SPEAKING*

To the Editor:

In February 1957, I bought in England a 1761 edition of James Burgh, *The Art of Speaking*. Shortly afterwards I was put out of circulation by that coronary thrombosis, and for a long time thereafter I was not able to inquire why I had a 1761 edition of a book which was supposed to have first been printed in 1762. Robert Watt's *Bibliotheca Britannica* (Edinburgh, 1824) lists the first edition as 1762. This volume, of course, is sometimes inaccurate, and so must be used with caution; but W. T. Lowndes' *The Bibliographer's Manual of English Literature* (London 1834, revised 1857, reprinted 1871) also lists Burgh's first edition as 1762. This is a far more accurate work than Watt's and must be respected. Finally, the biographer of Burgh in *DNB* lists the first edition as 1762. The weight of these authorities had fixed the date, and all American scholars but two had accepted it. One of these was Ota Thomas Reynolds in "The Teaching of Rhetoric in the United States during the Classical Period of Education," in *The History and Criticism of American Public Address* (New York, 1943), I, 203. The other was Warren Guthrie in "The Elocution Movement in England," *SM*, XVIII (March 1951), 21. Both of these listed the first edition as 1761.

Nevertheless, the weight of evidence would have been in favor of 1762, except for my having a copy dated 1761. So I wrote the Huntington Library, Folger Shakespeare Library, University of Cambridge, Bodleian of Oxford, and the British Museum; and from them received the following replies:

Huntington: "The earliest edition that the Huntington has of James Burgh's *The Art of Speaking* is the fourth, 1775."

Folger: "The earliest edition that we have is that of 1772 (the 3rd)."

Cambridge: "We do not possess a copy of James Burgh *The Art of Speaking*."

Bodleian: "We have only two late editions of the above work: 6th edition Dublin 1784, 7th edition London 1792."

British Museum: "We have the following editions of the work you mention: Dublin 1763, Second edition London 1768, Sixth edition London 1784, Seventh edition London 1792, Danbury, Connecticut, 1795."

Of course I had also written Warren Guthrie and found the opportunity to talk with Ota Reynolds. Both said they had found a 1761 copy at Harvard University. A letter to Mr. William A. Jackson of the Houghton Library at Harvard brought the following reply:

> The Harvard Library has a copy of a London, f. T. Longman, J. Buckland, W. Fenner, J. Waugh, E. Dilly, and T. Field, with their addresses, 1761 edition of James Burgh's *The Art of Speaking*. This book we have had since 1767 when it was given to us by John Hancock.

Likewise I wrote the librarians of those two other oldest American colleges, William and Mary, and Yale. William and Mary had no listed copy, but might have an unlisted copy, for it still is in the process of listing thousands of books owned by former students and faculty which are stored in the Manuscript and Archives Department. Yale had no copy of any early edition.

Finally, I wrote the Union Catalog Division, Library of Congress, which keeps possibly the most complete catalog of rare books owned by the American Research Libraries. Its record showed two 1761 copies, one at Harvard and the other at the Library Company of Philadelphia Library, plus a microfilm of the Harvard copy at the University of Southern California and the University of Michigan. W. M. Parrish reports that the University of Florida has a copy of 1761.

This settles one question and raises another:

1. Despite Watt, Lowndes, and *DNB*, there was a 1761 edition of Burgh and at least three copies are now in existence.

2. But there is no extant copy of any 1762 edition. Dr. Louis B. Wright, Director of The Folger Shakespeare Library, wrote: "Our reference librarian, Miss Dorothy Mason, has checked the title. . . . The earliest extant recorded copy is the 2nd of 1763 in the British Museum." The Union Catalog Division, Library of Congress, states, "1762 ed. not located."

Could it be that Watt erroneously recorded the first edition as 1762 instead of 1761, that Lowndes and *DNB* copied Watt's error, and that we have all been misled because of the great weight of these authorities? If anyone has any evidence, I would appreciate learning about it.

W. Norwood Brigance
Wabash College

THE MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF FRANCIS HORNER, M.P.

To the Editor:

In 1817 a British politician named Francis Horner died of a mysterious lung ailment at the age of thirty-eight. He had been born and reared in Edinburgh, and as a youth he had been the close companion of Henry Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, and Sydney Smith. Educated at Edinburgh High School and the University of Edinburgh, he had been a member of the famous Speculative Society and one of the founders of the *Edinburgh Review*. Although a member of both the Scottish and English bars, it was in the House of Commons that he hoped to achieve fame. Horner came into the House in 1807, and in the ten years that followed became known as one of the most honorable and intelligent members of the Whig party. It is probable that he would have held high office. However, his death occurred before he had achieved real prominence, and today he is scarcely remembered.

After his death, his brother Leonard put together his correspondence and his journal into a work which was entitled *The Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, M.P.* The two volumes of this work were published in London by John Murray in 1843. The same obscurity which has been the fate of the author has also been the fate of the book. Nevertheless, for the student of British public address, Horner's *Memoirs and Correspondence* offers three contributions: first, it contains some en-

lightening and critical accounts of famous speakers; second, it gives added insight into the speech education of the period; and finally, it is rich in the type of background materials important to the rhetorician. The following is an attempt to exemplify Horner's contributions in these three areas.

Among the speakers Horner mentioned were Fox, Pitt, Windham, Percival, Tierney, Brougham, Canning, and Romilly. Upon first seeing Fox and Pitt in action in 1796, Horner wrote the following to his friend J. A. Murray:

> The one [Fox], indeed, speaks with great animation, and, I am convinced, from the warmest sincerity of heart; and the other [Pitt] has a most wonderful fluency and correctness, approaching almost to mechanical movement. But neither of them has proceeded so far as the observance of Shakespeare's rule; for the one *saws the air* with his hands, and the other with his whole body. [I, 11-12.]

In a letter written to his father eight years later, he again compared Fox and Pitt. This time Pitt got the better of the comparison: "All the substance of his [Fox's] speech was excellent. Pitt gave both substance and manner, as a debater of the highest powers." [I, 248.]

From Horner we get one of the few comments concerning the forensic speaking of Brougham. Horner did not believe his old friend to be a first-rate pleader, for he stated that Brougham lacked "Precision and clearness in the details, symmetry in the putting of them together, an air of finish and unity in the whole." [II, 136.] He thought that Brougham had the talents for a "higher sort" of speaking than the forensic, but he did not elaborate upon this statement.

In summary, Horner's criticisms are particularly valuable since they generally are made with reference to specific speaking occasions which he had observed. They are not general, vague impressions.

Horner's references to speech education reveal (1) the lack of stress upon curricular speech training in the academic institutions of the period, (2) the importance of the debating society as a training ground for the young orator, and (3) the unusual exertions which he made in order to cultivate his style—exertions evidently fairly common among young men of his era.

Horner made no mention of any training he received in his formal academic career which helped him as a speaker. Probably all that was available was the course in rhetoric which William Greenfield taught at the University. Descriptions of Greenfield's course make it appear doubtful that it contained any practice in speaking.

Horner made frequent and laudatory mention of the Speculative Society, which he joined in 1797. Some interesting remarks concerning the speaking of the young Brougham are preserved in these comments. The extreme seriousness with which Horner approached the activities of this society apparently was shared by others of the select twenty-five who were members.

The student of today may be surprised at the efforts which Horner made to develop his style. He was able to read the classical languages, and spent much of his time reading selections which he believed would correctly form his style. When feeling ill for several days in 1801, Horner passed his time reading Cicero, Massillon, and Demosthenes. He records several instances of translating into English from a foreign language as "another exercise in style." While formal training was lacking in the schools, Horner and his companions nevertheless pursued an active and profitable rhetorical education on their own.

Finally, Horner gives background insight into the speakers of his period. His descriptions of the drunken ruin that had been Sheridan are truly pathetic. Fox is pictured as a warm, generous man, easy to know and easy to converse with. The complexity of Brougham becomes more realistic as his many facets are discussed in the letters Horner exchanged with their mutual Edinburgh acquaintances. The climate in which these speakers operated is also described. For instance, in a letter to Murray in 1796 Horner defended passionate eloquence in the House of Commons because "perhaps not one member comes into the chapel without his opinion previously formed on the questions that are to be discussed." [I, 12.] He believed that passionate eloquence might be the only sort with which a speaker could hope to sway his audience.

Perhaps these few samples of the materials to be found in Horner's *Memoirs and Correspondence* will stimulate its greater use by students of British public address. It is indeed a valuable reference work.

LLOYD WATKINS
Ohio University

PETITION FOR INTEREST GROUP THEATRE AND DRAMA

The undersigned members of the Speech Association of America, in compliance with the regulations governing "Organization and Meetings of Interest Groups" (By-Laws of the Association, Article V), submit herewith a statement of intention to organize an Interest Group to be known as "Theatre and Drama."

RESOLVED:

That an Interest Group for the promotion of theatre and drama be admitted to the present ranks of such groups within the Speech Association of America; that, in pursuance of this aim, an initial meeting of said Interest Group be duly scheduled for the December 1959 Association Convention, in order that the sponsoring committee (or its delegates) may form a temporary organization and elect a temporary chairman and a temporary secretary; and, further, that it shall be the function of said temporary committee to adopt at this initial meeting a resolution setting forth (a) the name and scope of the Group, (b) the purposes, (c) the differentiation of the Group from existing Interest Groups, and (d) the relation of the Group to the field of speech, which resolution, signed by the requisite number of Association members, the temporary secretary shall then submit to the Executive Secretary for presentation to the Administrative Council.

Respectfully submitted,

Pat M. Ryan, Jr.
Joel Dick
Albert B. Weiner
(Sponsoring Committee)
Alethea Smith Mattingly
Edward E. Markert
Keith Doss
John W. Gassner
Kenneth Dimmick
Paul E. MacCready
David J. Mall
J. W. Patterson
James Yeater
R. E. Davis
R. W. Albright
W. H. Stites

REPORT ON ELECTION OF 1959 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

For the 1959 Nominating Committee, the results were as follows: total votes cast, 741; total number of persons receiving votes, 359. The 12 persons receiving the most votes were:

Bower Aly
Frank B. Davis
Douglas Ehninger
Wilbur E. Gilman
Robert Gray Gunderson
Orville A. Hitchcock
T. Earle Johnson
James H. McBurney

Emil R. Pfister
W. Charles Redding
Claude L. Shaver
Donald K. Smith

The second ballot was mailed to members in November.

ACADEMIC TV TRAINING

To The Editor:

The emergence of television has brought us face to face with an unlimited influence which can operate for good or for evil. What are the results of ten years of television broadcasting? Family life centers in the home receiver, opinions change as rapidly as the weather, values have altered, sociological problems have grown in size and scope, international boundaries have been bridged, and the world has shrunk to a mere twist of a dial. The impact of the television picture has shaken the world far more than sound alone did in the past. Soon we will be able to sit in our homes watching live telecasts direct from Bombay, Hongkong, Paris, London, Berlin,—anywhere. We are challenged to greater understanding and closer communication with our world neighbors and their problems.

For centuries the theatre and allied arts have been building a background of cultural, social, and moral values. Television needs a deep and studied concentration in these areas. We must be able to justify our existence as television teachers not just in terms of academic requirements and achievements for a degree but in terms of historical achievement in other communication media. Somehow we, as teachers, must be able to show the student of television that there is more to the medium than late, late movies.

As teachers, we represent a sizable section of the viewing and listening public. Are we willing to sit back and allow pap to flow over us day in and day out? If we are, can we expect our students to do otherwise? We cannot preach one thing in the classroom and studios, and practice another.

Men like Sylvester "Pat" Weaver, Edward R. Murrow, and Eric Sevareid do not cry out for intelligent change in television practices just to hear themselves talk. They see real danger in present practices, and they envision a world of good that can be done with real understanding of the television medium's potential.

As teachers in the medium, we must inform our students of these dangers and the many uses to which television can be put other than mere entertainment. The techniques of adverse propaganda, subliminal perception, hypnotic persuasion, and brain-washing are all extremely dangerous ammunition for the electronic tube of television and must be controlled, if we are to survive as free people.

A balance between academic material and practical application is necessary to develop the integrated student, but there is more to our problem. Through proper evaluation of the medium, we must develop and communicate awareness and understanding of the influence television can have and will have for good or for evil, upon the minds of the world population. This evaluation can only be achieved through constant exploration of the problems beyond the classroom and the station.

We are living in the space-age. Our thinking and planning must keep pace. As communication "guides," we have a tremendous responsibility to our students, our communities, and our nation. We cannot afford ivory tower tactics.

JACK W. WARFIELD
University of Southern California

NEW BOOKS IN REVIEW

ROBERT G. GUNDERSON, *Editor*

GRADUATE RESEARCH IN SPEECH

Lester Thonssen

In the exposition and defense of his theory of culture, Isocrates remarked that "to view as a whole so great an extent of subject matter, to harmonize and bring together so many diverse varieties of discourse . . . , and to make all parts consonant one with another, was by no means an easy understanding." I reflected on this comment while reading Professor Auer's book, for it too contains a wide variety of details drawn from this rather limitless area we call *speech*. The literature of our subject is extensive and widely scattered in periodicals, books, monographs, reports, and dissertations. The physical feat of pulling together the major threads of this fabric is in itself an awesome achievement. Professor Auer has done the job with resounding success. His book will serve ends that go far beyond the immediate requirements of courses in the Introduction to Graduate Study; it will, I am sure, serve as a companion volume to textbooks in many of the specialized areas. The publication of *An Introduction to Research in Speech* is an important event in the history of speech education in America.

The plan of the book is simple. It outlines the major areas of the field of speech, discusses the types of research studies and the nature of the research problem, examines the bibliographical resources available to the scholar, explains in detail the distinctive features of three methods of research (historical, descriptive, and experimental), and presents a few suggestions for the improvement of professional writing.

Just when research in speech began is hard to tell. It depends upon how severely we define the term. In one sense, Plato's strictures on rhetoric were research undertakings, as were Cicero's evaluations of the oratory of Scaurus of Calidius, and of the host of others who peopled his *Brutus*. But the research with which Professor Auer is concerned is of relatively recent development. The early advocates of research programs published their pleas less than fifty years ago, and most of the illustrative material —of which there is a laudable abundance in the book—comes from studies undertaken after 1925. Those of us who have voted in more national elections than we care to count find it hard to believe that the formal program of graduate work was getting started about the time our younger colleagues were born. Even the most superficial examination of our accomplishments to date furnishes grounds for a measure of pride.

Both beginning and more sophisticated students will find the opening chapter helpful. It provides an over-view of the field, linking the areas closely with the activities of the professional organi-

Mr. Thonssen (Ph.D., State University of Iowa, 1931), Professor of Speech, City College of New York, is a Past-President of the SAA and a former editor of Speech Monographs.

zations (SAA, AETA, ASHA, etc.) which help to stimulate research. I somehow wished that Professor Auer had given a more extensive analysis of the features of speech as an organized discipline. I say this not because there are still some doubters in this fair land who question the intellectual respectability of our research undertakings. The author has no obligation to enter upon debate with them. Nor am I by any extension of remarks saying that he should assume a posture of defensiveness, of apology. Nevertheless, he has an opportunity in such a work to reveal objectively what the grounds are on which we stake our claims and what the relations of our subject are to the total enterprise of learning. The fact that this is a treatment of research in *speech,* rather than a description and analysis of research methods generally, suggests to this reader the advisability of etching sharply the outline, features, and distinctive marks of the field. And listing the areas in which we work and the studies we undertake will not alone achieve that end. By quoting ourselves we will, it is true, reveal our contemporary practices; but perhaps it is even more important to indicate first what this system of principles and phenomena we call speech is that prompts our scholarly practices. In short, what is the rationale of this field?

Within the compass of some thirty-five pages, Professor Auer gives about the most useful summary of bibliographical materials I have come upon. Listing both general and specialized resources, he provides the sort of coverage that will find ready use in many speech courses besides the ones for which the book is designed.

Since the number of indexes and guides is of an astronomical order, any additions to a selected list, suggested by an outsider, carry the stamp of arbitrariness and personal prejudice. I believe, however, that Theodore Besterman's contribution deserves a place on the list of general resources. His *World Bibliography of Bibliographies*—an impressive title if ever there was one—is doubtless the greatest work of its kind in print. Now systematically complete to 1953 (with a few entries of slightly later date), this four-volume colossus lists all separately published bibliographies in all of the languages except the oriental. Furthermore, there may be enough microfilm, microcard, and microprint material now available for students of speech to justify a listing among the specialized resources. I am thinking, for example, of such items as *British and Continental Rhetoric and Elocution,* Chauncey Goodrich's *Select British Eloquence,* Margaret Robb's *Oral Interpretation of Literature in American Colleges and Universities: A Historical Study of Teaching Methods;* and *Three Centuries of Drama.*

The heart of Professor Auer's book is in chapters V, VI, and VII, dealing with the techniques and procedures of the historical, descriptive, and experimental methods of research. These are lucid analyses—systematic, concise, and thorough. They will save prospective researchers many hours of labor; even more important, they will suggest a variety of ways of attacking problems. Whether or not the student plans to write a thesis in any of these areas, he will derive profit from reading the chapters. The section on the historical method, to name but one, should be required reading for all students of British and American Oratory, Rhetorical Theory, and Rhetorical Criticism.

I have said that the book will serve many purposes. One of its most salutary functions will be to stimulate a bit of

self-analysis, of soul-searching. Is the state of scholarship in our field healthy? Does the bulk of our research have significance? Is it of high quality? Do the findings articulate with the intellectual achievements in other fields? Do the staggering accumulations of masters' theses and doctoral dissertations add up to much more than time-consuming projects for eager students? I am not voicing my convictions in interrogative form. With relatively few reservations, I am prepared to answer "Yes" to the items of this self-prepared, self-administered questionnaire. But many of our colleagues still have doubts. Nothing short of superior teaching and exacting research will disabuse their minds of false or uninformed impressions. This book will help to brush away some misapprehensions.

Let me add two passing observations before closing. Apropos of the historical method, Professor Auer wisely remarks that nothing he has said should "lead to the conclusion that all historical studies must fall into a single pattern." My limited examination of theses during the past twenty-five years makes me feel that this warning should be solicitously noted. Adherence to rather stiff, stereotyped patterns has been discernible. This has, in my judgment, tended to stifle ingenuity and creativeness, and has brought about a kind of inquiry by formula, by the rule of the book. This has often resulted in a type of self-conscious scholarship in which the insistence upon objectivity—an admitted necessity, of course—has crowded imaginative and philosophic insight from the scene.

One of the most exciting—and in the long run it may prove the most fruitful—developments of recent years has been the application of the experimental method to problems in speech. Many experimental findings have already found a place in our teaching practices. I think, however, that we should note carefully Professor Auer's remarks on the limitations of the method. The number of variables in the complex personal equation of a speaker-audience relationship, for example, is manifold. Despite the integrity of the experimental design and method, the job of holding variables constant, of keeping "disturbing influences" out, is of Olympian proportions. It is difficult—some may say undesirable—to depersonalize the study of an orator.

Any year that produces one book in our field of the stature of *An Introduction to Research in Speech* deserves special mention. Jot down 1959 as a banner season.

BOOK REVIEWED

AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH IN SPEECH. By J. Jeffery Auer. New York: Harper, 1959; pp. x+244. $5.00.

BULWER AND MACREADY: A CHRONICLE OF THE EARLY VICTORIAN THEATRE. Edited by Charles H. Shattuck. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958; pp vii+278. $5.75.

In February 1836, Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton invited tragedian William Charles Macready to call on him at the Albany. The former, internationally famous and the most-read novelist of his day, had determined to test his strength in "the arena most tempting and most dangerous to all English men of letters after Shakespeare—the theatre"; and he was seeking to enlist the assistance of the latter, then the leading actor and stage-director of the British stage. Both the pertinent events preliminary to the ensuing meeting and a day-by-day account of its historic aftermath, encompassing nearly four decades, are faithfully set forth in *Bulwer and Macready*, of which Charles H. Shattuck modestly styles himself the editor. Shattuck has, however, accomplished much more than the collation and organization of the Bulwer-Macready correspondence (the principal matter of this volume, augmented by key sections from Macready's *Diaries*)—he has

given us a chronicle of the theatre history of an entire era, one in which his chief subjects, for better or for worse, stood at the forefronts of their respective fields.

Let us acknowledge him the *author* of this exemplary history, an author not the least of whose virtues is a capacity to delineate vividly the cultural canons (one might say idiosyncrasies) of the Victorian Age without once venturing an ameliorating—but necessarily compromising—gesture in their collective behalf. Shattuck does not mock either the long-view literary limitations of Bulwer's dramatic art or the contributory aesthetic limitations of Macready's audience; but neither does he defend them. "For us," he writes, "it is hard to remember that during the three decades after 1820 the English people believed that they were experiencing a genuine dramatic renaissance." Though this ostensible "renaissance" constitutes the very background against which Shattuck's actors perform, he himself remains a sufficiently discerning critic never to lapse into easy advocacy of it. Yet he manages, in this regard, more than a correct aloofness: more than once, in surveying the corpus of Bulwer's plays, he favors us with a knowing, tolerant smile.

To the 105 Bulwer-Macready letters published by Brander Matthews in 1905 Shattuck has added roughly a score more, plus significant exchanges of correspondence involving litterateur John Forster and London manager Benjamin Webster; and he has corrected the dedicated Matthews' numerous errors of transcription and his frequent misdatings. When working from originals, as noted in the Introduction, he supplies an exact transcript of these letters. "I have endeavored to reproduce as faithfully as possible all those carelessnesses of hand and idiosyncrasies of spelling, abbreviation, punctuation, and the like, which give quick letter-writing its personal flavor and sense of immediacy. 'Errors' of this sort are usually let stand without editorial comment." And since the drift of most of the letters is toward the première of a Bulwer play, Shattuck also provides transcripts of first-night playbills and of significant reviews in the public press. (He seems to err only once in his painstaking chronology: the Haymarket production of *Money* was first seen on December [not October] 8, 1840.)

By giving us the correct reading of *La Vallière's* "ravished" and "raptured"—for which Matthews had printed "vanished" and "ruptured"—in Bulwer's letter of November 22, 1836 ("I shall send you [a copy]—the ravished of Montespan being altered to the raptured &c."), Shattuck renders more meaningful the dramatist's ominous foreboding of the preceding month, that: "I know nothing of the Stage practically or the temperament of the audience—But I have always heard they are more prudish than the Censor." One newly discovered letter from Bulwer to Macready, dated December 20, 1837, partly confirms the tradition that *The Lady of Lyons* was completed within a fortnight; another, dated February 4, 1838, establishes that Bulwer himself (and not, as legend has it, stage manager George Bartley) conceived the final title adopted for this play.

Shattuck's critical annotation of letters coincident with the prolonged Bulwer-Macready collaboration on *Richelieu* and his cautious reflection on the actor's part in this enterprise deserve the highest commendation. Such a passage as the following (p. 95), for instance, is a model of creative scholarship:

> It is impossible to know what Macready's plan of revision was, but from detailed comparison of Bulwer's original sketch with the play as finally published—by subtracting one from the other—I conclude that it had to do with strengthening the story of the conspiracy against Richelieu and the King. Bulwer had originally set this going in the second act, and dropped it in the middle of the fourth, thus being "deficient in the important point of continuity of interest." It would be like Macready to think of starting the conspiracy in the very first scene, and sustaining its suspense to the denouement—just as in the last act of *La Vallière* he had insisted on the King's pursuit of Louise to the nunnery.

So is this one (p. 119):

> Macready had infinite difficulty in comprehending—or rather in accepting—the character of Richelieu as Bulwer wanted it shown. I doubt indeed that he ever played the role as the author intended it.

The student of literary and dramatic method will, as anticipated in the Introduction to *Bulwer and Macready*, "find much in the give-and-take of the principals to excite speculation." Thanks to Shattuck's editorial thoroughness and critical excellence, such a student may now pursue this kind of speculation with heightened enthusiasm.

PAT M. RYAN, JR.
University of Arizona

THE KABUKI THEATRE. By Earle Ernst. New York: Grove Press, 1959; pp. xxiii+296. With 58 half-tone illustrations. Paper $2.45.

JAPANESE THEATRE. By Faubion Bowers. New York: Hill and Wang, 1959; pp. xxi+294. Paper $2.25.

An endeavor to compare two occidental authors who have written upon a common, oriental subject is hazardous. Both men are well known among Japanese theatre scholars. Unfortunately, they are not valued with equal esteem. Each of the men has traveled extensively in Japan and each has a broad theatrical background. Both acknowledge their indebtedness to Dr. Kawatake Shigeyoshi, Head of the Drama Department of Waseda University in Tokyo.

In the preface, Mr. Ernst states that the purpose of his book is "to outline the form of Kabuki theatre, considering it throughout as an expression of Japanese life and culture" (p. vii). Although there is a wealth of detailed explanation about each minute datum, the reader is aware of a continuous progression toward the accomplishment of the stated thesis. This attention to detail makes the writing an invaluable source book for the student of Japanese theatre as well as justifying the selection of this book by Grove Press as Volume Three in its Evergreen Encyclopedia Series. Mr. Ernst has a lucid style of writing which possesses such a flowing quality that the reader is carried from chapter to chapter without breaks in interest. The final chapter, "Kabuki and the Western Room," is the transitional bridge which might help to span the breach between oriental and occidental thinking.

The point of view of Mr. Bowers is quite different. Early in his book he mentions that he is presenting "a report on the theatre in all its forms in Japan" (p. ix). If the reader accepts Dr. Kawatake's statement that Japanese theatre probably began about two thousand years before Christ (*Kabuki-Japanese Drama*, p. 93), then Mr. Bowers has assumed quite a task. Chapter one, entitled "Historical Introduction to Japanese Theatre" and dispatched in thirty-one pages, presents fragmentary information about Kagura, Gigaku, Bugaku, Dengaku, Sarugaku, Noh, Kyogen, and Bunraku. This pedestrian approach is of little interest to the scholar of oriental theatre. Mr. Bowers is at his best when he writes of the esthetics of Kabuki. When he mentions that Kabuki "is an intense abstraction from reality, yet at the same time, a deeply moving experience firmly rooted in universal humanity" (p. 199), he epitomizes what most Americans experience when they visit Kabuki-za in Tokyo.

However, his level of writing is not always this high. Such word usages as "pretty much" (p. 28, p. 73), "leaps and bounds" (p. 53), "consensus of scholarly opinion" (p. 43), "scotch that rumor" (p. 43), "around this time" (p. 43) may be annoying to the discriminating reader.

A pleasing foreword to the Bowers' book has been written by Mr. Joshua Logan. In the Appendix may be found three translations of Kabuki Plays (*The Monstrous Spider*, *Gappo and His Daughter Tsuji*, and *Sukeroku*). Experimental theatre groups in America will find these short plays stimulating to the actor and rewarding to the audience if well staged under competent direction.

J. Edwin Culbertson
Indiana University

DIRECTING THE PLAY: FROM SELECTION TO OPENING NIGHT. John Wray Young. New York: Harper, 1958; pp. xiv+171. $3.50.

Mr. Young has written this book with three objectives in mind. He has planned it ". . . to give directors . . . a blueprint of technique"; he believes it will interest ". . . Americans who want to know more about . . . noncommercial theatre in the United States"; and he has written it ". . . with deep regard for the discipline of theatre." The first objective is only partially accomplished, the second not at all, and the third in many places totally disregarded.

Divided into ten chapters, the book takes the director from his original preparation through casting, blocking, memorization, characterization, to dress rehearsals and opening night. This plan is admirable; however, very often Mr. Young becomes subjective and anecdotal. To this reviewer, the statement, "The educational theatre is working toward the day when no theatre degrees will be given to persons of questionable moral fibre," seems Victorian and entirely unrelated to the problems of casting. And, if Mr. Young is so generous as to allot two weeks for casting, why can he not be more generous than to allow three and a half weeks for rehearsals? His argument against pre-blocking suggests that a director, far from being the properly prepared leader of a rehearsal, should block the play as the spirit

moves him, working, like Kean, by "flashes of lightning." When Mr. Young maintains, furthermore, that the use of "the ancient rules about stage positions . . . may build a visual pattern as unreal as the Delsarte gestures," he seemingly passes over all the work done by painstaking directors from Saxe-Meiningen onward. He forgets that stage movement is an art which, if used effectively, can add substantially to the meaning of the play as produced.

On the other hand, Mr. Young's arguments for the use of "sides" as opposed to full books are valid. Of value, too, is his stimulating discussion of the reasons for the existence of the theatre in the midst of today's mass-media entertainment. However, the director who wishes to learn his craft will find little new or significant here.

RICHARD HARRIS
San Diego State College

THE ANATOMY OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 1840-1861. By Carl Bode. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959; pp. xxii+292. $6.00.

Carl Bode, a professor of English at the University of Maryland who recently served as cultural attaché to the American embassy in Great Britain, has previously established a reputation as a poet and literary editor. This book commands for him recognition as a social historian.

In an introductory chapter Bode promises "to suggest how the American character may have revealed itself through its [mass] cultural preferences" during the 1840's and 1850's. To enable the reader to follow the development of his thesis, he sets forth in the same place his conclusion that the "four principal complexes (or clusters) of qualities" manifest in American character of the period are: patriotism, aggressiveness, religion, and, "for want of a better word," love.

In successive chapters he examines drama, music, architecture, house furnishings, painting, sculpture, manuals of all kinds, religious works, novels, poetry, informal essays, travel books, and the periodical press. When he has finished, his earlier conclusions are admirably supported.

In the Parrington-Curti tradition, this volume affords no serious shocks to the sensibilities of admirers of those social historians. To infer that Bode's volume rivals those of his distinguished predecessors would be fallacious; Bode's venture is less ambitious. However, his lively anecdotal style, liberally supplemented with verbal and pictorial illustrations from a multitude of primary sources, conveys the rich flavor of an exciting period of American history.

Every specialist will conclude that the treatment in this book of his own primary interest is superficial. Drama people will certainly argue that a discussion of Harry Watkins, Anna Mowatt, and Edwin Forrest and their more popular vehicles leaves much unsaid about the stage from 1840 to 1861. Public address people especially will be disappointed to discover no chapter on speechmaking when they remember that this same Professor Bode's *The American Lyceum, Town Meeting of the Mind* was published but three years ago. To comprehend the American character of this period with its patriotic fervor, aggressive materialism, religious emphasis, and sentimental emotionalism without recognizing the contribution of the political and literary luminaries who filled the public and private platforms of the land is more than difficult.

With these reservations in mind, a reader can feel confident that Bode's volume will provide him a most useful survey of mass culture in America in the two decades that preceded the inescapable conflict. As background reading against which to study the speechmaking or theater of the period, this book is enthusiastically recommended.

ROBERT P. FRIEDMAN
University of Missouri

ERNESTINE ROSE AND THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. By Yuri Suhl. New York: Reynal, 1959; pp. x+310. $5.75.

Mr. Suhl's biography of the Polish-born Jewess, Ernestine Rose, fully demonstrates why she was called the queen of the platform. Perhaps because he, too, is a lecturer and was born in Poland, he has written sympathetically of Mrs. Rose's courageous battle for human rights. However, his obvious admiration for his subject detracts nothing from the interest of his story.

Any woman who dared to make a public speech in the nineteenth century faced a relatively hostile audience. The clergy quoted Corinthians I, 11:3, "Let your women be silent in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak." The orthodox press reminded readers that "when a hen crows like a cock, it is time to cut her head off." But Mrs. Rose went on speaking. She challenged

the most eloquent men of her day to debate upon the issues of women's rights, abolition, and free thought in religious matters. She was denounced as an infidel, jeered at because of her foreign accent, called a menace and a propagandist; but even her enemies could not deny her eloquence.

Appropriately enough, since her fame was built upon her power with the spoken word, Mr. Suhl has centered his account in her speeches. Excerpts from her addresses are quoted with comments upon her style, preparation, and delivery. Also included are brief sketches of such contemporaries as Sojourner Truth, Lucretia Mott, Susan B. Anthony, and Antoinette Brown.

The author states his theory of the function of public debate in describing the arguments that took place in the women's rights conventions. He says, "These disagreements over fundamental questions could not be resolved in one debate, or even in ten; but the debates were . . . vital to achieving ideological clarity. They helped crystallize views and opinions and define positions of individual leaders, thus underlining more clearly the areas of agreement."

The illustrations add to the interest of the book as do the abridged versions of what are purported to be original texts of four of Mrs. Rose's speeches. Dates, places, and reports of audience response are carefully chronicled, and the notes and bibliography indicate the author's thorough research; but many readers will regret his failure to footnote his account. Although the casual reader may be alienated by a footnote, the reader to whom this book makes its principal appeal would be pleased at their presence.

FRANCES MCCURDY
University of Missouri

"SUNSET" COX: IRREPRESSIBLE DEMOCRAT. By David Lindsey. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959; pp. xx+323. $5.00.

Samuel Sullivan Cox was admittedly a man who never quite reached the top rung on the ladder of success. A Democratic Congressman from Ohio and later from New York for an almost continuous period of 32 years, Cox was bitterly disappointed on several occasions when defeated in his candidacy for Speaker of the House. Indeed, in spite of an amazing record of elections to Congress year after year, Cox never quite received membership on the most powerful House committees or appointment to the most influential embassies. On the contrary, he had to be content with the Naval Affairs and Census Committees and with selection as ambassador to Turkey. Hampered, perhaps, by a proclivity for punning and for story telling—no one really trusts a funny man—and by a long-standing association with Tammany, Cox worked tirelessly for rapid and complete reconciliation between North and South after the Civil War. He was also a strong proponent of lower tariffs, a larger and more active Life-Saving Service, and higher wages for letter carriers.

Mr. Lindsey's biography of "Sunset" Cox, who derived his nickname from a somewhat florid description of a sunset he wrote as editor of the *Ohio Statesman*, is an extremely detailed account of Cox's political career. But it is made at the sacrifice of Cox as a human being. We learn almost nothing of his personal life and little of his character or personality until the ninth chapter. Here for a few short pages, as he takes up the role of diplomat and world traveller, he comes alive. Nor do we discover much about him as a speaker; indeed, on this point, Lindsey makes contradictory statements: one, a quotation from Thomas Reed that "Cox was not an orator," and the other, "he possessed talent as a speaker." There is little in Mr. Lindsey's biography that would be of interest to the speech teacher; its unimaginative style and lack of warmth make it uninspiring fare for any reader.

GORDON L. THOMAS
Michigan State University

ROAD OF PROPAGANDA: THE SEMANTICS OF BIASED COMMUNICATION. By Karin Dovring. Introduction by Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959; pp. 158. $4.75.

Dr. Dovring, a Swedish journalist and scholar who spent several years in the United States preparatory to writing this commentary on political persuasion, addresses a diverse audience. She speaks to academicians and professionals interested in analyzing mass communication, to politicians, journalists, and others seeking to influence public opinion, and to laymen who would like to understand the manipulator's methods.

The author notes that social scientists have neglected an inquiry into the theory of persuasion in favor of case studies. Persuaders are "still ahead of the new communication science

and its methods." "We are at the mercy of their influence unless we know the principles . . . skillful communicators have known and used since the very beginning as a professional secret, . . . and not only the temporary cases of their materialization." Exposition of these principles, chiefly as they concern the efforts of political groups in and out of power to win public support, is the major concern of the book.

What "professional secrets" are revealed? The persuader gains attention by utilizing symbols which are a familiar and important part of his audience's environment. Considerations of space and time prevent more than a partial representation of reality, thereby opening the door to biased communication. Since he can choose some elements of reality for emphasis while neglecting others, the communicator can slant the representation and consequently influence his audience's conception of it. Most members of the audience will give only attention to the message, but some possess wants and desires which can be related to the persuader's ideas so as to elicit their interest and, ultimately, active support. A propagandist, then, is one who "presents the facts in a way that tries to link his own and his public's interests in a certain direction, evoking from his public the particular responses or decisions he wants."

In what sense this information constitutes a revelation is something of a puzzle, but Dr. Dovring's explanation is sound enough, as is her advice to analysts and persuaders. Valid interpretation of the substance of a persuasive communication requires the analyst to consider its source and audience and the circumstances in which it occurred. The communicator "has to know not only the kind of characteristic values which are current in a community, but also how often and how much these values are used . . . if he wants to make the public attentive, reach its real current interest, and finally influence it." The author points out that because successful communication always reflects the relative importance of values in the community to which it is directed, content analysis is a useful tool for historical as well as contemporary investigation. She might well have quoted Gladstone: "What they send up to us as a mist, we pour back upon them as a flood."

To laymen, the author believes, analysis of the propagandist's activities will "give insight into our predispositions for making up our minds. . . . It will also give us the opportunity to choose, and not be guided." Whether this advice has any merit remains to be demonstrated.

HARRY P. KERR
Harvard University

PERSONALITY AND PERSUASIBILITY. By Irving L. Janis, Carl I. Hovlund, and others. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. xiv+333. $5.00.

This is the third volume of the Yale University studies in persuasion. It continues the program of reporting the psychological studies of communication by members of the Yale faculty in psychology and their associates. This volume shows increasing awareness of the complexity of communication behavior, and of the value of programming the study of its many variables if we are to achieve much insight into the whole. Although the major part of the work is devoted to the reports of experimental studies, there are chapters covering the philosophy of the program. Chapter I provides an over-view of the reported projects. A theoretical model is presented here which provides some synthesis of the many hypotheses tested in the research. Some experienced scholars of communication will question the adequacy of the map for the territory involved, although few would question the theoretical significance of many of the variables noted. The last two chapters summarize findings and extend the theoretical foundations of the program.

The authors are at their best in their fine experimental designs, their exact quantitative analysis of data, their well guarded generalizations, and their careful reporting. The central hypothesis concerns the possibility of a general factor in personality predisposing to greater or less persuasibility. The existence of such a factor is verified by a number of studies. Such specific personality variables as self-esteem, sex, external field dependence, outer-directedness, firmness of parental control, and persuasible friends are shown to be positively related to persuasibility. Even these differences, however, are not free from overlapping, and predictions for individuals cannot be made with a high degree of confidence. The contention of the authors that "those persons who are most strongly influenced by any one of the persuasive communications should show a tendency to be most strongly influenced by each of the others" carries us back to the futile disputes as to whether behavior characteristics are general or specific. Adequate consideration of sampling may show them to be both.

The student of speech may be disappointed that greater consideration has not been given to our vocabulary and the constructs of communication as we know it. This may be too much to expect of scholars in other fields who have a personal interest only in limited aspects of communication. They can afford to ignore us. We cannot afford to ignore them. A useful feature of design for studies of this type would be a unit of measurement which would make it possible to compare attitude changes in studies with different variables under consideration. Such comparison isn't possible here. Much of the persuasive stimulation was presented in writing. Findings might have been different for speech. Again audiences were primarily students, and the authors suggest that "generalizations beyond the classroom setting may not be justified." But there is more here worthy of commendation than criticism. Even our tender-minded who have not disciplined their thinking in an exact scientific manner should find this book a challenge. We need more research programs with the quality and scope of this one.

FRANKLIN H. KNOWER
The Ohio State University

FALLACY: THE COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT. By W. Ward Fearnside and William B. Holther. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959; pp. vi+218. Paper $1.95.

In their attempt to present a thorough exposition, the authors divide fallacies into three types: material fallacies, psychological fallacies, and logical fallacies. In each of these divisions their procedures are identical; they preface each fallacy with explanatory material, then present several examples, following each with a "comment" to reveal the illogical elements. The format is at once simple and inviting. However, the execution is inferior to the plan.

The organization of the work is its strongest point. While the tripartite classification of fallacies is admittedly arbitrary, it is workable. One wonders, however, about the wisdom of placing a discussion of the tests for authority under "psychological fallacies," while the tests for analogies are placed under "material fallacies." This may proceed from an inability to distinguish between "evidence" and "argument," an inability best summed up in the words of the authors (p. 84): "Genuine appeals to reason found in speeches or discussions are the bones of formal argument and the flesh of evidence." Some clarification is needed here for adequate, workable concepts.

The second most desirable feature of the book is its relative comprehensiveness. Most of the fallacies studied in argumentation are presented. The book may thus prove a good source for illustrations, the quality of which varies greatly.

The weaknesses of the book lie in the general area of style. Here the problems are multiple. The authors are discouragingly unaware of their use of undefined, loaded terms. For instance, neither "rhetoric" nor "persuasion" is defined, yet on page 1 is found, "The triumph of rhetoric is like the spread of a virus infection," and, "Few can hope to become immune to *all* the tricks of persuasion since, like viruses, there are too many of them." It is assumed that there is general agreement concerning the meanings of these terms, and that the terms mean something evil. Clarity is not aided by such practices.

Meaning is also obscured by the authors' tendency to parade their vocabularies. If the book is to be used by undergraduates, such words or phrases as "nexis," "otiose," "metaphysical commitment," "reification," "hypostatizing," "expertise," "obfuscate," "pejorative," and "anthropomorphic" appear unwarranted.

These problems are complicated to an even greater degree by lack of clarity in composition. The authors are prone to use long and awkward sentences. They too frequently, and without warning, introduce a digression of doubtful value. The net result is that they make relatively simple concepts difficult and involved. Thus, the explanatory materials prefacing the examples of each fallacy often need explaining themselves.

It is hard to tell for whom the book is intended. Because of its stylistic problems, a beginner will find it difficult; on the other hand, the subject matter will be quite familiar to an advanced student of argumentation. The final estimate must be that the subject of fallacies has been given reasonably thorough and far more understandable treatment by others.

LLOYD WATKINS
Ohio University

TEACHING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. By C. M. Fleming. New York: John Wiley, 1958; pp. xiii+291. $5.00.

Professor Fleming teaches at the University of London Institute of Education, but his text would seem to indicate that the study of the teaching process in England asks the same questions about teaching that are being asked

in the United States, and draws answers from the same literature. Fleming believes that if we are to understand the psychology of teaching ("the teacher in the act of tuition") we must ask such questions as:

> What sort of beings are they who engage in teaching and learning? . . .
> What are the processes involved in learning and teaching? . . .
> What changes occur as pupils grow towards maturity? . . .
> What are the mutual influences of members of teaching and learning groups?
> What are the technical skills which teachers must acquire?

From these and related questions, he derives the major divisions of his text: The teacher as a student of motivation; the teacher as a promoter of learning; the teacher as an observer of growth; the teacher as craftsman and technician; the teacher as experimenter; and the teacher as administrator and therapist.

Professor Fleming concerns himself with topics which will seem familiar to the American student of pedagogy—motivation, learning, growth, measurement, etc.—but this treatment of these topics is remarkable in many respects. Fleming is obviously a thorough student of the literature related to his topics. He writes with informed ease on theorists as diverse as Rousseau, James, Shand, Freud, Piaget, Lewin, and Rogers, and on matters as diverse as field theory, sociometric techniques, cybernetics, and the teaching of reading. In a series of terse yet fully intelligible chapters, he succeeds in synthesizing the contributions of an enormous number of theorists and experimenters in such a way as to give the reader a sense of the historical development of thought concerning the topic in question, the status of contemporary theory and research, and the significance of both theory and research for the teaching-learning situation. He achieves compression and clarity without leaving a sense of over-simplification, and he documents his text unobtrusively, yet so thoroughly that his chapter bibliographies, taken together, constitute an extensive and skillfully selected resource for any student of psychology or the teaching process.

Professor Fleming's chapters on motivation, learning theory, and growth seem to me altogether admirable. His chapters on the teacher as craftsman and technician, as experimenter, as administrator, and as therapist seem to me less satisfying. These latter topics have always proved difficult to treat except in relation to the demands imposed by the traditions and subject matter of particular academic disciplines, and although Fleming illustrates his concepts with a variety of descriptions of specific teaching practices, the difficulty remains.

Teaching: A Psychological Analysis can be recommended for all who seek to extend their understanding of the teaching process.

DONALD K. SMITH
University of Minnesota

THEORY AND TECHNIQUE OF INTERPRETATION. By Martin Cobin. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959; pp. xii+256. $4.50.

Martin Cobin, a teacher of interpretation at the University of Illinois, expects the interpreter "to select literature of value, to experience this literature by a total response to it, and to employ speech so as to excite a comparable response in those to whom he reads the literature." To help the interpreter achieve these ends, Cobin develops in his textbook a seven-step approach: initial response, literary analysis, literary synthesis, speech analysis, speech synthesis, stimulative reading, and cultivated response.

Organized in two parts—the first presenting general concepts, the second relating these concepts to specific exercises in interpretative reading—the book is admirably suited to the theory-practice method of instruction. Not the least of the book's virtues is the fact that most of the chapters are independently meaningful; units on theory can therefore be alternated with reading rounds as the instructor chooses.

Part I answers essentially two questions: (1) How can the reader analyze the thought, motion, and structure of literature to increase his understanding of it and to stimulate his response to its impact? (2) How can the reader use speech to stimulate a comparable response in an audience? Two chapters on structure—among the most valuable in the book—introduce a clear and sensible system of markings for the reader to use "when it does not suffice to think the thought and feel the emotion."

The author wisely clarifies the techniques discussed in Part I by sample analyses of the thought, emotion, or structure of selected works—such as Bacon's essay on "Revenge"—and includes appropriate assignments and practice materials for students to use in developing their skills in analysis. Throughout Cobin emphasizes technique as a means to an end rather than an end in itself and stresses the

individual interpreter's contribution "not merely as a technician but as a human being employing techniques to achieve goals which are measurable on a scale of human values."

Part II contains suggestions for specific applications of theory to exercises in reading a public address, an essay, a narrative, verse, a dialogue, a poetic essay, lyric poetry, and free verse. Under each exercise the author defines the literary type and discusses problems to be anticipated by the reader, possible solutions, practice materials, criteria for evaluation, and suitable selections for interpretation.

Teachers of interpretation who prefer a textbook that includes an anthology and/or extensive material and exercises in voice and diction should know that Cobin's text omits both. Those who emphasize theory and techniques of literary analysis and delivery should welcome the text as a distinct contribution to the field. A word should be said about the difficulty of the text. Cobin covers a lot of ground; his style is at times quite compact. A beginning one-semester class will probably cover only part of the text advantageously; it would seem better suited to a two-semester class or an advanced course.

ROBERT R. CROSBY
Ohio Wesleyan University

CREATIVE DISCUSSION. By Rupert L. Cortright and George L. Hinds. New York: Macmillan, 1959; pp. xii+303. $4.50.

Rupert L. Cortright and George L. Hinds argue eloquently that discussion processes must play a vital role in America's new society, complicated by its atomic energy, automation, and automatons. Discussion, they say, promotes "humanation" rather than automation: "To find the balance between authority and participation, between individual responsibility and group action, between power and creativeness is the challenge of our tomorrow. Discussion gives us a chance to find this balance."

Whether accepting this attractive thesis or not, most teachers will welcome three features of this new text:

First, the authors include oral controversy in the realm of discussion, not as a misuse or prostitution of the process, but rather as a matter of practical reality. Discussants sometimes argue; groups make decisions, by majority vote if necessary; and discussions survive and thrive even in a contentious atmosphere.

Second, the authors exploit their wide experience in labor and management conferences, collective bargaining sessions, and personnel training programs to supply a multitude of fresh illustrations of realistic discussion practices, thus relying less heavily than most textbook writers on classroom examples.

Third, the authors display a consistently eclectic taste in selecting from writings in industrial management, social psychology, general semantics, group dynamics, and educational psychology those illustrations and concepts which promise to improve discussion processes. "Instead of arguing about whether discussion is superior to lecture," the authors say, "educators ought to be using both processes creatively for the attainment of social and intellectual growth."

Discussion leaders and teachers do not have to agree with everything in this book to benefit from it. The authors are advocates of a flexible, dynamic utilization of discussion in a growing industrial society. Although the advocacy is occasionally intense, it is nevertheless a challenging and provocative advocacy.

CHARLEY A. LEISTNER
Oberlin College

REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN SPEECHES: 1958-1959. The Reference Shelf, Vol. 31, No. 3. Edited by A. Craig Baird. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1959; pp. 195. $2.50.

This twenty-second annual collection of speeches maintains the high quality of its predecessors. Textual authenticity, though not as certain as if electronic transcriptions were used, is good in view of Baird's usual practice of obtaining texts from the speaker or his representative. An appendix provides useful biographical data on the eighteen speakers included in the anthology.

Selections are categorized under "International Policies and Attitudes," "Industry and Labor," "National Politics," "Education," and "Religion." Although this framework is adequate, Baird avoids some of the hottest controversies and extremist speakers. Harry Ashmore is included—but with a speech primarily on education; no speeches are included on integration. There is nothing on governmental corruption or "right-to-work" proposals. True, Baird's selections represent some of the *best* speaking of 1958-59, but is it *representative?*

In view of the limited space available, such criticism is perhaps unkind; for this anthology is invaluable to students of speech and public affairs.

RONALD F. REID
Purdue University

SHOP TALK

RICHARD MURPHY, *Editor*

ON BEING FIRED

Being fired can be a bit of a shock. ST has sat on various local grievance committees, for some years served on a national academic freedom board, and has observed a number of hot campus skirmishes which resulted in what is technically known as "involuntary termination." To present his sterling qualification to write on the subject, ST will have to depart from his usual modesty, and reveal that he was once fired himself.

"A number of the instructors are not to be reappointed for the coming year," read the friendly little note: "you are among the number." It was Depression days, and there were mass dismissals both in factory and college. But ST, and his immediate colleagues and superiors, thought commitments had been given which made the action unfair in his case. He made a protest, which ordinarily would not have carried across campus. At this point the head of his division, who couldn't get any explanation, resigned in protest (See *New York Herald Tribune*, April 22, 1936, late city edition, p. 19; *The New York Times*, Sunday, May 10, 1936, Education, p. 10.) In brief, there was quite a row, which neither ST nor his late employer much enjoyed.

How many college teachers are fired a biennium, no one knows. In the sample of causes of termination for 1954-1956, given in *The Academic Marketplace*, dismissals are 17% of the total. Authors Caplow and McGee point out, however, that "an unknown number of dismissals are disguised by kindness as ordinary resignations." Seldom do persons dismissed demand or get an open trial, or even a specification of charges. In ST's case, his university claimed they hated to see him go—"I never heard any criticism of your work," wrote the president—but they couldn't afford to pay him what he was worth. "A reduction of the budget is never a happy affair," the president said; ". . . let me say again that the reduction of the budget is not a happy affair."

Some persons fired are too hurt to fight; others settle quietly for severance pay, say a year's salary; still others take on a "you can't fire me, I quit" attitude. The martyrs among the dismissed are those who are associated with an issue of academic freedom: E. A. Ross, John R. Commons, Scott Nearing, etc., etc. Since 1915, reports of Committee A, American Association of University Professors, in the *AAUP Bulletin*, are classics in reporting violations in freedom and tenure.

In addition to dismissals en masse, as in budget retreat, or for refusals to sign a disclaimer oath, there are quiet, Machiavellian plots for getting rid of a person. One way is to make the job so distasteful the teacher is forced to leave. ST had a friend who loved research. The head of his department repeatedly assigned him to extension teaching. One stormy, winter night, the frustrated researcher put the extension car in the barn at midnight, and took a job as

director of research for a manufacturer, at three times his academic salary. Another kind way to get rid of a person is to encourage him to take a "better" job elsewhere. A friend, who felt his services were not fully appreciated, received a fine offer from another institution, and thought his chance had come. Letter in hand, he confronted the head of his department. Instead of raising the bargainer's salary, and imploring him to remain, the head sadly declared he could not stand in the way of such a glorious opportunity.

In ST's observation, the more distinguished a person is when he is fired, the more difficult to work one's way back. A college chum, fired midway in his second semester as a graduate assistant in philosophy—for taking too great an interest in academic freedom and civil liberties—had no trouble exchanging teleology for journalism, and in a few years, had two Pulitzers. But another friend, a distinguished historian, fired for being accused of making light of religion, spent eight years working his way back to academe. The president of a university, with which ST presently has a rather close connection, was fired suddenly, at midnight, five years ago, and although a most distinguished man with an international reputation, he has but recently reclimbed the ladder to a comparable position. By the way, he never was told why he was fired, either. If one had some choice in the matter of being fired, it would seem best for him to have the experience in his younger days, when one's flexibility is best.

A great protection against dismissals, sudden or mysterious, is the system of tenure. After a number of years of service regardless of rank, or upon attaining a certain rank, the teacher serves for life, and can be removed only upon reaching age of retirement, or upon charge and hearing. There may be a shortcoming or two in tenure. One is that it may come a little late in life, and professors who deliberately sail with the wind to attain protection for professing, may have nothing to profess by the time tenure is achieved. Another possible defect is that some professors confuse tenure with sinecure. Urged to finish that article or that book, they summon their last reserve of strength, finish the job, fall exhausted over the tenure wire, and never draw a deep academic breath again. In ST's experience, however, most of those on tenure work all the harder because of their assurance of a permanent job and the fullest degree of academic freedom permitted by their institution.

All this is not to argue that anyone with an A.B. degree should have a life job in a college or university. Those incompetent in their jobs ought to be guided to more harmonious or less rigorous climate. If a teacher makes little or no effort to rise to his responsibilities, or is false to them, he ought to be fired, with due warning and due process, of course. But the competent teacher, and especially the audacious one, may be dismissed because of pressures from outside the university, or because of caprice of administration, or even colleagues. For protection he must rely on principles of freedom and tenure, honestly interpreted. Even in an age of specialization this is not something to be assigned exclusively to American Civil Liberties Union, American Federation of Teachers, or American Association of University Professors—valiant though their efforts be. It should be the constant concern of every teacher. Academic freedom and protective tenure make the teacher more than a roustabout; he can be a member of a profession with dignity and integrity.

SHOP TALK SPEECH CONVENTION CALENDAR

National

Speech Association of America: Statler, Washington, December 28-30; (1960, The Jefferson, St. Louis, December 28-30; 1961, New York; 1962, Cleveland; 1963 [August], Denver).

American Educational Theatre Association: with SAA in Washington; (1960, University of Denver, August 28-30; 1961, Waldorf-Astoria, New York, August 28-30; 1962, University of Minnesota, August 24-26; 1963, University of Oregon, August 26-28; 1964, University of Pittsburgh, August 27-29).

American Forensic Association: with SAA in Washington.

National Society for the Study of Communication: with SAA in Washington.

NUEA Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials: with SAA in Washington.

Regional

Central States: La Salle Hotel, Chicago, April 8-9.

Eastern States: Henry Hudson Hotel, New York, April 7-9.

Rocky Mountain: University of Denver, February 11-13.

Southern: Hotel Robert E. Lee, Winston-Salem, Nofth Carolina, April 3-8.

Related Organizations

American Association for Cleft Palate Rehabilitation: Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, May 12-14.

American Association of University Professors: Statler, Detroit, April 8-9.

Linguistic Society of America: Sheraton Towers Hotel, Chicago, December 28-29.

Modern Language Association: Palmer House, Chicago, December 27-29.

Please send your news and notes to the new editor of Shop Talk: Robert L. Scott, Department of Speech and Dramatic Arts, 414 Folwell Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14.

PLACEMENT SERVICE. For twenty years SAA has operated a placement bureau for members. Cost is $7.50 a year. Members get monthly and supplemental bulletins in which jobs are listed. Here are some samples:

C-17 A Pacific state college has a vacancy in theatre for instructor or assistant professor, 25-40, to teach stagecraft, directing and acting, to supervise student-directed one act play program and serve as Business Manager for major productions. Should have M.A. with additional graduate training preferred and general theatrical background and interest. Candidates with college teaching experience preferred. Salary from $4980-7008.

C-50 A Gulf state university needs speech therapist *immediately* to work with individual students. Must have M.A. Salary $4000-6500 depending on training and experience. Permanent position.

C-119 A Midwest university wants professor or associate professor to teach graduate and undergraduate sequence in discussion, with some work in public speaking. Should have Ph.D. and must be specialist with publications and recognition in discussion. Experience in direction of graduate work desired. $6000-9000 for 9 months, possibly higher.

Members not only get announcements of jobs, but helpful tips on making applications. Example:

An application photograph should be taken by a professional photographer. Avoid casual poses which might be interpreted as "arty" or peculiar, i.e. in costume, with pipe, or with chin in hand. You want an unpretentious likeness, something that suggests that you are a person of culture, refinement, intelligence, wisdom, and good sense.

The service is operated by the Executive Secretary of SAA, Owen Peterson.

Asked about the extent of the service, he has kindly supplied these details:

In 1958, 376 jobs were listed in the Bulletins. By October 1, of this year, 396 positions had been carried in the Bulletins. Most of these positions were listed by different institutions.

The Placement Service has approximately 1,000 active members at all times. In addition, the files of more than 3,000 inactive members are kept at the national office. Last year the Placement Service forwarded 4,524 letters of application and sets of credentials. The breakdown on this figure is 2,647 letters of application and 1,877 sets of credentials forwarded.

As usual, we will maintain a desk at the convention in Washington to assist em-

ployers in getting in touch with prospective employees.

SPEECH SALARIES. John W. Keltner, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, St. Louis, who surveyed college and university speech salaries for 1956-1957, has made a second survey, this time for 1958-1959. In his report, salaries are given by rank, type of institution, and region. Data were collected from questionnaires sent to department heads listed in the SAA *Directory* (about 600); 287 (35%) usable replies were received. A total of 1617 positions was reported. Here are two select bits from the report.

Median nine month salaries in speech, for all institutions and regions, were:

Professor	$8500
Associate Professor	6500
Assistant Professor	5800
Instructor	4700
All ranks	5900

Highest median salaries in all ranks are paid in the West. The East and South are below the national median; Central and West are above. Highest median salaries are paid by state universities, with state colleges second, and teachers colleges third. (Other types as classified are non-public universities and colleges, municipal universities, land grant colleges, and junior colleges.)

Included in Mr. Keltner's study is analysis of salaries for directors in speech areas. Median nine month salaries, for all institutions, were:

Director of Technical Theatre	$5300
Director of Debate	5900
Director of Radio and TV	6100
Director of Clinic	6300
Director of Theatre	6300
Department Head	7500

THE PROFESSOR TURNS. After years of grading papers, the professors have turned to grading their own salaries. The American Association of University Professors has announced a grading table for college and university salaries (*AAUP Bulletin*, June 1959). The professors discarded the idea of a curve, and instead, set up grading tables which are "realistic only in the sense of setting targets which can be obtained if no efforts are spared." The scale is so severe only one university, Harvard, got A on both minimum and average salaries, and the highest grade for colleges was a B, which was awarded to Swarthmore. The study notes that adjustments in salary scale are being made over the country, and other schools might make the dean's list if another survey were made today. (See tables below.)

Data were collected by local chapters, of which there are 560. Only 282 reports were received; about 55,000 faculty members are reported on. Of the chapters, 72 were able to get salary data from the administration, but permission to publish was withheld. Secrecy about professor's salaries reminds old ST of the old story about the bank president and the new teller. When payday came, the president gave the teller his pay envelope with the remark, "We bankers have the professional attitude, and, of course, don't discuss our salaries." To which the teller replied, "Don't worry, Boss, I won't tell anyone. I'm just as much ashamed of it as you are."

JOBS REPORT. This summer the Research Division of NEA issued an eighty-seven page statistical report on *Teacher Supply and Demand in Universities, Colleges, and Junior Colleges, 1957-58 and 1958-59*. To collect data for the

AAUP Scales of *Minimum* Salaries for 1958-1959
(Nine-month basis, specified benefits included)

	AA	A	B	C	D	E	F
Professor	$14,000	$12,000	$10,000	$8,750	$7,500	$6,250	$5,250
Associate Professor	10,000	8,750	7,750	6,750	6,000	5,250	4,000
Assistant Professor	7,750	6,750	6,000	5,250	4,750	4,250	3,750
Instructor	6,000	5,000	4,500	4,000	3,750	3,500	3,250

AAUP Scales of *Average* Salaries for 1958-1959
(Nine-month basis, specified benefits included)

	AA	A	B	C	D	E	F
Professor	$17,500	$14,300	$11,650	$10,000	$8,400	$6,850	$5,700
Associate Professor	11,750	10,100	8,750	7,500	6,600	5,700	4,850
Assistant Professor	8,750	7,500	6,600	5,700	5,100	4,550	4,000
Instructor	6,600	5,450	4,825	4,300	4,000	3,725	3,450

section on colleges and universities, inquiries were sent to the 1076 institutions listed in the U. S. Office of Education's *Directory;* 938 usable replies, 87.2% were received. Here are some bits of information culled from the voluminous report:

1. Last year, the number of new full-time teachers entering the profession was down, from 9,293 to 9,100.

2. The number of new college and university teachers having earned doctor's degrees was down, from 25.3% to 23.8%. The number having less than an M.A. degree was down—21.8% to 20.8%.

3. In 1956-1957 and 1957-1958, *193 persons received doctor's degrees in speech and dramatics. Of these, 58.5% were in college teaching and continued; 13% entered college teaching.*

4. Total number of unfilled positions last year was 1,276. From 1959-1970, the estimate for new teachers needed is 346,800; *speech and dramatics will need 9,350.*

5. On leave last year for one reason or another were 4,761 teachers, 3.8% of total college and university teaching staff; 2,782, 58%, were on leave for advanced study.

6. Of 365,748 bachelor's degrees awarded last year, 33.6% went to women; of the 65,614 master's degrees, 32.6% went to women; of the 8,942 doctor's degrees, only 10.8% went to women.

7. On the prospects of employing more women in college and university teaching, 23% of the institutions express doubt; 77% are interested. Of the interested, 28.5% "believe that larger numbers of qualified women should be welcomed in all fields," but cautiously except men's physical education.

PERMISSIONS. Putting together odds and ends of information, useful or useless, involves more than scissors and paste. Inquiries have to be made, usable materials have to be discovered, and then comes the question of permission to publish. Since *QJS* is a non-profit venture, permissions are ordinarily freely granted, although conditions of publishing complete or else, giving proper setting, or deleting something in letters, may be imposed. This column is so cluttered as it is, we almost never note any acknowledgment, but we never print somebody else's stuff without permission. To illustrate, here is what happened on the three stories above. Professor Keltner, upon request, sent us his study of salaries, with a kind note, "use what you want." On the AAUP story, Warren C. Middleton, Managing Editor, *AAUP Bulletin*, replied, "We are glad to grant you permission to quote. . . ." For the NEA story no request was necessary; SAA is what is called a "department" of NEA, and the bulletin says, "NEA departments and affiliated associations may reproduce excerpts from this Report in their official publications without authorization." For permission to run letters from James A. Winans, in our last issue, we wrote to his daughter, Marguerite Winans Boutilier, Clinton, New York, his heir. She granted permission, and added, "if there is anything we possess . . . that can ever be of help, will be glad to cooperate." In regard to printing unpublished letters, better consult your attorney. ST's legal counsel advises that the receiver of a letter has property rights to the paper and ink and the cancelled stamp, but that rights to publication repose in the writer, and his heir, and his heir, into perpetuity. If you want to play safe, don't publish something and get it copyrighted. Just write it to a friend, but be sure to assign publication rights in your will.

PAUL REXFORD BREES, 1894-1959

Paul Rexford Brees, Professor of Speech, Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio, died May 4 of a paralytic stroke.

Professor Brees was born June 29, 1894, in the Cherokee Strip of Oklahoma Territory, and he never lost the open, friendly attitude of the West. He studied with Professor C. C. Harbison, at Fairmont College, now the University of Wichita, and with Lew Sarett at the University of Illinois, where he received an A.B. degree in 1918. In 1927 he received an A.M. degree from the University of Michigan, where he studied with Thomas Trueblood. In 1948 he received a Ph.D. degree in speech from the University of Southern California.

He came to Wittenberg in 1922, and his coming marked the transition from the voluntary but haphazard speech activities of the literary societies to an organized department, a required course in public speaking in the freshman year, and a consistent participation in the program of speech activities throughout Ohio and neighboring states, and through the years.

Many of the original and continuing plans and advances of the Ohio Association of College Teachers of Speech came at his suggestion. He was co-author, with G. Vernon Kelley, of *Modern Speaking*, published in 1928, with the last revision in 1948.

He neither sought office nor declined re-

sponsibility. His personality was strong, his opinions definite, and the exigencies of the moment did not deter him from his convictions. His many friends mourn his departure.

G. VERNON KELLEY
Wittenberg University

GUY E. OLIVER, 1884-1959

Guy E. Oliver, Professor of Speech at North Central College, Naperville, Illinois, died August 23, 1959. He was born in Crescent City, Minnesota. He attended Hamline University, and received a B.A. degree in 1909. He did graduate work at Northwestern University, and studied professionally at Leland Powers School of the Spoken Word in Boston. For some years he appeared on the professional platform as reader.

In 1916 he went to Naperville and organized the department of speech at North Central. In 1952 he retired, but continued to reside in Naperville. He was one of the founders of the Illinois Speech Association, and one of the pioneers of speech education in the state.

At a memorial service on the campus, these words were spoken:

> He was a teacher of, and an actor in drama, not merely drama which is the re-enacting of some event, idea, or story, but the drama which is the living out of what one is . . . , the drama which is the outward presentation of what one is as a person, the ordering not only of words, but of movements, of contacts, and of graces, so that there is integrity between what one is and what one does.

GLENN E. REDDICK
North Central College

STSD DIRECTORY. Several times we have noted *Speech and Drama*, published in January and July by The Society of Teachers of Speech and Drama, 45 St. James's Place, London, S.W. 1. From Harold J. Ripper, editor of the journal, we have learned something of the origins and history of the society. He writes:

> *Speech and Drama* was adopted as the title for the successor to the *Bulletin* of the Incorporated Association of Teachers of Speech and Drama when that society amalgamated in 1951 with the Elocution and Drama Diploma Teachers Association. The first issue under this title was in July 1951. The *Bulletin* of the IATSD was started about 40 years ago when that society was founded by Elsie Fogerty, then principal of the Central School of Speech and Drama. I took over from its first editor, Miss Mabel Gulick, in 1948.

STSD issues a *Register of Members*. In it are two oddities from an American view. Members are identified by diploma abbreviations, as A.G.S.M., R.B.T.C. Dip., etc. A code explains one is Associate of the Guildhall School of Music and Drama, and the other, Diploma of the Rose Bruford Training College of Speech and Drama. The second novelty is the listing of one person from the United States: Cartier, Dr. Francis A., A.M., Ph.D. (Hon. Member). We appealed to the honorary member for information, and got a reply from Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he serves "primarily as a curriculum builder and text writer in the areas of communication and problem-solving skills." He writes:

> Almost none of the speech or drama teachers in Britain have college degrees. The academies and schools give only diplomas or "licences." Your directory will bear this out. The letters LRAM, for example, mean "Licentiate of the Royal Academy of Music."
>
> I am not at all sure why I was tendered an honorary membership, though I was and am very much flattered and proud of it. I suspect that my honorary membership came from the good offices of my friend, Mr. Ripper, a man of tremendous physical and intellectual energy. I was not eligible to join as a regular member though I had an M.A. in Speech. But I was not a "licentiate."

PARLIAMENTARY PROPS. Do you know how to make a motion? Can you protect your rights at meeting? If not, there are bushels of aids you can get. A national magazine issues a *Pocket Book of Parliamentary Procedures*. The YWCA has *A Primer of Parliamentary Procedure*. The International Association of Machinists has its *Officers Guide*, with cartoons. Practically every organization has its own manual.

Many of the aids to democratic procedure are on the novel side. A state university issues a game, something like a punchboard. There is a book which breaks in the middle, exposing graduated pages for answers with finger-tip control. A woman who specializes in teaching procedures to women's clubs, has an innocent looking note pad, which, when opened, shows all the answers at a glance. The United Automobile Workers has an 8½ by 11 inch card-

board sheet for handy reference; a blown-up wall edition, measuring about 4 by 5 feet is available for local meeting halls. Many student societies have their own guides. The ASSCW, State College of Washington, for example, has a twenty-four page manual, with pages graduated at the right margin, for ready reference.

Among the more ingenious devices applied to parliamentary procedure is the slide rule. The "Pan-L-View," issued in Evanston, Illinois, has a panel of answers which slides through a 6½ by 12 inch frame, containing the captions of "debatable," "second required," etc. A smaller version, called "The Legislator," and measuring only 3 by 6 inches, designed by a man in LaPorte, Indiana, supplies about the same information, in slightly compressed form.

Many of the devices for simplifying parliamentary procedure have been contrived by persons with other major interests, but who have become fascinated by the subject. The designer of "The Legislator" is a tool and die maker, who was so distressed by poor procedures in his union, he designed the slide rule aid. "The proper procedure in this work," he advises us, "is truth and order." A lawyer in Chicago devised *Television Methods Applied to Parliamentary Law*, a manual with various charts that appeal to the eye at both very and ultra high frequency. Charles O. Dhonau, President of the Cincinnati College of Embalming, has a short section on fundamentals of parliamentary procedure in his *Personalities in Funeral Management* (Cincinnati, Ohio, The Embalming Book Company, rev. ed., 1952).

In 1957, Seth A. Fessenden left Montana State University to become Director of Educational Research for Toastmasters International, in Santa Ana, California. His leave was for three months, but he stayed on until this fall, when he resigned to become professor of speech at a new school opened in Fullerton, California, Orange County State College. Thinking the program of the toastmasters would be of interest, we asked him to write a short report. This he did, and he says it was his last job on his last day.

TOASTMASTERS INTERNATIONAL

In October of this year, 80,000 Toastmasters in 3000 clubs located in every state of the Union and in thirty-one countries outside of the United States celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the first Toastmasters Club in Santa Ana. The spread of the movement was slow at the beginning, but at the present time new clubs are being formed at the rate of one a day.

It took fourteen years to charter the first 100 clubs, ten more years to reach 700, about twenty-seven years to reach the first thousand. In 1932, fifteen clubs extending along the west coast from San Diego to Seattle were incorporated as Toastmasters International, a nonprofit organization for the purpose of "enabling the members thereof to gain proficiency in public and after-dinner speaking, and to foster a better appreciation of public speaking."

The founder, Ralph C. Smedley, is still active but now specializes in the educational work. In explaining the bases of Toastmasters, he says: "Our work is based primarily on the principles of learning by doing and improving through practice and criticism. It is my conviction that the power to communicate is one of man's greatest endowments. I believe that all civilized life grows out of that ability and the uses that are made of it. I believe that the improvement of man's ability to communicate his ideas is a means of improving life in all its phases, and that the progress of civilization depends on this improvement."

A few studies have been made to determine the caliber of man in the Toastmasters club; the most recent and most ambitious was made about two years ago by the Home Office in Santa Ana in cooperation with Professors Wolgamuth and Gillis, then of the University of Maryland. It was found that more than half of the men were college graduates, that their average income was between six and ten thousand dollars, that they were principally in sales, engineering, or junior executive positions, and that they entered Tostmasters to improve their ability to speak even though over a fourth of them had previous academic training in speech. In every instance, primarily because emphasis is on *speaking* rather than "on learning about speech," the work in Toastmasters was considered more valuable to them than their classroom work in speech.

There are no professional teachers hired by Toastmasters clubs. Each man speaks impromptu during "table topics" each meeting, and presents a prepared talk of five to seven minutes every four or five weeks. These talks are evaluated and criticized by colleagues in accordance with recommendations from the Home Office and in accordance with their own

judgment as listeners. In general, the critics react frankly and without pulling punches. They seldom deal with content or the adequacy of the analysis of the topic; rather they are concerned with poise and delivery. It is generally assumed that the man speaking is mature and is talking on a subject which he understands. The critics are concerned with how well the speaker gets his ideas across to them. Occasionally, a guest evaluator is invited in—this may be a professional teacher of speech—but his comments are held in no higher esteem than those of the colleague.

In order to help the club in its work with the member, there is a second level of men who are experienced in the club work. This level is called the District, which is sub-divided into Areas. Each Area Governor is responsible for the success of men in five or six clubs, and he may have a staff of three or four other experienced men to help him in this service. Districts are larger; they have an average of about fifty clubs, and are more concerned with administrative affairs, although the health of the clubs is the first point of interest. There are five to seven men on the district officer level, not including the area officers. All of these men serve without pay. The only paid personnel in Toastmasters are those in the Home Office—about thirty people.

The policy affairs of Toastmasters are administered by a Board of Directors made of twenty past district governors, half of whom are elected at an International Convention held yearly. These men, as is the case throughout the organization, serve primarily for the purpose of helping the organization benefit the individual Toastmaster in the club. They receive partial expenses for official meetings but no other payment.

Group work, which culminates in importance with the board, is given considerable emphasis even in the club. Almost every man is a member of a working committee. Throughout Toastmasters International there are 15,000 committees working on various phases of the training programs and activities.

Most of the published material is printed and distributed by the Home Office in Santa Ana. At present the only major exception is the monthly *Toastmaster Magazine*, which is sent to every member and to many libraries. In this magazine are articles of general interest on all phases of communication, news of club activities, and technical articles on speaking. The five principal publications were written by the founder, R. C. Smedley: *Basic Training*, *Beyond Basic Training*, *The Amateur Chairman*, *Speech Evaluation*, and *The Voice of the Speaker*. In addition to these are bulletins and pamphlets suggesting types of programs for the clubs, methods of evaluation, work on parliamentary procedure, and other areas of general importance to effective club operation.

Toastmasters is successful partly because it meets the needs of so many men and partly because of its democratic nature. In practically no instance is a man or a club given a directive. In the basic philosophy every one is given the freedom of choice within the bounds of fairplay and mutual assistance. Each man is encouraged to set his own goals and to choose his own ways of handling problems. No one is the authority, but all respect the judgments of others.

SETH A. FESSENDEN
Orange County State College

QUANTITATIVE AND EXPERIMENTAL. This summer a student in statistics came to the office with a queer query. She had an assignment, she said, to run correlations on some original, raw data, and she had been told we had loads of the stuff. Could she have enough for a term paper? After rummaging through boxes of questionnaires and interviews, she hit upon the old matter (reported XLIV, 453-455) of how a savant with a Ph.D. degree should be addressed. At this point, the question of ethics came up. Since answers to the question of how the subjects preferred to be addressed were signed, would it be proper to make use of such confidential data, even if raw? The problem was resolved easily enough, since the names were no more than numbers to the statistician. She swore absolute secrecy, and while sworn, signed form Z63 attesting to the fact that she was not actively engaged in trying to overthrow the government of the United States by force or violence. Beamingly she left the office with a portfolio of statistics, somewhere between rare and raw, with a look of combinations and permutations in her eye.

At the end of summer session she returned, still beaming, and displayed a thirty page report, on which there was a red, circled "A". She left us a carbon copy, complete except for the "A". It was a masterpiece of independent research. She had traced the degrees of the 174 signers of a questionnaire on whether they preferred to be addressed as "Doctor," to discover

whether they had a Ph.D. degree. She then correlated degree held, or not held, with the indicated preferred form of address. For discovering degrees held, she had consulted directories of SAA, AETA, ASHA, SAES, and NSSC. She was somewhat surprised to discover that 28 persons, 16% of the total, who signed themselves as chairman of a speech department are not listed in any of the current directories.

Try as we would, we couldn't discover much use for the study, except for observing that the data were invalidly collected, were not worth collecting, and that nothing much could be concluded. We were about to file the work in the baalams box when our favorite consultant on things quantitative and experimental came in. We showed him the report. "Some very significant findings here," he observed, "if approached quantitatively." We asked him if he would care to select a section or two of the report, run the figures through his computing machines, and write up the results in the statistical mode. He said he would be delighted, and the next day returned with the article printed below. Always the scientist, humble, impersonal, objective, he refused to sign his name, or let it be revealed. "Just say this is an anonymous contribution to the new scholarship," he whispered, head bowed.

TO DOCTOR OR NOT TO DOCTOR—AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In order to determine whether possession of the Ph.D. degree is significantly related to preferred form of address, the data were cast in a 2 x 3 frequency table and subjected to a chi square analysis. Table 1 shows that there is a slight tendency for those holding the degree to prefer that Ph.D.'s be addressed as "Doctor."

TABLE 1

CHI SQUARE TEST OF INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN DEGREE HELD AND PREFERRED FORM OF ADDRESS FOR PH.D.*

Response	Has Ph.D.	No. Ph.D.	Total
Yes	31	9	40
No	40	21	61
Don't Care*	32	13	45
Total	103	43	146

Chi Square = 1.666
df = 2
$.30 < P < .50$

*Whereas the original study reported only on those preferring or not preferring to be addressed as "doctor," refinements in the instrument make it possible to filter out, by means of a special ST depth analysis, those who are indifferent. These are classified under "Don't care."

However, the obtained chi square of 1.666, with two degrees of freedom, could occur between thirty and fifty times in one hundred by chance alone; hence the null hypothesis must be retained. Possession of the Ph.D. degree is statistically independent of preferred form of address.

Next, the hypothesis of geographical area as a determining variable in preferred form of address was raised. Subjects were divided into Midwestern, Eastern, Western, and Southern geographical groups, and the data were cast in a 3 x 4 frequency table for chi square analysis. Among other effects noticeable in Table 2, it may be seen that there is a tendency for the Midwestern group to express no preference, for the Eastern and Southern groups to prefer that Ph.D.'s not be addressed as "Doctor," and for the Southern group to be considerably more opinionated, as evidenced by the extremely small frequency of "Don't Care" responses.

TABLE 2

CHI SQUARE TEST OF INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND PREFERRED FORM OF ADDRESS

Response	Midwest	East	West	South	Total
Yes	14	9	9	8	40
No	27	13	6	15	61
Don't Care	22	9	10	4	45
Total	63	31	25	27	146

Chi Square = 7.112
df = 6
$.30 < P < .50$

Again, however, the obtained chi square of 7.112, with six degrees of freedom, would be observed thirty to fifty times by chance alone, and the null hypothesis must be retained. These data provide no basis for the claim that geographical location is a significant factor in preferred form of address.

POSITIVE FINDINGS

It can certainly be said that a high degree of uncertainty exists in the inferences. Further study and analysis is indicated. A pilot study of preferred form of address in relation to whether the subject (1) owns his own academic regalia, or (2) rents it, or (3) borrows it, or (4) sneaks out of town when processionals are scheduled, should make a meaningful contribution.

GRANTS

Paul D. Brandes and Lloyd I. Watkins, Ohio University, have received a grant of $2,056 to support their study of French orations.

The Purdue Speech and Hearing Clinic has

received $3,000 from the Lafayette United Cerebral Palsy fund to use in equipping the new quarters for physical and occupational therapy. For the third year, Psi Iota Xi has made a grant for the annual summer institute in speech and hearing therapy for high school girls. This year's grant is for $1,904.

The University of Arkansas has a grant from NDEA to test speech improvement training for the lower grades by closed-circuit television.

The University of Denver has received a grant of $16,500 from the U. S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, to develop the program in speech pathology.

The speech clinic of the University of Pittsburgh has received $27,400 from the United Cerebral Palsy Association, to be used for research and for training teachers.

Leaves

Iowa State University: Harry Ausprich, for the year, to complete gradute studies.

Marietta College: J. L. Sloan, for the year, to complete graduate studies.

New York State College of Education, Geneseo: Stanley Rutherford, for the year to teach in the University of Maryland overseas program, at Munich, Germany.

Oregon State College: David H. Grover, for the year, to complete graduate studies.

Southwest Texas State College: Suzanne Pullon, for the year, to continue graduate studies.

St. Olaf College: Theodore Nelson, for the year, to travel in Europe. During his absence, Kenneth Wilkens is acting chairman.

University of Arkansas: George R. Kernodle, second semester, to do research in theatre history.

University of California, Berkeley: Don Geiger, spring and fall terms of 1960, on a Fulbright to teach at Tokyo University.

University of Oklahoma: Jack Douglas has returned to campus after leave for a year to study communication theory. He received a grant from the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology.

Wayne State University: Eugene H. Bahn, for the year, to be dean at Anatolia College, Thessaloniki, Greece.

Buildings

At Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, the new Dramtic Arts Building is now in use. It cost $800,000 and was financed by bonds issued against student fees. The main auditorium seats 400, and the stage area is designed to seat 175 for in-the-round productions.

At Illinois State Normal University, a new Centennial Building for art, music, and speech is now in use.

A new Speech-Music Center in construction at Kent State University will be the largest building on the campus.

A new wing, with seminar rooms, classrooms, radio and television studios, and a listening laboratory, has been added to the speech building at Louisiana State University.

Marquette's new speech and hearing habilitation center has been named for the late William R. Duffey, who founded the department of speech in 1922. Last year the center, the School of Speech reports, "provided service to 1,650 patients a week."

A new Fine Arts Building for speech, music, and art has been opened at Northern Illinois University.

St. Louis University has a new building for speech. A little theatre, quarters for the clinic, and radio studios have now been centralized.

A new Fine Arts Building is nearing completion at Stephen F. Austin State College, Nacogdoches, Texas, with facilities for the entire speech department.

The Department of Speech and Drama at the University of Connecticut has a new building in which the speech and hearing clinic has twenty rooms.

Heavilon Hall, a new building at Purdue University, has quarters for the department of English, the department of speech, and the reading laboratories. The speech and hearing clinic has sixty rooms on the lower floor.

Last year the Drama Building at the University of Texas was destroyed by fire. A University Theatre Center is now being built. The Laboratory Theatre, the first unit, is completed. A second unit, for classrooms, studios, offices, and an experimental theatre, will be started the first of the year. A third unit, a large theatre, is now at architectural stage. Our correspondent is enthusiastic:

> The Center is situated in the Main University campus on the banks of a creek lined with live oak, hemlock, and pecan trees which separate it from a through boulevard. Ample parking space is available. When completed it will be America's first University Theatre Center and will complement the University's extensive and world-famed collections of theatre history materials which have been recently acquired.

Curricula

Central Missouri State College will offer the M.A. degree in general speech beginning in September.

Colorado State University, Fort Collins, beginning this September, has an M.A. program in public address and in drama.

The College of Education, Idaho State College, has decreased its requirements in Education from thirty-seven credits to twenty-five, to permit more work in the major fields.

Effective this fall, the School of Speech at Kent State University became a unit in the new College of Fine and Professional Arts, with architecture, art, industrial arts, home economics, journalism, and music. The school was formerly in the College of Arts and Sciences.

Marshall College, Huntington, West Virginia, has expanded its work in speech, now has twelve full-time staff members, and offers work in public address, radio and television, theatre, interpretation, speech correction, and audiology.

Montclair State College, New Jersey, this fall started a graduate program in speech, with an M.A. degree in speech and hearing therapy, general speech, and dramatics.

The New York State University College of Education, Geneseo, has begun an M.S. program in speech and hearing.

The program in English language for foreign students at the University of Southern California is now being given in the Division of Communication, which includes speech.

CONFERENCES. The Fifteenth Annual Children's Theatre Conference (affiliated with AETA) was held at Michigan City, Indiana, August 26-29. Host was the Dunes Art Foundation. Meetings were held at various places in the resort area, such as Purdue University Center, Golden Sands Restaurant, Spaulding Hotel; shuttle buses were provided. The Workshop in Creative Dramatics and Children's Theatre, August 17-26, preceded the conference.

The National Society for the Study of Communication held its summer, family-type conference at Harand Lodge, Elkhart Lake, Wisconsin, August 28-30. Supervised play was provided at $1.00 per child. Wesley Wiksell, Louisiana State University, was chairman of the program. President Francis A. Cartier, Maxwell Air Force Base, reports that a number of non-academic people, such as training directors and management consultants, attended. At summer meetings most of the society's business, including election of officers, is conducted. The group will hold its regular annual convention in conjunction with SAA at Washington, D. C., this December. Seth A. Fessenden, Orange County State College, Fullerton, California, is executive secretary—in case you want to communicate with the society.

Theatre

Adelphi College: *A Streetcar Named Desire, The Enchanted, King John*—a presentation of the readers' theatre; *The Imaginary Invalid, The Boy Friend*, a musical.

Arizona State University: *The Playboy of the Western World, Little Eyold, The Truth About Blayds, Dr. Faustus*, an original play for the Arts Festival; *An Evening With G.B.S.* (one-acts and excerpts from the works of Shaw).

Bradley University: *Auntie Mame, Dial "M" for Murder, The Visit, Richard III.*

Catawba College: *The Diary of Anne Frank, The Iliad*—a theatrical interpretation, premiere of a new American play.

College of Mount St. Joseph-on-the-Ohio: *The Valiant Woman* by Sister Xavier Marie S.C., *The Coming of Christ, The Yellow Jacket*, a mediaeval Chinese play.

Colorado State University: *The Boy Friend, The Glass Menagerie, She Stoops to Conquer, Don Juan in Hell, The Happy Time.*

Concordia College: *The Corn is Green, The Inspector General, Winterset, Murder in the Cathedral.*

DePauw University: *The Happiest Millionaire, The Diary of Anne Frank, The Glass Menagerie, What Every Woman Knows.*

Eastern Michigan University: *Dark of the Moon, Summer and Smoke, The Taming of the Shrew.*

Georgetown University: *Captain Brassbound's Conversion*, a Christmas reading, three original plays, *Detective Story*, an original musical comedy.

Idaho State College: *Li'l Abner*, a Shakespearean tragedy, *Teahouse of the August Moon, Of Mice and Men, The Matchmaker;* children's theatre, two productions.

Johns Hopkins University: Racine's *Phaedra, The Braggart Warrior, Candida.*

Kent State University: *What Price Glory?, Desire Under the Elms, Street Scene, Summer and Smoke, All My Sons, The Cave Dwellers.*

Marietta College: *Nuts in May, Six Characters in Search of an Author, Noah, Love for Love.*

Milwaukee-Downer College: Paddy Chayevsky's *Middle of the Night;* an evening of comedy and music (a readers' theatre production).

New York State University College of Education at Geneseo: *Reap the Wind;* two road

shows: one, a children's theatre production booked in elementary schools throughout Western New York, the other, a bill of three one-acts for high schools throughout the area.

Northeastern University: *Teahouse of the August Moon, Tea and Sympathy, Fanny, The Mousetrap.*

Oregon State College: *Annie Get Your Gun.*

Queens College: *Under Milk Wood, Cyrano de Bergerac; A Gift of Fury,* an original play by Herbert Blau; *Camino Real.*

St. Louis University: *The Rainmaker, Speaking of Murder, The Glass Menagerie, Touch and Go.*

San Jose State College: *She Stoops to Conquer, Inherit the Wind, Greensleeve's Magic.*

Southwest Missouri State College: *The Diary of Anne Frank, The Playboy of the Western World,* a touring production of *Rumpelstiltskin.*

Stanford University: *The Moon Besieged; I Knock on the Door,* presented for the Western Speech Association meeting; *Under Milkwood, The Dybbuk, Richard II.*

State University of Iowa: *Scrap of Paper, The Frogs, Awake and Sing, The Caprices of Marianne, The White Devil,* and an original.

Stetson University: *A Different Drummer, Twelfth Night, Arsenic and Old Lace.*

Tulane University: *The Glass Menagerie, The Would-Be Gentleman, The House of Bernarda Alba, The Playboy of the Western World.*

University of Illinois: *Love for Love, Mary Stuart, The Hairy Ape, The Cocktail Party, You Never Can Tell.*

University of Kansas: *Member of the Wedding, Brigadoon, The Crucible, The Ballad of Baby Doe, The Alchemist.*

University of Michigan: *Horse Eats Hat, Don Pasquale, Epitaph for George Dillon, Das Rheingold, The Way of the World, Look Homeward Angel.*

University of Southern California: *Carousel.*

University of Texas: *The Lark;* Euripides' *Hecuba*—a new translation by William Arrowsmith; *The Matchmaker, Of Mice and Men,* a Shakespearean production.

University of Wisconsin: *Visit to a Small Planet, William Tell, Down in the Valley, The Devil and Daniel Webster, Measure for Measure, The Great Sebastians.*

Wayne State University: *Allegro, The Importance of Being Earnest, The Three Sisters, The Green Pastures, A Trip Abroad, Twelfth Night.*

Theatre Notes

The players at Catawba College, Salisbury, North Carolina, go to New York each spring for a week's view of theatre.

The dedication address for the Dramatic Arts Building at Eastern Michigan University was given by John Gassner.

For the fourth year, Lake Erie College, Painesville, Ohio, is giving its Family Play Series. Short plays are taken to off campus groups at a charge of one dollar for four productions. A discussion follows the play. The project is supported by grants from the Ohio Division of Mental Hygiene. Last year 175 groups subscribed to the series.

The Tulane theatre has a guest lecturer before each major production. For *The Glass Menagerie,* Tom F. Driver, Union Theological Seminary, spoke on "Tennessee Williams, the Man on a Thin Wire." Before the performance of Moliere's *The Would-be Gentleman,* Eugene H. Falk, University of Minnesota, will speak.

A group of student actors from the University of Mississippi, under the direction of Charles M. Getchell, is touring Greenland, Iceland, and Labrador, under USO direction. The director reports mail has been rather irregular.

Reading Hours

The readers group at Ohio State University is presenting reading hours to various audiences. The major selections for the year are: *The Love of Seven Dolls,* adapted from the book by Paul Gallico; Browning's *The Ring and the Book;* a cutting from Schiller's *Mary Stuart;* James Thurber's *The Thirteen Clocks.*

At the University of Arizona, in addition to the afternoon monthly reading hours, at which students from interpretation classes appear, the department is scheduling two evening Readers Theatre performances a semester: in October, *Under Milkwood,* by Dylan Thomas; in December, An Evening with Ernest Hemingway; in February, *Hedda Gabler,* by Henrik Ibsen; in March, *The Little Foxes,* by Lillian Hellman.

At the University of Florida, Readers Theatre is sponsored by Zeta Phi Eta.

Readers Workshop at the University of Washington is featuring a weekly radio series on passages from famous American orations.

Radio and Television

At Furman University, a television course in speech for elementary school students is being given over WFBC-TV. All sixth grade students in the Piedmont area, from about 130 elemen-

tary schools, view the program, called "How Do You Say It?" Sara Lowrey teaches the televised class. Supplementary TV classes are given for teachers, who may receive graduate or undergraduate credit in speech or education.

At Howard College, Birmingham, Alabama, the speech department is producing an eighteen-week series of variety shows for the college.

Kansas State University has a new closed circuit television hookup, with outlets in ten classrooms.

Members of the speech department at Queens College are producing two courses over WNYC-AM-FM in New York, "The Values We Live By," and "The United States in a World of Revolt."

Southern Illinois University, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, is presenting classes in speaking, for credit, over open circuit, KETC, Channel 9, St. Louis, for its centers at Alton and East St. Louis. There are two half-hour telecasts a week, and two one-hour practice sessions.

The University of Houston has its own TV station, KUHT, for experiments in educational television.

At the University of South Dakota, experiments comparing televised lectures in fundamentals of speech with classroom lectures are in the third year.

Appointments

Adelphi College: Harvey Halpern, Leroy Paves.

Arizona State University: Robert E. Davis, Robert E. Sandlin.

Bradley University: Robert M. Anderson, instructor.

Central Missouri State College: Michael F. Kelly, M. Scheffel Pierce, assistant professors.

Eastern Michigan University: Bill G. Hulsopple, assistant professor and associate theatre director.

Iowa State University (Ames): Norman Kaiser, instructor.

Long Island University: Malcolm Lieblich, adjunct professor; Bernard Besman, Sandra Freeman, Sydonia Presser, lecturers; Barbara Pasternack, speech therapist.

Marietta College: Ronald L. Loreman, technical director of theatre.

Memphis State University: R. J. Prendeville, assistant professor and technical director of theatre.

New York State University College of Education at Geneseo: John Paul, chairman; John Davis, associate professor; Harold Starbuck, associate professor and director of speech and hearing; Raymond Lezak, associate director of speech and hearing.

Oregon State College: Ralph W. Peterson, assistant professor and director of debate and extempore speaking; Frank S. Gonzalez, John M. Watkins.

South Dakota State College: Paul Seymour, assistant professor.

Southern Illinois University: Jack Parker, director of forensics; Marion Davis, Albert Dunavan, David Potter.

Southwest Missouri State College: Byrne Blackwood, technical director; Robert Gilmore.

St. Olaf College: John Ness, instructor.

Southwest Texas State College: Betty Heard, instructor.

Stephen F. Austin State College: Richard Browning, instructor; Merle Lentz, in charge of theatre.

Temple University: Edwina Upson, therapist.

University of Arizona: J. W. Patterson, assistant professor and director of forensics; Gail Jaffe, David Mall, Kathleen Shogren, Alden C. Smith, instructors.

University of Denver: John T. Auston, associate professor and director of forensics; Joseph L. Stewart, assistant professor in speech science and audiology.

University of Kansas: Ralph Shelton, assistant professor; Jerry Siegel, research associate; Kenneth Kiley, Wilmer Linkugel, James Neelley, William West, instructors.

University of Michigan: Duane Diedrich, Thomas Skinner, John Spalding, Clarence Stephenson, pre-doctoral instructors; Violet Gwendolyn Adams, Eva Sivertsen, lecturers.

University of Oklahoma: Tom Whitten Tillman, assistant professor and supervisor of audiology; Edward Marcus Brown, instructor and director of forensics; Mrs. Ruth Langston, instructor.

University of Texas: Mrs. Amanda Taylor, instructor.

University of Virginia: Robert Wayne Smith, assistant professor and director of debate.

Wayne State University: Clyde Vinson, Jack Warfield, assistant professors; Chloe Armstrong, visiting lecturer.

Promotions

Catawba College: Burnet M. Hobgood, Professor; Hoyt M. McCachren, assistant professor.

Iowa State University (Ames): Richard Wilkie, assistant professor.

St. Olaf College: Ralph Haugen, associate professor.

South Dakota State College: Donald E. Sikkink, associate professor and head of department.

Tulane University: Dan W. Mullin, associate professor.

University of Hawaii: Lucie Bentley, Orlan Lefforge, associate professors; Morton Gordon, Wesley Hervey, Valentine Larson, assistant professors.

University of Kansas City: J. Morton Walker, assistant director of theatre.

University of Oklahoma: Albert J. Croft, professor; Ansel H. Resler, associate professor.

With the Emeriti

A. Craig Baird, who retired from the State University of Iowa in 1952, but who continues to teach there part of each year, will again be at Southern Illinois University winter and spring terms.

Mrs. Perrill Munsch Brown retired in July from the University of Oklahoma, where she had taught since 1927, thirty-two years, and became Associate Professor of Speech, Emeritus. From 1914 to 1927 she taught in the high school at McAlester, Oklahoma. Her main interests are in speech education, especially in the elementary school. She has been busy since retirement in speaking to PTA and club groups, and is thinking of organizing some speech clubs for business and professional women. She retired at seventy years. She was one of the founders of the Oklahoma Speech Association, and has been awarded a life membership in that society. Address: 721 West Lindsay, Norman, Oklahoma.

Charles A. Fritz retired from New York University in 1956. The first year he spent quietly in New York. For two years, 1957-1959, he taught part-time at Smith College, and liked Northampton so well he decided to settle there. Before going to New York University, Professor Fritz taught at Otterbein College, 1915-1924, and at Iowa State College, 1924-1925. He retired at sixty-six and was seventy in October. His main interests are in rhetoric and interpretation. Address: 260 North Maple, Florence, Massachusetts.

John H. Frizzell retired from Pennsylvania State University in 1946. He was principal of Boys High School, Reading, Pennsylvania, before joining the staff at Penn State in 1923. The only teaching he has done since retirement was for three years at the Bellefonte State Prison—"a most satisfying experience," he reports. "John Henry," as he was known on campus, leads a busy life. He has written 2300 daily prayers for the local paper and is putting together a second book of prayers; he edits a weekly Rotary Club bulletin, and has done so for twelve years; he edits a quarterly bulletin for the University emeriti, and serves as ritualist for his fraternity. For seventeen years Professor Frizzell has been secretary of his college class, and for fifty-four years he has been a lay preacher in the Episcopal Church. While on the active faculty, he was head of the department and official chaplain of the University. His main interest as teacher was public speaking. He retired at sixty-five and is now seventy-eight. Last April he gave one of the past-presidents talks at the fiftieth anniversary meeting of SAES in New York. Address: 226 Highland Avenue, State College, Pennsylvania.

George McCarty, who retired from Indiana State Teachers College in 1956, and later taught at William and Mary, and Coe College, is this year at the University of Dubuque, as professor of speech and director of forensics.

Rollo A. Tallcott retired from Ithaca College in 1952. Before going to Ithaca permanently, he taught at Hiram College, 1909-1913, at Valparaiso University, 1913-1921, at Butler University, 1921-1925, at Ithaca College, 1925-1931, and at Pennsylvania State Teachers College, Slippery Rock, 1932-1936. During most of his retirement, Professor Tallcott has lectured, and given public readings of plays, and done a lot of oil painting just for the fun of it. This year he is teaching at Allen University, Columbia, South Carolina. He retired at sixty-eight and is now seventy-five. Permanent address: 209 South Albany, Ithaca, New York.

Personals

Lucy Barton, University of Texas, is writing the article on stage costume for the new edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica.*

A. R. Christensen, South Dakota State College, is now administrative assistant to the president.

Edwin Cooperstein, director of television and radio at Fairleigh Dickinson University, directed "Open End," the program which received three Emmy Awards—the most—in the New York Television area.

In recognition of Lionel Crocker's three decades of service as faculty adviser, Ohio Mu

Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity has presented to Denison University library a gift of $500 to be used to buy books in speech.

Albert J. Croft, University of Oklahoma, has a year's leave to serve as Director of the Center for Education in Public Responsibilities at the university.

Marion Downs, University of Denver, has been appointed audiologist in the College of Medicine, University of Colorado, in Denver.

Gordon F. Hostettler, Temple University, will receive a citation of merit from his alma mater, Kent State University, at its semi-centennial celebration.

James D. Lambert has resigned from the University of Arizona; he is now special assistant to the director of orientation and training at the Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Alethea Smith Mattingly is acting head of the department at the University of Arizona, in the absence of Klonda Lynn, who is taking her sabbatical leave in Europe.

Jack Murphy and Cj Stevens have resigned from the University of Kansas City to enter industry.

Roger E. Nebergall, under the rotating system used at the University of Oklahoma, is chairman of the department.

Charles Ritter, director of Stetson University theatre, has received first prize in the University of Washington original play awards for his one-act, *Money, Love, and Other Things.*

W. R. Underhill, Iowa State University, Ames, has been named Professor-in-Charge of Speech in the Department of English and Speech.

CONGRESSIONAL FIX. The furore over "fixed" radio and TV programs, quiz shows and such, was started by a Congressional investigation. Yet the Congress practices a kind of fix itself, thinks Senator Richard Neuberger, who says that whereas *Congressional Record* "purports to be a record of congressional proceedings and debates as they in fact take place" *(Congressional Record,* August 20, 1959, p. 15085), actually "the official transcript of debates in the Senate and House is frequently revised, amended, subtracted from, and even embellished with lengthy additions *(ibid.,* April 21, 1958, p. 6103). To correct this "rigging" Senators Neuberger and Allott introduced S. Res. 168, which requires that "the remarks of Senators in proceedings of the Senate shall be recorded in the *Congressional Record* as actually made," except for changes in grammar, syntax and errors in reporting. The bill got buried in committee.

ST asked his favorite Senator what he thought of the bill, and he said it is a good idea. But his legislative assistant, who makes the Senator's changes in the *Record,* expressed doubt that "a verbatim transcript would be in the public interest; things happen too fast and there has to be a great deal of shooting from the hip" (text unaltered). Maybe the matter should be referred to the SAA Committee on Professional Ethics, which for years has been trying to put together a code of fair practices.

NEW UNIVERSITY. This fall the University of South Florida, Tampa, plans to open with 1500 freshmen. The president is now searching for a faculty of 150, and the library is buying books from scratch. Floors for salaries are from $4500 to $8500. The president says the faculty will be composed of "relatively young persons." Teachers of English, speech, and drama are needed.

HAIL AND FAREWELL

HAIL. With this issue, ST^2 ends his term. ST^3 is identified in a plaque, *supra.* We commend him to you, and solicit your continued support.

The house of Shop Talk was founded two administrations ago by Loren Reid. We have tried to carry on in the tradition of the founder, bringing you news and notes and short reports on professional matters of general concern. Accordingly, we have reported on getting a job, on being fired and being retired, on salaries and conditions of work, on leaves, and grants, and buildings, and books, and alas, on deaths.

To our faithful contributors, many thanks; we couldn't keep shop without you. ST's thanks go also to the head and to the executive secretary of his department, who have extended many courtesies to ease dull care, and to the office staff, who have artfully managed to get out letters and copy despite the press of departmental affairs. Finally, a special salute to Editor Bryant, who although suspecting at times, from the amount of copy sent in, we were trying to take over the journal, has shown impeccable tolerance for matters covered, with a fine rigorism toward idiocrasies in punctuation and spelling.

FAREWELL!

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